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( i) 
This thesis is an investigation of the extent and importance of 
China's dependence upon imported silver in the years leading up to the 
fall of the Ming dynasty in 1644. The commercial expansion and fiscal 
reforms of the late Ming years had resulted in an increased demand for 
silver, yet very little of the metal was mined domestically and China 
relied on foreign sources to supply the increasing demand. It is this 
dependence upon foreign sources of supply, at a time when the demand 
(ii) 
for monetary media was continually increasing, which has led to the 
suggestion that the collapse of the Ming dynasty may have been a 
consequence, at least in part, of a decline in the volume of imported 
silver. The thesis gives a detailed consideration of this hypothesis. 
It also examines the suggestion that the changing pattern of money-use 
within the empire, the increasing use of silver, was associated with the 
rise of new social tensions, and that together these undermined the 
stability of the Ming administration. The evidence accumulated from 
the perusal of this monetary perspective will be balanced against what 
is known of the turmoil of these late Ming years so as to broaden an 
understanding of the crisis of state and society in the seventeenth 
century China. 
(iii) 
PREFACE 
On 25 April 1644 the last Ming emperor committed suicide, bringing 
to an end a dynasty which had ruled over the Chinese empire for 277 years. 
The Chongzhen emperor's reign (r. 1627-1644) had been a very turbulent 
one. Domestic rebellions had wrought havoc through most of northwest 
and central China, while to the northeast foreign Manchu forces had 
constantly threatened to invade. Most serious of all was the fact that 
the administrators of the realm were bitterly divided along factional 
lines. The Chongzhen emperor had had the misfortune to preside over a 
dynasty in decline and his suicide was perhaps indicative of an 
eventual resignation to the fact that he could do little to avert the 
Ming collapse. Within a few months of his death the Manchu forces had 
established themselves in Beijing and were gradually able to extend 
their control out over the Chinese empire. Their dynasty, the Qing, 
ruled China until the end of the imperial epoch in 1911. The political 
crisis of the seventeenth century was thus of great importance to China, 
as it saw the establishment of an administrative regime that would carry 
the Chinese people through pre-modern times and into the twentieth 
century. 
But this process of dynastic transition was not confined simply to 
the politically active administrative elite of society. Along with the 
rebellions which plagued northwest and central China there were a series 
of peasant and tenant uprisings in the southeast, and these combined 
with ecological disasters, famines and diseases to cause devastation 
throughout much of the empire. The Chinese population is estimated to 
1 
have fallen from around 160 million in 1600 to 123 million in the 1650s. 
1 
The most important work on China's population during the Ming and 
Qing periods remains that of Ho Ping-ti, Studies in the Population of 
China, 1368-1953 (Cambridge, Mass. 1959); but the data used here is from 
the more recent study of Paul K.C. Liu and Kuo-shu Hwang, "Population 
(iv) 
Recovery was slow in the second half of the seventeenth century and it 
was not until the 1720s that China's population again reached the 160 
million mark. Obviously, then, the turmoil associated with the Ming-Qing 
transition was of much longer duration that the few months immediately 
surrounding the Chongzhen emperor's death and its effects were widely 
felt throughout society. 
Some of the complexities of this process of dynastic change have 
been elucidated by the studies recently published in the book edited by 
J.D. Spence and John E. Wills Jnr.: From Ming to Ch'ing: Conquest, 
Region, and Continuity in Seventeenth Century China (New Haven, 1979) . 
While also concerned with the transition from Ming to Ch'ing, this thesis 
distinguishes itself by focusing upon the extent to which monetary 
factors were of importance in the process of dynastic change. A 
monetary perspective may well contribute to our knowledge of this period, 
especially as it enables an analysis of the Ming decline to extend 
beyond purely political concerns. As Fernand Braude! has noted: 
money everywhere contrives to insert itself into all economic 
and social relationships. This makes it an excellent indicator: 
by observing how fast it circulates or when it runs out, how 
complicated its channels are or how scarce the supply, a fairly 
accurate assessment can be made of all human activity, even the 
most humble.2 
The following discussion cannot do full justice to the explanatory 
potential implicit in Braudel's comments, yet the perusal of a monetary 
perspective may help broaden our understanding of China's seventeenth 
century crisis; to what extent should it be considered more of a 'general' 
rather than simply a political crisis, involving wider social and economic 
aspects? 
Change and Economic Development in Mainland China Since 1400", in Hou 
Chi-ming and Yu Tzong-shian (eds.), Modern Chinese Economic History (Taipei, 
1979), pp. 81-82 Table A.l. 
2 
Fernand Braude!, The Structuresof Everyday Life (London, 1981), p. 436. 
(v) 
The concept of a general crisis in seventeenth century Europe is 
by now a familiar if much disputed one. 3 Arguments arising from the 
vigorous discussion regarding the applicability of this concept and the 
trend towards a more integrated 'world-economy' approach in historiography 
have led to the suggestion that China also experienced a general crisis 
in the seventeenth century. And it is a monetary connection which has 
encouraged this transference of an analytical approach from Europe to 
East Asia. This was first hinted at by Braudel in his early work when 
he described how Mprecious metals once absorbed into Mediterrranean life 
4 
were fed into the stream that continually flowed eastward." Monetary 
metal, in particular silver, was found to be the rope linking east to 
west. A trans-Pacific component was added when the Chaunus extended 
their study of the carrera da Indias to include the famous Manila 
5 galleons. This consolidated the impression that the East Asian world 
was as dependent upon the silver of the Americas as was Europe. 
Arguing from this Seville-centred perspective, it was suggested 
that East Asia also suffered a restricted flow of silver from the Americas 
in the early seventeenth century. This suggestion was made with 
particular reference to China by S.A.M. Adshead when he proposed that 
the Ming 'silver rush' of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries, the dispatch of eunuch tax commissioners throughout the 
empire in search of new sources of the metal, was a direct consequence 
of a decline in imports of silver. This decline was seen to coincide with 
3For some recent syntheses of this controversy see Trevor Ashton 
(ed.), Crisis in Europe, 1560-1600 (London, 1965); Geoffrey Parker and 
Lesley M. Smith (eds.), The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century 
(London, 1978); a particularly stimulating article by Emmanuel Le Roy 
Ladurie, "The Crisis and the Historian," in his The Mind and Method of 
the Hostorian (Chicago, 1981), pp. 270-305; and, most recently, Emmanuel 
Le Roy Ladurie and Joseph Goy, Tithe and Agrarian History from the 
Fourteenth to the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1982). 
4 
Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in 
the Age of Philip II, (London, 1972), Vol. I, p. 464. 
5 . , 
Plerre Chaunu, Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Iberiques XVIe, 
XVIIe, XVIIIe siecles (Paris, 1960). 
(vi) 
the first major contraction of the Seville-system. ''Unknown to itself,'1 
6 
wrote Adshead, "China was responding to the rhythms of Mexico and Peru." 
Here we have Earl J. Hamilton's argument that the vicissitudes of 
international movements of bullion reflected directly upon the economic, 
social and political conditions in sixteenth and seventeenth century 
Europe finding a parallel in seventeenth century China. 7 It is 
acknowledged by Adshead that Japan was also a source of silver for China, 
but emphasis is given to the Spanish-American· mines and the Seville-
centred system. It will be a principal concern of this thesis to 
investigate the extent and nature of China's dependence upon foreign 
silver and to determine whether this dependence was as closely related 
to the social and political turmoil which led to the fall of the Ming 
dynasty as is implied by Adshead. 
A monetary perspective also leads to a consideration of the 
viewpoint espoused by Jacques Gernet, who is less concerned with 
China's dependence on foreign silver than he is with the domestic 
consequences of widespread silver use. In his general history of China, 
Gernet writes of the Ming decline: 
The generalization of the monetary economy with silver ingots 
seems to have wrecked the institutional framework erected by 
the founder of the Ming dynasty, insofar as it caused general 
mobility in society.8 
6
s.A.M. Adshead, "The Seventeenth Century General Crisis in China;• 
Asian Profile, 1,2(0ctober, 1973), p.276. More recent work on this has 
been done by Williams. Atwell in his two articles: "Notes on Silver, 
Foreign Trade, and the Late Ming Economy 1 " Ch' ing-shih Went' i, 3, 8 (.1977) 1 
pp.l-33; and "International Bullion Flows and the Chinese Economy,'' Past 
and Present, 9!? (May, 1982), pp. 68-90. ---
7 Earl J. Hamilton, American Treasure and the Price Revolution in 
Spain (Cambridge, Mass., 1947). Hamilton's work stimulated the Chinese 
scholar Quan Hansheng (Ch'u2m Han-sheng) to investigate the relationship 
of imported silver to prices in eighteenth century China; see "Mei-chou 
pai-yin yu shih-pa shih-chi Chung-kuo wu-chia ke-rning ti kuan-shi" 
(American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Eighteenth Century China), 
Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology, Academica Sinica, 
28 (.1957), pp. 517-550. But this article does not countenance the 
possible role which China's dependence upon foreign silver may have played 
in the Ming-Qing transition. 
8 
Jacques Gernet, A History of Chinese Civilization (Cambridge, 1982) 
(vii) 
In a sentence, Gernet links the threads of silver, state and society. 
He sees the increased silver usage as resulting in a shift in investment 
patterns, with capital moving away from land and into commercial and 
craft enterprises. This,he suggests, threatened the property-owning 
Ming elite. Rather than viewing the Ming collapse as a breakdown of 
political authority in the centre which allowed anarchy to intensify 
throughout the realm, Gernet feels that monetary changes underlay a 
growing social turmoil which eventually destroyed the stability of 
the empire. But is it possible to trace China's seventeenth century 
crisis to changing patterns of money use, or should explanatory 
emphasis be given to other more political factors? These are the 
questions which provide the central focus to this thesis. 
While consideration will be given to events throughout the seventeen-
th century, the focus of the thesis will be upon the onset of the mid-
century crisis, upon the events which led to the fall of the Ming dynasty 
in 1644. The first two chapters will look beyond China's walls, to the 
production and distribution of silver in the seventeenth century world; 
their aim will be to see whether China was in fact "responding to the 
rhythms of Mexico and Peru", to see whether a cut-off in the supply of 
silver did undermine the financial stability of the late Ming 
administration. The third chapter will bring the discussion into China 
itself, concentrating on how the influx of foreign silver affected late 
Ming society. Then, in the fourth chapter, the focus will shift to the 
state and its ability to obtain and utilize silver so as to offset the 
need for an ever increasing annual expenditure during the late Ming 
years. This chapter will balance monetary factors against the existing 
body of knowledge regarding the political events associated with the fall 
of the Ming dynasty. Finally, the epilogue will consider briefly the 
longer term consequences of China's dependence upon imported silver. 
(viii) 
For the romanization of Chinese names and terms I have used the 
pinyin method, as this, rather than the older Wades-Giles system, is the 
form of translireration increasingly in use throughout the world. In 
much of the source material, however, the Wades-Giles system is used, 
so I have retained this form where it has been used for the names of 
authors and titles of books and articles which are cited in the notes 
and bibliography. And when referring to Ming and Qing rulers I have 
used the names given to their reign periods rather than the less commonly 
known personal or temple names (for example, 'the Wanli emperor', and 
not 'Emperor Shenzong'). 
Finally, a brief note of thanks must be given to the people who 
have been most helpful to me with this thesis. To Frank Perlin I am 
grateful for his prompt and kind response to the enquiries of a student 
half the world away. And at the University of Canterbury three people 
have been most generous with their time. D~ S.A.M. Adshead, as my 
supervisor, provided much initial direction and encouragement, while 
Drs, Neville Bennett and Ian Catanach have been kind enough to read 
draft chapters and offer valuable advice. To all three I am grateful, 
as they have helped make my time at university a pleasure. 
(ix) 
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INTRODUCTION 
"The Chinese were very skilful in judging at Sight of the finest 
Silver, and are scarcely ever deceived." So wrote the Jesuit Father 
Du Halde, a visitor to China in the late seventeenth and early eight-
. 1 
eenth centur~es. Silver had been used both as a monetary medium and 
as a store of wealth in China at least since the beginning of the imperial 
epoch (221 B.C.), so it was perhaps not surprising that Father Du Halde 
should have remarked on the ability of the Chinese to assess quickly 
the value of a particular quantity of the metal. But silver had not 
always been as highly valued as it was in the seventeenth century. Prior 
to the fifteenth century silver use was restricted and at times the metal 
was considered to be worth much less than were other forms of monetary 
media. As well as silver, gold, grain, silk, hemp cloth, and paper notes 
2 
all had at times functioned as money. It was only during the Ming 
dynasty that silver emerged to be, along with copper cash, one of the 
two main currencies of the realm. Indeed, the evolution of a bimetallic 
currency system was one of the most important features of the Ming period. 
But this bimetallic system did not develop immediately under the Ming 
1. 
dynasty. On the contrary, on coming to power in 1368 the new administration 
found that it had inherited an economy suffering from an extreme paucity of 
monetary metal and it was forced to adopt a similar form of paper currency 
to that which had been in use during the preceding Song and Yuan periods 
(A.D. 960-1367). The Chinese were the first people to use a paper currency, 
the practice having begun in Sichuan province in the eleventh century, 
1 . Jean Bapt~ste Du Halde, ~T~h~e~G~e~n_e~r~a~l~~~~~-o~f __ C __ h_i_n_a (London, 1736} 1 
II, pp. 286-287. 
2 For a general discussion of the different types of money which were 
used in Imperial China see Yang Lien-sheng, Money and Credit in China: A 
§hart History (Cambridge, Mass., 1952). 
2. 
and, perhaps inevitably, they were also the first to suffer from the 
misguided notion that administrative difficulties could be overcome simply 
3 by printing more notes. Inflation was a problem that plagued the Ming 
dynasty from its outset and it was this problem which led directly to the 
acceptance of a bimetallic currency system. 
During the Yuan dynasty notes had been the principal monetary media 
of the , and, for the most part, the sale of gold and silver was 
prohibited in order that the administration could concentrate these precious 
metals in its treasury, thereby ensuring a sound basis to the currency. 
'Equitable Ratio Treasuries' were established throughout the empire so 
that people could exchange precious metal for paper notes. Hm1ever, much 
gold, and particularly silver, was traded westward through the Mongol 
territories of Inner Asia into Persia and the Middle East. 4 In the late 
thirteenth century the Mongol Ilkhanate in Persia even attempted to 
introduce a form of paper currency similar to that in use in China, the 
notes being called chao in imitation of the Yuan currency, but the market 
refused to h d h . hd f . 1 t' 5 t ese notes an t ey were w1t rawn rom c1rcu a 1on. 
This was a time when silver was again asserting its dominance in the Islamic 
Middle East, although it has recently been suggested that the 'silver crisis' 
in the region between A.D. 1000 and 1300 was not as severe as had been 
. . 6 1mag1ned. 
3Notes, in the form of bills of exchange at least, can be traced back 
to the 'flying money', or feiqian, of the eighth century, but it was not 
until the eleventh century that a true paper currency came into use. On 
the origins of paper money in China see D.S. Twitchett, Financial 
Administration under the T'ang (Cambridge, 1970), pp.73-74; and Yang, 
Money and Credit in China, pp. 51-61. 
4 For the flow of silver out of China to the west in the Yuan period see 
Robert P. Blake, "The Circulation of Silver in the Moslem East down to the 
Mongol Period," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 2 (1973) pp. 291-328. 
5Edward G. Browne, A Literary History of Persia (Cambridge, 1964) ,'II, 
pp. 37-39, gives a brief mention of the attempt to introduce Yuan style notes 
to Persia in 1294. 
6 Claude Cahen, "Monetary Circulation in Egypt at the time of the 
Crusades and the Reform of Al-Kamil," in A.L. Udovitch (ed.), The Islamic 
3. 
This flow of silver out of China to the west undermined the efforts of 
the Yuan administration to maintain a precious metal reserve for its 
currency, a problem which was compounded from 1276 onwards by an increase 
in the annual output of new notes. A "mild but continuous inflation" 
7 
resulted. Then, in the 1350s, the value of the currency plummeted, as 
the administration printed quantities of notes in a futile attempt to 
finance its campaigns against widespread rebellion. These notes rapidly 
became worthless. It was said that even in the capital money worth 
ten ingots (of silver J would not buy one tenth of a picul of grain. " 8 
People were forced to rely solely upon copper coins (cash) for their 
currency requirements. But copper coinage was in very limited supply, as 
the administration had prohibited its use in 1273 and reinstated it as 
legal tender only in 1350.9 Such, then, were the monetary conditions 
inherited by the Ming administration when it came to power in 1368: both 
copper coins and silver bullion were in short supply and paper currency was 
thoroughly discredited. 
The early Ming administration was well aware of the unpopularity of 
the late Yuan notes, yet it found that it had little choice but to revert 
to a paper standard (an attempt to establish a currency system based 
solely upon copper coins had to be abandoned due to the shortage of the 
metal) . In 1375 notes in six denominations were released and the use of 
gold and silver as monetary media was prohibited, although both of 
th . . 10 ese precious metals could be bought and sold as ordinary commodlt1es. 
Middle East: Studies in Economic and Social History (New Jersey, 1981~ 
particularly pp. 327-330, criticizes the view that there was a dearth of 
silver in the Middle East between A.D. 1000 and 1300; a view that had been 
proposed previously by A.M. Watson, "Back to Gold - And Silver", Economic 
History Review, 2nd series 20 (19~7), pp. 1-34. 
7 
Yang, Money and Credit in China, p. 64. 
8 Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past (Stanford, 1974) 1 p. 161. 
9 
Yang, Money and Credit in China, pp. 63-65, 
10 
Li Chien-nung 1 "Price Control and Paper Currency in Ming ," in E-tu 
Zen Sun and John de Francis (eds.), Chinese Social History (Washington D.C., 
19 56) , p. 28 3 . 
In its attempt to enforce the use of notes the administration restricted 
the output of coinage and then, in 1394, prohibited the use of cash 
11 
altogether. Millions of inconvertible notes poured from the Baochao tiq~ 
si, the government•s 'Precious note control bureau•, especially during the 
1390s, yet these found little popular appeal and the Ming administration 
was soon facing the same inflationary difficulties as experienced during 
the late Yuan years. By 1450 the value of the Ming notes had depreciated 
1,000 fold and it was said that they piled up in stores w:ithout attracting 
12 
the slightest attention of passers-by. The government was forced to 
give belated recognition to the fact that its paper currency was almost 
worthless and in 1450 abandoned the printing of any more notes. At the 
same time, the prohibitions on th.e use of copper and silver as currency 
were lifted. 13 The fifteenth century was therefore a period of monetary 
transition in China, with copper cash and then gradually silver bullion 
taking over as the currencies of the realm. 
4. 
This transition meant that the Ming currency system became a bimetallic 
one, yet it was not truly bimetallic; rather, it evolved into what has been 
called a duometallism, or parallel bimetallism- i.e., a bimetallic system 
14 
with floating exchange rates. The two currencies, copper and silver, 
functioned distinctively within the economy, with cash providing the basis 
to the system and being used in most retail transactions, while silver 
gradually dominated in the wholesale sector and later came to be used in 
the payment of higher salaries and taxes. And as the value of copper was 
much less than that of silver the two currencies could not be easily 
substituted for one another. 
11 b' I J.d. I p. 289. 
12Ray Huang, Taxation and Government Finance in Sixteenth Century 
Ming China (.Cambridge, 1974), p.73; and also his article, "Fiscal Administration 
During the Ming Dynasty," in c.o. Hucker (ed.}, Chinese Government in Ming 
~imes: Seven Studies (N.Y., 1969), p.l06. 
13Li, "Price Control," p.293; and Huang, Taxation, p. 76. Notes were 
again issued in 1643, but these found little acceptance amongst the populace 
and did nothing to help forstall the collapse of the dynasty, as had been 
5. 
The administration attempted to maintain a theoretical exchange rate 
between cash and silver of 1,000 qian per silver tae1, but in practice the 
actual exchange rate constantly fluctuated and differed from locality to 
locality, from marketing area to marketing area. The reasons for this were 
varied. Firstly, the government was never able to secure enough metal to 
allow it to produce a sufficient quantity of good quality coins and 
counterfeiting was therefore widespread. The actual exchange rate in any 
particular region thus depended on the nature of the coin circulating with-
in that area. Secondly, as the two currencies served different sectors of 
the economy, the product mix of a particular region tended to determine the 
balance of silver to copper found in that region. For instance, metropolitan 
areas would have naturally attracted more silver than did rural areas. The 
most pronounced of these regional differences, however, was that which 
developed between the north. and the south of the empire, copper retaining 
an importance in the north which it gradually lost in the southeast. By 
the nineteenth century an observer noted that "The southerners use silver 
even in the small transactions of several fen (1 fen= 0.01 tael}, while 
th.e northerners use copper cash even in the transactions of fifty or even (a] 
hundred tae l?. "15 But this degree of intrusion by silver into the lower 
level of transactions came only after a sustained period of silver imports 
and commercial growth during the eighteenth century. In the fifteenth and 
early sixteenth centuries, whether it be in the north or the southeast of 
the empire, silver played a more peripheral role in the economy. Its 
increased importance came in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries, when changes to the state's fiscal policies and an expanding 
commercial sector intensified the demand for a money which could satisfy 
hoped when it was decided to issue them. 
14 
For a discussion on the nature of the bimetallic system in use in 
~ate Imperial China see Chen Chau-nan "Flexible Bimetallic Exchange Rates 
~n China, 1650-1850," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, VII, 3 (August, 
19?5), pp. 359-367; and also Frank H.H. King, Money and Monetary Policy in 
Ch~na, 1845-1895 (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), pp. 39-40. 
15 
Chen, "Flexible Bimetallic Exchange Rates," p. 362, "'· 4 • 
6. 
a higher level of exchange than that easily served by copper. But the 
increased use of silver can be also be traced to problems with±ri the cash s.ector 
itself. 
Copper coinage had been in use in China since at least the fourth or 
third centuries B.C. and under differing administrations proved to be the 
most consistently used medium for the basic level of monetary transactions. 
There were times, such as during much of the Yuan dynasty, when the use of 
copper cash was prohibited, but these periods were the exception to the 
rule. Because of this central role which cash played, governments consist-
ently sought to maintain a strict control over the mining of copper and its 
minting into coinage. During the Han dynasty, in 175 B.C., the monopoly on 
the minting of coinage was lifted in an attempt to stop the counterfeiting 
of coins, but the practice continued so the emperor Wudi reimposed the 
16 
monopoly in ll2 B.C. Subsequent administrations retained this monopoly, 
although at times its lifting was reconsidered, as under the Tang dynasty 
. A D 734. 17 l.n • • During the Ming administration, the monopoly over the 
minting of copper coins remained a constant feature of government policy. 
Having abandoned a paper currency, however, the Ming administration 
found it once more had to confront the problem of securing sufficient copper 
metal to meet its currency requirements. This it was never able to do. 
Domestic resources of the metal were not fully exploited during the Ming 
Cit was not until the eighteenth century that the Yunnanese mines began to 
realise their true potential) , and it was late in the sixteenth century 
before any foreign sources proved fruitful to China. Writing in the early 
seventeenth. century, Song Yingxing noted the existance of copper producing 
16 Pan Ku, Food and Money in Ancient China (New Jersey, 19501, trans., 
Nancy Swann, pp.233 and 293. 
17 Penelope A. Herbet, "A debate in T'ang China on the state monopoly 
on casting coin," Ttoung Pao, 62, 4-5 (.19771, pp. 253-292. 
mines in Sichuan and Guizhou provinces, as well as at Wuzhang (Ruguang 
. ( . . . ) 18 province) and Guangx~n ~JJ.angxJ. prov1.nce .. Song also mentions that 
zhangzhou merchants were importing Japanese copper to Fujian by the 
seventeenth century. Prior to the development of the Japanese mines in 
the mid-sixteenth century, however, copper had flowed the other way, with 
chinese coins being exported to Japan. In the Jiajing reign period (.1522-
1567) , when the official exchange rate in China was 700 qia~ per silver 
tael, the current rate in Japan was 250 qian per tael, so it was extremely 
f 'tabl f ha t t 1 copper co1.'ns out of Ch~na.l9 pro J. e or mere n s o smugg e  And it 
was not only by smuggling that th.ese coins left China; in 1453 a single 
Japanese tributary mission carried off over fifty million Ming coins. 20 
This loss from circulation of coins overseas combined with the insufficient 
supplies of the metal to produce a serious \copper coin famine'. 
At first the Ming had issued high quality coins. The bronze coins 
contained 91 per cent copper and 9 per cent tin, while the brass coins 
. 1 . 21 contaJ.ned 90 per cent copper and 0 per cent ZJ.nc. But good quality 
coins were of little value if they could not be produced in sufficient 
quantity to meet th.e needs of a growing population and expanding economy. 
7. 
Inevitably, counterfeiters moved in to meet the demand which the administration 
itself could not supply, melting down the high quality government coinage 
and then circulating larger numbers of poorer quality cash. By th.e Jiajing 
reign period, when the administration began to step up the official output 
18
song Yingxing (Sung Ying-hsing), T 1 ien-kung K 'ai-wu; Chinese 
Technology in the Seventeenth Century (Pennsylvania, 19661, eds. and trans., 
E-tu Zen Sun and Shiou-chuan Sun, pp. 242-247. 
19Albert Chan, The Glory and Fall of the Ming Dynasty (Oklahoma, 1982) 
p. 280. The unit of account for silver, the tae], was tied to the unit of 
weight, the liang, 1 tael being approx. equivalent to 1 liang of silver, 
whereas the composition of copper in the coinage fluctuated and was particul-
arly variable when counterfeiting was rife, as it was for much of the second 
half of the Ming dynasty. The official exchange rate in China was therefore 
often very different to the actual rate in various localities within the 
empire, but the distinction between China and Japan prior to the middle of 
the sixteenth century would still have been great enough to make it very 
profitable to ship coins to Japan. 
of coins, the market had already been flooded with low quality counterfeit 
ones. Although the official copper/silver exchange rate at this time was 
considered as 700 qian per tael, it is said that in some markets the actual 
22 
exchange rate was more like 6,000 qia~ per tael. Counterfeiting had 
become so widespread that the administration could do little to prevent it 
and with private minters competing with the government for copper it became 
impossible for the administration both to increase its output and maintain 
high quality coins. By the end of the Jiajing reign the official standard 
of coinage had dropped, with a diverse mix of coins being produced, some of 
very poor quality. 
This deterioration of the Ming coinage intensified during the 1590s 
when the Wanli emperor (r.l572-l620l, in response to the need for increased 
military expenditure, approved an order to greatly increase the output of 
new coins. Then in the Tianqi and Chongzhen reigns (1620-1644) new mints 
were opened and more coinage produced, again in an attempt to meet the need 
for increased expenditure. But by this time many of the coins contained 
only twenty to thirty per cent copper. The Ming Shi describes how, in the 
Chongzhen reign, "a hundred coins piled up hardly measured an inch in 
' h . . .. 23 thlckness and when they were thrown on the floor t ey broke lnto pleces. 
By 1638 the purchasing power of copper cash was said to be only one fourth 
what it had been in the Wanli reign and many of the government mints had 
to be closed as they could not compete with counterfeiters in obtaining 
1 . 24 supp les of copper. Thus, the increased demand for silver, which was 
20 Huang, Taxation, p.76, 
21 Yang, Money and Credit in China, p.37. 
22 Huang, Taxation, p.77. 
23
cited and translated by Chan, The Glory and Fall, p.285, 
24 Ibid. 
8. 
9. 
such a prominent feature of the late Ming economy, can be explained, in 
part at least, by this depreciation of copper cash, something which became 
a serious problem from the mid-sixteenth century onwards. 
In contrast to the depreciating copper cash,silver was a much more 
stable form of currency, a currency less susceptible to inflationary pressure. 
This was because silver circulated as bullion and its value was determined 
by weight and fineness- the silver unit of account, the tael, being 
considered equivalent to the unit of weight, the liang. Silversmiths did 
mould the metal into ingot~or 'shoes of sycee~ to make its use as currency 
easier, but the metal was still generally weighed and checked for fineness 
at the time of transaction. The Portuguese Father Gabriel de Magaillans, 
a visitor to China in th.e seventeenth century, wrote of how the ingots were 
"cut with steel scizors, which the people carry about them for that purpose, 
and divide them into pieces, bigger or lesser, according to the value of 
the pu:r:chas'd Commodity." 25 As well as scissors, merchants carried with 
them small sets of scales, upon which they could determine the amount of 
silver needed to satisfy each particular exchange. When Father Du Halde 
arrived in China later in the century he was to note that the Chinese 
own it would be more convenient to have Mony coined, and of 
a determinate value, but they are afraid it would be a Temptation 
to Clippers and Coiners, whereas now there is no Danger¥ because 
they cut the silver as they have occasion to pay for what they buy . 
. . • • It is easy to judge that there would be Debasers of Mony in 
China, if the Silver was coined as well as Copper, since their small 
Pieces of Copper are so often counterfeited •..... 26 
Just as the depreciation of paper notes had encouraged people to use the more 
stable copper coins, so too did the depreciation of cash in the late Ming 
years encourage the more widespread use of silver. 
25Gabrie1 de Magaillans, A New History of China (;London l688) , p.l37. 
26 Du Halde, The General History of China, II, pp. 287 and 289, 
The importance of a stable currency such as silver bullion was 
reinforced by the fact that credit facilities were not well developed in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth. centuries. Moneylending and pawnbroking were 
widespread- official records reveal there were 7,685 registered pawnshops 
in 1685 - with rates of interest around 3 to 5 per cent per month, but it 
seems that more sophisticated forms of deposit and remittance banking did 
27 
not develop until the nineteenth century. It is possible,however, that 
the interregional remittance of funds was not entirely unknown at the turn 
of the seventeenth century. For instance, we know that when Matteo Ricci 
was generously offered a house in Nanjing by Liu Guannan, Father Cattaneo 
arranged for some form of bill of exchange to be sent from Macao to enable 
Ricci to fulfil his promise to complete the payment on the house within a 
28 year. This bill of exchange was possibly a yinpia~, or silver note, 
issued by one of the merchants in Macao who was involved in the moulding 
and assaying of silver and who had contacts in Nanjing. Yet when Ricci 
went to draw the money he required, he found it impossible to locate the 
merchant cited as assigne on the bill (back in Macao the Jesuit Fathers had 
no difficulty in recovering their investment) • As foreigners the Jesuits 
may have found greater obstacles to conducting such transactions than did 
native Chinese, yet this incident does suggest that interregional credit 
remittance was not very common at this time. Travellers and traders thus 
had to carry their funds with them and silver would have been preferred 
over copper cash. for this. Circulating as bullion, silver did not suffer 
10. 
27Yang, Money and Credit in China, pp. 73 and 98, discusses moneylending 
and pawnbroking. For the development of banking in the nineteenth century · 
see Susan Mann Jones, "Finance in Ningpo: The 'Ch'ien Chuang•, 1750-1880," 
in W.E. Willmott (ed.), Economic Organization in Chinese Society lStanford, 
1972}, pp. 47-77; and for an account of the development of credit and finance 
in one city during the late Qing period see William T. Rowe, Hankow (Stanford, 
1984}, pp. 158-176. rt has been suggested recently that credit played a more 
significant role earlier in th.e Qing dynasty than what had previously been 
supposed, but this view seems largely speculative and has been contested; 
see Wang Yeh-chien, "Evolution of the Chinese Monetary System, 1644-1850", 
in Hou Chi-ming and Yu Tzong-shian (eds.l, Modern Chinese Economic History 
(~aipei, 1979}, pp.425-452; and the response to this paper by Frank H. H. 
King, pp. 455-456. 
28Nichola Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, the Journals of 
11. 
from the regional differences. in quality and value which copper coinage did, 
and, as a precious metal, silver was simply less burdensome to transport than 
were large numbers of copper coins. 
Changes in the state's fiscal policy were also instrumental in creating 
an increasing demand for silver in the late Ming years. The core to the tax 
structure instituted during the founding years of the dynasty had been a 
land tax imposed on all landholders and payable in grain. But this tax 
had fallen heaviest on the productive southeast of the empire and in time 
this was to lead to much evasion and increasing inequities within the fiscal 
structure. 
In 1393, for instance, the prefectures of Suzhou and Songjiang had 
contributed 13.68 per cent of the total tax paid, yet they encompassed only 
1 76 f . d 29 . per cent o the cultlvated lan . Further exactions were imposed on 
landholders in the southeast when, in 1421, the Ming capital was shifted 
from Nanjing to Beijing and surcharges were added to the basic tax quota 
so as to pay the costs involved in transporting grain to the new administrative 
centre of the empire. These surcharges were often as much as two or three 
times the amount of the original land tax, even though landholders were 
30 
responsible for much of the transportation themselves. Inevitablcy1 
those who could afford to bribe local officials and those with influence 
inside the yamen office began to explore all avenues possible to avoid 
meeting their tax and cor~vee obligations. The means employed to this end 
31 
were varied, but the consequences were the same. The official Gu 
Dingzhen described in a memorial submitted in 1527 how 
Mathew Ricci 1583-1610 (.Cambridge, Mass., 1959)., pp. 343-360; and also 
George H. Dunne, Generation of Giants (London 1962), p.64. 
29Mi Chu Wiens, "Changes in the Fiscal and Rural Control Scys:tems in 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries," Ming Studies, 3 (Fall, 1976)., p.56. 
3
°For a discussion of these various surcharges see Mark Elvin's 
abridged translation of Hoshi Ayao, The Ming Grain Tribute System (Ann Arbor, 
1969}, pp. 54-61; and also Mi Chu Wiens, "Socioeconomic Change During the 
Ming Dynasty in the Kiangnan Area" (unpublished PhD. dissertation, Harvard 
University, 1973), p.46. 
The amount of tax loss can be counted by thousands and tens of 
·.thousands each year. The law~abiding households in counties and 
prefectures made up the losses year after year, and eventually 
fell into distress. 32 
Although such inequities were most pronounced in the southeastern region 
of the empire, they were sufficiently widespread by the early sixteent~ 
century for there to have been a considerable impetus amongst officials 
to implement some form of restructuring to the state's fiscal machinery. 
This restructuring culminated in a body of policy which came to be known 
as the Single Whip Reform, or yitiao bianf~, a reform which was the most 
significant innovation in fiscal policy during the entire Ming and Qing 
periods. 
In essence the Single Whip Reform saw a shift in the unit of 
assessment from the household to the landholding and th.e integration of 
the land tax and corvle obligation into a single commuted exaction to be 
paid in silver. Payments in silver had been introduced as part of the 
Ming fiscal structure as early as 1436, when it was stipulated that one 
of the surcharges imposed on landholders in the southeastern provinces, 
the 'gold-patterned-silver', was, as the name suggests, to be paid in 
. 33 
money not gra1n. Then, in the late fifteenth century, merchants 
12. 
operating under the auspices of the government's salt monopoly were granted 
permission to make payments for their salt receipts in silver. Previously 
these merchants had carried grain and goods to the frontier military posts 
and in return were issued the receipts which entitled them to trade in a 
quantity of salt proportionate to the volume of goods they had delivered 
to the frontier. But once the salt merchants could purchase their receipts 
31 On tax evasion see Wiens, "Socioeconomic Change," pp.57-58; 
Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past, p. 236; and Jerry Dennerline, 
"Fiscal Reform and Local Gentry; The Gentry-Bureaucratic Alliance 
Survives the Conquest," in Frederic Wakeman Jnr. and Carolyn Grant(ed:5".), 
£onflict and Control in Late Imperial China (Berkeley, 1975}, pp. 86-120. 
32
wiens, "Changes in the Fiscal," p. 64. Lie£ Littrup's recently 
Published study on Jinan prefecture in Shandong province has shown that 
such inequities were not confined to the Jiangnan region of the south-
13. 
with money it was inevitable that the demand for silver would increase; 
it is said that by the 1560s the merchants were trading around 2. 8 million 
taels of silver annually, about four times as much as at the beginning of 
34 
the century. 
Modifications to th.e land tax itself began early in the sixteenth 
century, but it was not until 1567 that the magistrate of Yuyao district 
in Zhejiang province, Deng Caiqiao, incorporated for the first time the 
corv~e obligations imposed on all landholding households into the land 
tax assessment itself, so that each mu of cultivated land had a single 
exaction required of it and this was, for the most part, to be paid in 
'1 35 Sl ver. Under the direction of the then regional inspector for 
Zhejiang province, Pang Shangpeng, and of the senior grand secretary 
Zhang Juzheng, the reform spread to other districts and other provinces. 
While it was not until the reign of the Yongzheng emperor ( 1723-17351 
that the process of integration was completed, with the introduction of 
the land-poll-silver (didang yin), most provinces had implemented the 
reforms to some degree by the end of the Wanli reign in 1620. Ray Huang 
estimates that by the end of the sixteenth century between 65 and 100 
per cent of the land tax and labour services ~n the rich heartland of 
the southeast, the Jiangnan region, had been incorporated, with approx-
imately 60 per cent integration in the southeast outside of Jiangnan, 
d . . . h h' 36 an between 40 and 50 per cent 1ntegrat1on 1n nort C lna. 
The impetus for the Single Whip Reform was a general desire to make 
the Ming fiscal system more efficient and more equitable, and, to some 
east; see Subbureaucratic Government in China in Ming Times: A Study 
of Shandong Province in the Sixteenth Century (Oslo, 1981)., pp. 66-98. 
33Huang, Taxation, p. 72; and Wiens, "Socioeconomic Change," p. 73. 
34
wang Ch'ung-wu, "The Ming System of Merchant Colonization," in 
E-tu Zen sun and John de Francis Ceds.), Chinese Social History (.Washington 
D.C., 1956)_, pp. 299-308; and Huang, Taxation, pp. 189-214. 
14. 
extent, this. was achieved. But the_ greatest consequence of the reform 
was the tremendous stimulus given to the circulation of silver within 
the late Ming economy. Taxes continued to be assessed on the basis of 
productivity, but the taxpayer now had to sell that produce in order to 
meet the exactions of the state. Thus, by the turn of the seventeenth 
centur~ silver had become an integral part of both the monetary and 
fiscal machinery in Ming China. The consequent demand for the metal 
was intense and it was this demand which meant that China became 
increasingly dependent on the wider world economy. Silver drew China 
out beyond its walls and it is with China 1 s links to that wider economic 
network that the early chapters of this thesis will be concerned. 
35For the precursors to the Single Whip see Liang Fang-chung, 
"The 'Ten-Parts' Tax System of Ming," in E-tu Zen Sun and John de Francis 
(eds.), Chinese Social History (Washington D.C., 1956), pp. 27l-280. 
And for the Single Whip itself, Liang Fang-chung, The Single Whip Method 
of Taxation in China (Cambridge, Mass., 1956).; Huang, Taxation pp. 112-133; 
Littrup, Subbureaucratic Government, pp. 78-98; and the entries in the 
DMB for Hai Rui, I, pp. 474-479; Pang Shangpeng, II, pp. 1113-1116; and 
Zhang Juzheng, I, pp. 53-61. 
36Huang, Taxation, pp. 125-130. 
CHAPTER ONE 
Silver 
Como os chinos sentirao prata, em montes trouxerao 
fazenda. 
(When the Chinese smell silver, they will bring 
mountains of merchandise. )_ 1 
From the mid-sixteenth on through the seventeenth, eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries large amounts of foreign silver were 
taken by Chinese merchants in exchange for their silks and porcelain. 
The Chinese demand for silver seemed insatiable and once inside the 
Middle Kingdom there the silver stayed. A factor with the English 
East India Company in 1636 wrote of this Chinese lust for silver: 
15. 
"They will as soon part with their blood as it, having once possession." 2 
Such a demand has lead one historian to describe China as a great 
3 
suction pump, drawing in silver from the four corners of the world. 
In a study such as this, which attempts to relate international 
bullion movements to domestic events in seventeenth century China, some 
appreciation of the world-wide network whereby silver reached China's 
doors must first be sought. These first two chapters, then, will look 
at the production,and distribution of silver in the seventeenth century 
world. Centres of production and agencies of distribution will be our 
concern. Subsequent chapters will explore the effects of these silver 
imports on the economic, social and political life of late Ming China. 
lFrom a letter written by Manuel de cSmara de Noronha, who served 
as Captain-General of Macao during the 1630si see C.R. Boxer, The 
Great Ship From Amacon (Lisbon, 1959L p.ll n.6. 
2Ibid. p.l. 
3
"Mais c'est la Chine est la plus puissante pompe aspirante de 
metal blanc venu de.s quatres coins du monde, 11 Vitorino de··Magalhaes 
Godinho 1 L 'economie de L '·empire portugais aux XVe et XVIe si~cles 
(Paris, 1969i. p.531. 
16. 
China's own silver resources were never seriously exploited during 
the Ming or early Qing periods, but domestic production, such as it was, 
will be considered before the more important foreign sources of supply. 
Silver mines in both Japan and Spanish-America were opened and 
developed during the sixteenth century and it was these regions which 
became the major suppliers of the metal to China throughout the 
seventeenth century. This first chapter will focus on the production 
and distribution of Asian silver, both Chinese and Japanese, while the 
next chapter will consider production from the Spanish-American mines 
and the various ways in which part of that production reached China's 
shores. 
Chinese Domestic Silver Production: Ming and early Qing Periods 
It is difficult to determine exactly how much silver was mined 
domestically during the Ming and Qing periods. The only province 
in the empire with substantial reserves of silver ore was Yunnan. In 
his treatise on Chinese technology, published in 1637, Song Yingxing 
stated that the mines of Yunnan produced more than twice as much silver 
as did all the other mines of China combined. 4 Song noted the 
existence of mines in eight other provinces, but in all these the yields 
were limited and it was necessary for the government to restrict 
production. Even with such restrictions it was often the case that 
the local administration of an area in which a mine was situated was 
forced to make up quotas by drawing on silver already in circulation. 5 
Only in Yunnan was it possible to mine and refine silver continuously. 
Silver production rose in the early fifteenth century when the 
Yonglo emperor Cr.l403-1424t increased mining quotas and extended 
4 Sung, T'ien-kung K'ai-wu, p.238 
5 . Ib:td. 
17. 
Chinese administration over two silver-rich areas to the south. The 
first of these came with the Ming occupation of Vietnam between 1406 
and 1427. The mountains Viet-bac region, north of the Red river delta, 
contained a number of gold and silver mines, the production of which 
the Ming administration was able to monopolize during its period of 
occupation. It is said that between 1416 and 1423 1,100 taels and 
500 taels worth of gold were extracted from the Vietnamese mines by 
the Chinese. 6 The production of these mines was lost to the Chinese, 
however, when they withdrew from Vietnam in 1427. From that point 
onwards it is most likely that the only Vietnamese silver acquired by 
the Chinese was that sent as gifts to the Middle Kingdom with tribute 
missions. 
The other silver-rich area acquired during the Yonglo administration 
was to be of more lasting benefit to the Chinese empire. Early in the 
fifteenth century Chinese control was extended south of Yunnan fu 
(Kunming) and beyond Yongzhang fu, to an area known as the "Great Silver 
Mines", or 'Bawdingyd:.', an area which previously had been administered by 
the Maoshan states of Upper Burma. Prior to the Chinese occupation of this 
region, much of its silver output had been carried by Dai traders southwest 
7 into Bengal. This flow of silver was reversed with the extension of 
Chinese administration to the area and from 1412 until 1858 it bcame a major 
domestic source of silver for the Chinese. It has been estimated that the 
annual average output from the mines of the Bawdin region during the 466 
. . k' '1 8 years of Chinese adm~nistrat~on was 3,300 ~lograms of Sl ver. Output from 
these mines was not continuous, however, and no accurate data is 
6John K. Whitmore, "Chiao-chih and Nee-Confucianism: The Ming 
Attempt to Transform Vietnam," Ming Studies, 3 (Spring 1 1977) 1 p. 71. 
Whitmore also considers the role of Vietnam in the circulation of precious 
metal in Asia in his article "Vietnam and the monetary flows of eastern 
Asia, thirteenth to eighteenth centuries," PMLMEMW, pp. 363-393. 
7John s. Deyell 1 "The China Connection: Problems of Silver Supply 
in Medieval Bengal," PMLMEMW, p. 222 
8Ibid. p. 223. 
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available regarding production for the Ming and early Qing periods. All 
the Yunnanese mines, including those of the Bawdin region, were closed 
in 1521 and production did not begin again until the late 1550s.9 
The temporary closure of mines reflects the often contradictory 
attitude of the Ming administration towards domestic silver production. 
On the one hand the demand for silver in the economy was high, but on 
the other hand the administration saw difficulties in controlling large 
labour forces in inaccessible regions of the empire. A rebellion in the 
zhe.]iang-Jiangxi border region between 1444 and 1449 was instigated by 
disaffected mining labour and, as a consequence, silver mines in the 
10 
area were closed. 
After the brief period under the Yonglo administration when silver 
mining was encouraged quotas were once more reduced and production 
declined. From the 1430s until the mid sixteenth century the output 
of silver from China's mines was minimal. It was not until 15591 when 
strict government control of mining was relaxed and private entrepreneurs 
were encouraged to become involved in the exploitation of precious metal 
reserve~that output again increased. The administration also shifted 
its share of production at this time from a fixed quota to a percentage 
11 
of actual output, apparently between 30 and 40 per cent. This 
encouragement given to mining did not last, however, as once again the 
problems of controlling labour emerged. Another insurrection in the 
Zhejiang-Jiangxi border region (circa 1566) saw the prohibitions on 
12 
mining in this area re-introduced and mining in general was not encouraged. 
9 Huang, 
11Huang, Taxation, p.242, puts the figure at 40 per cent; whereas 
Etienne. Balazs, Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy (New Haven, 1964), 
p.45, puts the figure at 30- per cent; as does Quan Hansheng, cited by 
Atwell, "International Bullion Flows," p.76. 
12Ray Huang, Taxation, p.242. 
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The last phase of officially sponsored exploitation of China's 
silver reserves under the Ming came with the so-called 'silver rush', 
from 1596 until 1605. 13 The demand for silver by this time was intense 
as the Single Whip Reform had been implemented in many parts of the 
empire and the development of a vigorous commercial economy necessitated 
1 f 1 b . • 1 . 14 that a greater vo ume o monetary meta e ~n c~rcu atlon. New mines 
were brought into production and output from existing ones was stepped up. 
Supervision of this phase of mining was given to eunuch-officials, 
however, and the result was a great deal of corruption. The percentage 
yields accruing to the administration were insufficient for it to 
continue to encourage the exploitation of silver reserves, especially 
with the continued fear of controlling large labour forces in remote 
regions. Also, the regular administrative officials resented the 
degree of monetary and fiscal control given to these eunuch tax 
commissioners and protested vigorously. By 1605 the Wanli emperor 
was forced to issue instructions to the effect that it was no longer 
permitted to work private mines without government authorization. The 
important thing, he declared, was "not to disturb the bowels of the 
15 
earth." In the remaining years of the dynasty it is possible that 
the government lost control of some of its silver reserves, but no 
information is available to indicate an increase in either public or 
private mining activity. Similarly, there may have been some private 
exploitation of silver reserves in the early Qing years, but the 
administration itself was preoccupied with establishing political control 
throughout the realm and did not concern itself with such things. 
l3 Balazs, Chinese Civilization, p. 46. 
14 ' See Introduct~on and Chapter Three for fuller discussions on 
this increased demand for silver. 
15 Balazs, Chinese Civilization, p.46. 
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It was not until the e.ighteenth century that the Qing. administra.tion 
could seriously attend to exploiting China 1 s precious meta.l reserves. 
There is no indication that silver mining was undertaken on any 
significant scale throughout the seventeenth century, 
The work of Quan Hansheng on the revenue which the Ming government 
derived from domestic silver mining in the fifteenth century confirms 
h . .. f . 16 t e trend that emerges from th1s 1n ormat1on. Quant-s figures 
show the peak period of government revenue from silver mining to have 
been in the early years of the fifteenth century. From then onwards 
government revenue progressively declined. The period 1411-1420 saw 
an annual average income of approximately 10,900 kilogra.ms of silver. 
This was down to an annual average of approximately 5 130.0 kilograms 
for the period 1431-1440; 2 1 700. kilograms for the period 1451-1460; 
2,200 for the period 1471-1480; 1,900 kilograms for the period 1491-1500; 
and 1,200 kilograms for the periodlSll-1520. If the administration 
was in fact collecting about 30 per cent of the total production in 
revenue these figures would indicate a decline in overall production 
from approximately 36,300 kilograms annually in the period 1411-1420. to 
approximately 4,000 kilograms annually by the period 15ll-l520. 
Ray Huang notes that in 1548 the reported income from silver mining 
was 62,030 tael? Capprox. 2,345 kgs.)., which would indicate a total 
production for the year of around 7,800 kilograms. For t-• .he year 1601, 
Huang cites the reported income as being ll0,210 taels (.approx. 4,166 kgs) 
. 1 k'l ' 17 or a total product1on of around 3,880 1 ograms. With all . the 
problems of under-reportage, corruption, etc., these figures remain 
highly speculative, but they do tend to indicate that domestic silver 
output remained limited throughout the entire Ming and early Qing periods. 
16 Quan Hansheng's work is summarized by Atwell, "International 
Bullion Flows,'' pp. 76-77. 
l7 . Huang, Taxation, p. 243. One is considered approximately 
equal to 0.0378 kqs. (see appendix). 
21. 
Japanese Silver Productio~ 
China's nearest foreign source of silver was Japan. The 
exploitation of Japan's precious metal reserves did not begin on any 
significant scale until the sixteenth century. Previous to this Japan 
had relied on imported Chinese copper coinage for its currency. The 
first important silver mine opened at this time was in Iwami province, 
western Japan. Here a Hakata merchant, Kamiya Jutei, revolutionized 
Japanese mining technology. He moved from simple surface mining to the 
sinking of deep shafts and also began to employ a new process of 
extracting and refining silver. 18 This was the process of cupellation, 
the smelting of metaliferous ore with lead to refine out lead monoxide 
and the oxides of other base metals, leaving behind pure silver. It 
was a process that had been known in China probably since late Zhou 
times {the fourth and third centuries B.C.), and was certainly in use 
by the Tang period (A.D. 618-902) . 19 Song Yingxing included descriptions 
20 
of the process in his seventeenth century treatise on technology. 
It seems likely, therefore, that Kamiya Jutei learned of this extraction 
and refining process, known in Japan as haibukiho, or ashblowing 
extraction, from a Chinese or Korean source. From Iwami the process 
spread to all mining centres and the resultant increase in production 
leads Delmer Brown to conclude that by 1540 silver had become Japan's 
21 principal export. Chinese merchants must soon have learned of 
this increased production, as it was about this time that they began 
. . h . 22 arr~ving 1n Kyushu ports seeking to pure ase s1lver. 
18 Delmer M. Brown, Money Economy in Medieval Japan: A Study in the 
Use of Coins. (New Haven, 1951), p. 56. 
19 Joseph Needham and Lu Gwei-djen, Spagyrical Discovery and Invention: 
Magistrates of Gold and Immortality: Science and Civilization in China, 
4, 2 (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 54-60. 
20 Sung, T'ien-kung K'ai-wu, p. 241 
21 Brown, Money Economy, p. 33 and 56. 
22 h · b " h · d u f G ld d s '1 · n Atsus 1 Ko ata, T e Product~on an ses o o an ~ ver 1
22. 
The cupellation process as practised in Japan. From Masuda Tsuna, 
Kodo Zurokl! (1801); reproduced in Needham and Lu, SJ2agyrical Discovery 
and Invention: Magistrates of Gold and Immortality, p. 37, 
Another impcrtant innovation in mining technology occurred in the 
1590s when the Japanese acquired a process they called Nanbanbuki , or 
'Southern Barbarian Smelting•. 23 This process, named after the 
Portuguese who introduced it to Japan, appears to have involved a more 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Japan,'' The Economic History Review 
2nd. Series, 18, 2U965L pp. 245-266. 
23 Brown, Money Economy, p.57. 
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sophisticated method of refining than that used in the haibukiho process, 
possibly the use of a better liquation furnace. While the Portuguese 
knew of the mercury amalgam process which had caused such a dramatic 
increase in output from the Spanish-American mines, it was probably 
not this process· which they introduced to Japan. Portuguese ships 
sailing annually from Macao to Nagasaki around 1600 are known to have 
carried between 150 and 200 picul~ (9,000 to 12,000 kilograms). of 
Chinese quicksilver, but there are no references to an increased 
consumption of Chinese mercury in the early seventeenth century, the 
. d . . 24 per1o when Japanese s1lver output rose cons1derably. Also to be 
noted is that at the same time as the Portuguese were carrying this 
mercury to Japan they were carrying over 200,000 kilograms of lead. 
Such quantities of lead consumption are probably attributable to the 
widespread use of the lead extraction process, although some of it may 
well have been used for armaments. While we cannot be absolutely 
certain that the mercury amalgam process was not in use in Japan in the 
early seventeenth century, it seems roost unlikely that it was. 
Political conditions in sixteenth century Japan underlay the 
increased production of precious metals. The third Ashikaga Shogun, 
Yoshiroitsu (1358-1408}_, succeeded in reunifying the country in the 
final years of the fourteenth century, but by the middle of the fifteenth 
century the central authority of the shogunate had weakened and Japan 
again was divided by a number of competing family networks, all of 
whom encouraged the exploitation of precious metal reserves to help 
f . . . . 25 1nance the1r ro1l1tary endeavours. From the rise of Nobunaga (1534-1582) 
24A list of goods carried in the ~Great Ships' from Macao to Nagasaki 
is found in Boxer, The Great Ship, Appendix B, pp. l79~81. 
25 Kobata, "The Production and Uses," p. 57; and Brown; Money Economy, 
p. 57. 
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in the 1570s Japan was gradually forged into a new centralized political 
unit. The culmination of this process was the success achieved by 
Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542-1616) in that decisive battle at Sekigahara Pass 
in 1600. The victory gave Ieyas.u control of the most important central 
portion of Japan from Edo to Kyoto from which he was able to dominate 
the rest of the country. Production of Japan's silver mines was then 
monopolized by the Tokugawa Bakufu and in l60l Ieyasu introduced the 
first standardized currency system to Japan. This new system of copper, 
silver, and gold coins gradually became established in the country 
26 
throughout the seventeenth century. 
The principal silver mining regions of Japan were those of Kaurisawa, 
S d I 1 d d h . f . k d .. 27 a o .s an , an t e prov1nces o Iwam1, I uno an TaJ1ma. It is 
not possible to determine what the total output of these silver mines 
was during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 1 but some data is 
available which helps indicate the general scale of production. For 
instance, we know that Hideyoshi Cl536-1598} received 79 ,4l4 maJ of 
silver in tax or tribute in l598. This amounts to l2,827 kilograms, 
10 000 k · 1 f h · h f th · of T · · 28 over , . . . 1 ograms o w J.c . came rom e one prov1nce aJJ.ma. 
One of the most productive silver mining regions, Sado Island, did not 
contribute to Hideyoshi's finances in this year and it is certain that 
from the mines which did contribute payments were not equivalent to 
total output, The overall output of silver in l598 is therefore likely 
to have been well in excess of the l2,000 to 13 1 000 kilograms 
26 Brown, Money Economy, p.65; andY. Takekoshi, The Economic Aspects 
of the History of the Civilization of Japan {N.Y., l930L, II, p. 30-34. 
27Takekoshi, The Economic Aspects, I, p.545; and Iwao Seiichi, 
'
1Japanese Foreign Trade in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth. Centuries," 
Acta Asiatica, 30. Cl976}_ 1 pp. 1-18. Iwao states, p.S, that there were 
over 30 silver mines and 50 gold mines operating in Japan by the end of 
the sixteenth century. 
28 Brown, Money Economy, pp. 59-60., 
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paid in tribute. 
Silver production in early seventeenth century Japan increased 
considerably. No doubt this was due to the spread of the more efficient 
refining technology of 'Southern Barbarian Smelting' during the 1590s. 
In the 1602 Iwami mines are said to have contributed 3,600 kan 
(13,536 kilograms) of silver to the Bakufu. 29 In the same year one 
mine alone on Sado Island produced 10,000 l<an (37,600 kilograms) of 
'1 30 Sl. ver. Atsushi Kobata estimates that the annual.average output from 
the Sado mines in the early seventeenth century was between 60,000 and 
90,000 kilograms. Kobata also estimates that the total annual output 
of Japanese silver mines in this period was around 200,000 kilograms. 31 
There is no way of verifying this estimate but if the mines of Iwami 
and Ikuno provines produced even half as much as those of Sado then the 
overall annual production must have been well in excess of ~00,000 
kilograms, and was probably as high as kobata's estimate. 
The only data that is available for the second half of the seventeenth 
century is for the silver mines of Iwami province. 32 Here the annual 
average output for the period 1683-1706 was 1,348 k<ilograms of silver, 
declining to 692 kilograms annually for the period 1707-1732. As we 
know the Bakufy received in excess of 30,000 kilograms of silver from 
the Iwami mines in 1602, it is obvious that there had been a considerable 
decline in production. This is, of course, for only one silver mining 
region; we know nothing of production trends for other Japanese mines 
in the second half of the seventeenth century. But from what we do know 
29 b'd 58 I l. ., p. . 
30Ibid. I p. 6Q. 
31 Kobata, "The Production and Uses," p. 248 .. 
32Kozo Yamamura and Tetsuo Kamiki, "Silver Mines and Sung Coins 
- A monetary History of Medieval and Modern Japan in International 
Perspective," PMLMEMW, p.343. 
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it seems the years of peak output.were those of the early part of the 
century and it is possible that the annual production of silver in this 
period was as much as 200,000 kilograms. 
Merchants operating in the trading world of Asia in the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were well aware of the great 
reserves of s·ilver that were being mined in Japan. In part it was this 
silver that attracted both Asian and European merchants to Japanese 
ports. The Englishman Will Adams wrote in 1611 of the advantages the 
Dutch enjoyed by trading in Japan: 
You shall understand that the Hollanders have here an Indies 
of moneyi for out of Holland there is no need of silver to 
come into the East Indies. For in Japan, there is much silver 
and gold to serve for the Hollanders to handle where they will 
in the East Indies.33 
Dutch, English, Portuguese, Chinese, and Southeast Asian ships all 
sailed to Japan seeking the silver which would enable them to profit by 
their trade in other Asian ports, and particularly Chinese ports, for 
that is where. the demand for silver was greatest. Not only was it 
profitable to carry silver to Chinese ports, for European traders it 
was vital.. Without silver they lacked the key which gave access to the 
Chinese silks and porcelains which were in such demand in other parts of 
Asia, the Americas, and Europe. Japan was the only significant Asian 
source of silver in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and its 
product was therefore at a premium. To the Chinese it was their nearest 
foreign source of the metal. To the Europeans it meant silver did not 
have to be. carried all the way to China from Europe or the Americas. 
A comparison of the relative values of silver to gold in China and 
Japan reveals how profitable it was to ship the metal southwest across 
33 Thomas Rundall (.ed .. )_, Memorials of the Empire of Japan in the 
XVI and XVII Centuries (.N.Y. 19.66)_, p.3l. 
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the East China Sea to the Chinese ports. The parity of silver to gold 
was always lower in China than Japan during the seventeenth century, 
although, as Table One indicates, it did approach the Japanese level in 
the 1640s. This may have only been the case in the ports of Fujian 
and Guangdong, however, as there also existed a degree of regional 
variation in the relative value of silver to gold within China. Atsushi 
Kobata notes that according to Gu Yanwu, the parity of silver to gold 
in the years from 1629 to 1644 was 10:1 in most parts of China but 
reached 13: l south of the Changj iang (_Yangtze) River. 34 Silver 
accumulated in the port regions of Fujian and Guangdong was gradually 
drawn into the hinterland of China, thus undermining the tendency for 
the relative value of silver to gold in China and Japan to reach an 
'l'b . 35 equ1 1 r1um. Considerable amounts of Japanese silver reached China 
by the 1640s and in return much Chinese gold was ca,rried to Japan. The 
slow process by which silver was filtered into the Chinese hinterland and 
the considerable demand that existed in the empire for the metal ensured, 
however, that it continued to be profitable to ship Japanese silver to 
China throughout the seventeenth century. 
34 Kobata, "The. Production and Uses," p. 254 
35Kobata (Ibid.). and others feel that the relative value of silver 
to gold in Cnina and Japan did reach an equilibrium about 1640. To me, 
this view seems- to fail to take into account the fact that a regional 
disparity existed within China itself and that silver was continual~y 
being drawn from the coastal regions into the hinterland of the emp1re. 
TABLE ONE 
The Parity of Silver to Gold in China and Japan, 1570 - 1700. 
(silver . Per unit of gold) . 
Date Source China Japan 
1571 A - 7.3 
1572 B 8 
-
1589 A - 11.06 
159os D 7 
-
1594 A - 10.34 
1600 c 8 -
1604 A - 10.99 
1610 A - 11.84 
1620 A/B 8 13.05 
1622 A - 14.00 
1635 B 10 
1637-1640 B l3 -
1662 c 10 -
1700 c 10 -
Sources: A - Yamamura and Kamiki ''Silver Mines and Sung 
Coins," p. 346, Table 10. 
B- Ibid., p. 345, Table 9. 
C - L.S. Yang, Money and Credit in China, p. 48. 
D - A. Kobata "The Production and Uses of Gold and 
Silver , " p . 2 54 . 
The Traffic of Japanese Si1ver to China 
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The mechanisms by which Japanese silver reached China were varied. 
Direct Sino-Japanese trade was prohibited by the Ming administration in 
1557 and it was not until the lifting of the maritime prohibitions 
(haijin) by the Kangxi emperor (r. 1661-1722} in 1684 that the Chinese 
again officially sanctioned trade with Japan. A Spanish merchant visiting 
Canton in the late sixteenth century, Bernardino de Avila Giron, noted 
that a monument in the city bore the inscription: 
As long as the sun and moon give light, the Chinese and 
Japanese cannot live under the same sky or drink the 
same water.36 
This edict, however, reflected official policy more than it did actual 
29. 
practice. In fact, it was only during the period from 1661 to 1684, with 
the drastic coastal evacuation policy and the closure of Chinese ports, 
implemented by the Qing administration in its efforts to eradicate the 
resisting Zheng maritime network from Taiwan, that there was any serious 
disruption to Chinese overseas trade. The prohibition on Sino-Japanese 
trade did inhibit the free flow of silver from Japan to China but it did 
not put an end to it. As Frank Perlin has noted, money and monetary 
metal is "a medium particularly subversive of conventional boundaries, 
both material (political and geographical) and intellectual ....... 37 
This is certainly true in regard to Japanese silver entering China during 
this period. 
Sino-Japanese Trade 
It was in response to a violent confrontation between competing 
Japanese tribute missions in 1523 that the Ming government closed the 
Office of Trading Ships in ~ingbo and prohibited foreign trade through 
38 the port. Ningbo was the officially designated port through which 
all Sino-Japanese diplomatic and commercial relations were to occur. 
The result of the 1523 closure was that although Japanese tribute missions 
continued to be received up until 1549, what had previously been 
considered legal trade then became illicit. Piracy and smuggling 
mushroomed and, as a consequence, all relations with Japan, both 
diplomatic and commercial, were officially severed in 1557. 39 Exactly 
36Michael J. Cooper, "The Mechanics of the Macae-Nagasaki Silk Trade," 
Monumenta Nipponica, 27, 4 (1972), p. 424. 
37Frank Perlin, "Precolonial South Asia and Western Penetration in 
th.e Seventeenth to Nineteenth Centuries," Review, IV, 2 (Fall, 1980) p.289. 
38 Iwao, "Japanese Foreign Trade," p. 1. 
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how much silver was carried to China by Japanese and Chinese junks in 
this period of intense piracy is unknown. In her study of agricultural 
change in south China, Evelyn Sakakida Rawski notes that in 1542 three 
large ships en route to Zhangzhou from Japan were captured and found to 
be carrying approximately 3,000 kilograms of silver. 40 Obviously a 
great many more ships would have been carrying silver at this time, but 
because of the illegal nature of the trade it is impossible even to 
venture estimates for the total volume of silver imported to China from 
Japan in these years. By 1567 the Ming administration had brought the 
problem of piracy under control and Chinese merchants were again permitted 
to trade overseas, although the prohibitions on trade with Japan remained 
in force. 
To circumvent the Ming restrictions on direct Sino-Japanese trade a 
flourishing entrepot trade developed in Southeast Asia from 1567 onwards, 
whereby Chinese merchants exchanged their silks and sugar for the silver 
carried by Japanese merchants. The Chinese merchants were mostly Fujianese 
traders from Zhangzhou and Chuanzhou prefectures who had established 
trading networks in the Southeast Asian ports of Patani, Siam, Cambodia 
and Cochin China. 41 John K. Whitmore describes well the situation in Hoian 
(.Faifo), Cochin China, a situation that must have been similar to that of 
39
so Kwan-wai, Japanese Piracy in Ming China During the Sixteenth 
Century (East Lansing, 1975), pp. 4-5 and 44. For other discussions on 
the piracy which plagued the Chinese coast during the mid-sixteenth century 
see John E. Wills Jnr. , "Maritime China from Wang Chih to Shih Lang," in 
J.D. Spence and John E. Wills, Jnr., (eds.), From Ming to Ch'ing (New 
Haven, 1979), pp. 203-237; Charles 0. Hucker, "Hu Tsung-hsien's Campaign 
Against Hsu Hai, 1556," in his Two Studies on Ming China (Ann Arbor, 1971), 
pp. 1-31; and Merri1yn Fitzpatrick, "Local interests and anti-pirate 
administration in China's southeast, 1555-1565," Ch'ing-shih Wen-t'i, 4, 
2 (December, 1980), pp. 1-50. 
40Evelyn Sakakida Rawski, Agricultural Change and the Peasant Economy 
of South China (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), p. 76. 
41
rwao, "Japanese Foreign Trade," p. 3; also Boxer, The Great Ship, p. 31 
In these works there are also references to the fact that Chinese merchants 
were sailing direct to Japanese ports prior to 1567, ignoring the prohibitions 
on such trade. 
other entrepot centres: 
In the port of Hoi-an, the Chinese and Japanese each had their 
own enclaves, adjacent to each other. Coming with the northeast 
monsoon at the end of the (lunar) year, ships from Japan brought 
large amounts of silver and copper cash which went mainly for 
silk, sugar, aloeswood, deerskins, rayskins and ceramics. 
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Japanese traders controlled the local silk and sugar markets by 
prepayment with the imported cash. The Chinese merchants gathered 
during this four month 'fair' and traded their silks, copper cash, 
and tutenag for the Japanese silver and the goods of Southeast 4 Asia, pepper in particular, sandalwood, camphor, and other aromatics. 2 
This entrepot trade did not reach its peak until the early years of the 
seventeenth century and Kozo Yamamura and Tetsuo Kamiki estimate that in the 
earlier period from 1560 until 1600 only some 11,250 kilograms of 
. h . th. d 43 Japanese s~lver was exc anged v~a ~s tra e. 
From 1600 on to the imposition of the ban on Japanese merchants 
trading in foreign ports in 1635 the Sino-Japanese entrepot trade in 
Southeast Asian ports flourished. Tokugawa Ieyasu was eager to establish 
Japan as a thriving commercialcentre and although his efforts to 
re-establish direct relations with China were doomed to failure, as the 
memory of Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea was still uppermost in Chinese 
minds, he did give much impetus to Sino-Japanese trade. In 1600 Ieyasu 
instituted a system of officially licensed ships, known as Red Seal Ships, 
or shuinsen, which had shogunal approval to enage in trade. Under this 
system 350 ships are said to have left Japan between 1600 and 1635, 
carrying off between 30,000 and 40,000 kilograms of silver, virtually 
44 
all of which would have been traded with Chinese merchants. In 1633 
unlicensed ships were forbidden to trade in foreign ports, but up until 
42 John K. Whitmore, "Vietnam and the monetary flows," p. 380. For 
other descriptions of this entrepot trade see Boxer, The Great Ship, p. 76; 
and Sarasin Viraphol, Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652-1853 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1977), passim. 
43Yamamura and Kamiki, "Silver Mines and Sung Coins," p. 531. 
44
rwao, "Japanese Foreign Trade," pp. 9-10. For Japanese attempts 
to re-establish direct relations with China at this time see Ronald P. Toby, 
"Reopening the Question of Sakoku: Diplomacy in the Legitimation of the 
Tokugawa Bakufu," Journal of Japanese Studies, 3, 2 (Summer, 1977}, pp. 323-
363. 
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then they also must have carried off a considerable amount of Japanese 
silver. Finally, in 1635, Japanese anger at the intrusion of the Christian 
West provoked a withdrawal from the outside world, with the Bakufu 
beginning what is now referred to as the Tokugawa seclusion. All Japanese 
45 
ships, licensed or unlicensed, were forbidden to trade in foreign ports. 
Foreigners, including Chinese, who wished to avail themselves of the much 
desired Japanese silver now found they had to make the trip to Japan. 
Despite the prohibitions on trade with the Japanese, Chinese junks 
became regular visitors to Japan in the seventeenth century. Prior to 
1634 the Chinese had visited several of the Japanese ports, but after 
that time they were restricted to trade through Nagasaki. The number 
of Chinese in Nagasaki is said to have increased from about twenty in 
1608 to several thousand by 1620 and the number of junk visits increased 
to between 30 and 60 per year by the 1620s. 46 With the ban on Japanese 
overseas trade in 1635 and the subsequent expulsion of the Portuguese 
from Japan in 1639, the number of Chinese junks visiting Nagasaki increased 
dramatically. In 1639 ninety-three junks sailed to Japan from China and 
in 1641 the number increased to ninety-seven. The amount of silver traded 
with Chinese merchants increased from 7,500 kan (33,720 kgs.) in 1635 to 
17,000 kan (63,920 kgs.) in 1646. 47 By the end of the 1650s, however, the 
number of Chinese junks visiting Nagasaki had dropped to an annual average 
of between 50 and 60 and the volume of silver traded was down to 
48 
approximately 7,200 kan (27,000 kgs.) annually. This decline was no 
45 For translations of the seclusion edicts put in place by the Tokugawa 
Bakufu in the 1630s see David Lu, Sources of Japanese History (N.Y. 1974) ,I, 
pp. 216-217. 
46 Iwao, "Japanese Foreign Trade," p. 11. 
48Ibid. Y. Takekoshi, The Economic Aspects, II, pp. 378-386 confirms 
the picture given by Iwao although he gives no source for his data. See 
' also L. Dermigny, La Chine et !'Occident: Le commerce a Canton au XVIIIe 
si~cles, 1716-1833 (Paris, 1964), Vol. I, p. 100. 
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doub.t a consequence. of the civil conflict which spread down the China 
coast as the Qing administration attempted to establish political control 
of the empire following its capture of Beijing in 1644. 
On the basis of data presented by Iwao and Takekoshi; Table Two 
presents an estimate of the total amount of silver carried from Japan by 
Chinese merchants from 1610 until 166o. 49 
TABLE TWO 
Estimated Volume of Silver Leaving Japan in Chinese,Junks, 1610-1660 
Period Estimated Volume 
1611-1620 annual average of 2,000 kan = 20,000 kan = 75,200 kgs 
1621-1630 annual average of 5,000 kan = 50,000. kaYJ = 188,000 kgs 
1631-1640 annual average of 10,000 .kan 100 ,oo.o kan_ = 376,000 kgs 
1641-1650 annual average of 15,000_kan = 150,000 kan = 564,000 kgs 
1651-1660 annual average of 7,000 kan 
-
= 70,000 kan 
-
= 263,000 kgs 
Total = 390,000 kan = l, 466, 400 kgs 
This gives an estimated total of 1.5 million kilograms of silver being 
carried from Japan in Chinese junks between 1610 and 1660. 
By the middle of the seventeenth century 'Chinese' junks visiting 
Nagasaki included both junks from the Chinese mainland and those of the 
Zheng maritime network. Centred around the Zheng family, this maritime 
network resisted the consolidation of Qing control along the Chinese 
coast, holding out eventually until 1683. When the Qing administration 
s.tepped up its efforts to eradicate the Zheng network in the 1660s, by 
49
rbid. 
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closing ports. and withdrawing the coastal population many miles inland, 
the number of junks from the Chinese mainland that were able to visit 
Nagasaki was considerably reduced; perhaps no junks from the mainland 
h d k . th' . 50 reac e Nagasa ~ at ~s t~e. The 'Chinese' junks which did visit 
Nagasaki in the 1660s and 1670s were principally those of the Zheng 
network and those of Chinese merchants based in the ports of Southeast 
Asia. The Qing policy of isolating the Zheng resisters on Taiwan ensured 
that the amount of trade the Zheng merchants could conduct in Nagasaki 
were severly reduced. Without their previously extensive connections 
along the Chinese coast the Zheng merchants had difficulty in obtaining 
silks and sugar etc., which in turn meant they were restricted in the 
amount of business they could engage in at Nagasaki. Hence, by 1681, 
the only 'Chinese' ships trading at Nagasaki were those of Southeast 
Asian origin. The volume of this lChinese' trade at Nagasaki in 1681 
was only 15 per cent of what it had been prior to 1661. 51 Also of note 
is that the Bakufy prohibited the export of silver from Japan in 1668, 
although this was lifted with respect to Chinese ships in ~672. 52 It 
seems likely, therefore, that very little Japanese silver reached the 
Chinese mainland between 1661 and 1684. 
After the Qing invasion of Taiwan and the eradication of the Zheng 
maritime network in 1683 the prohibitions on overseas trade were lifted. 
50
on the coastal evacuation policy see Hsieh Kuo-ching, uRemoval of 
the Coastal population in the early Tsing Period," Chinese Social and 
Political Science Review, XV (1930-lL, pp. 559-596. Also of note here 
is that records on the volume of Chinese shipping through the port of 
Manila show that for the period 1661-1684 there was only an occasional 
year when ships from the mainland of China reached the Philippines; see 
Pierre Chaunu, Les Philippines, pp. 164-169, 
51 Iwao 1 "Japanese Foreign Trade 1 " p. 12. 
52Atsushi Kobata, "The Circulation of 
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," 
kinen kokushi ronshu (Kyoto, 19701 1 p. 10. 
Silver in the Far East During 
Kobata Atsusbi taikan 
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In l685 the Kangxi emperor ordered thirteen ships to load with silks and 
sugar for Japan and by l686 over lOU Chinese junks were·trading in Nagasaki. 5 := 
One hundred and ninety-four Chinese junks visited Nagasaki in 1688 and 
their cargo fetched a price in excess of 19,000 .kan of silver. 54 The 
return cargoes consisted mainly of Japanese silver and copper. This 
sudden increase in the export of precious metals alarmed the Japanese 
and regulations were introduced to control Sino-Japanese trade. It was 
decreed that the volume of trade should not exceed 600,000 taels, but 
pressure from both Chines~ and Japanese merchants saw this limit 
gradually increased so that by 1698 the volume of trade permitted was 
55 
up to 1,3oo,ooo taels. These last fifteen years of the seventeenth 
century saw a great deal of copper and silver exported from Japan by 
Chinese merchants and it was not until the second decade of the eight-
eenth century that the Japanese became more vigourous in their efforts 
to stem the outflow of precious metals. A conservative estimate of the 
amount of silver exported through Nagasaki by Chinese merchants between 
1685 and l700 would be 180,00.0 kilograms. 56 
We are now in a position to estimate the total volume of silver 
exported from Japan by Chinese and Japanese merchants in the late sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries. While some of the tchineset. ships involved 
in this trade were actually junks sailed by Southeast Asian merchants, 
it seems likely that they also were landing silver in Chinese ports and 
profiting by the purchase of Chinese merchandise which was in demand in 
53John Hall, "Notes on the Early Ch 1 ing Copper Trade with Japan¥" 
Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, l2 (_1949)_, p. 452. 
54 Iwao, "Japanese Foreign Trade," p. 13 
55 Hall, "Notes, 1' p. 454 
56Tb.is estimate is bas.ed on an average of 60. ships .per year ;for l5 
years, each carrying away 2Q(l kgs. of silver.. Iwao, "Japanese Foreign 
Trade," p. 13, notes that 194 ·ships carried a total cargo valued .at 19,000 
kan Cover 70.,000 kgsl of silver. If half of this value was taken in 
silver metal then each ship would be carrying around 180 kgs. of silver. 
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their own ports. Similarly, we know that Japanese silver was exported 
to Korea as early as 1538 and some of this may well have filtered through 
to China by way of trade and tribute missions. 57 Japanese silver also 
reached China via the tributary trade of Liuqiu (.Ryukyu} Islands. 58 Yet 
all these routes were subsidiary to the main network of Sino-Japanese 
trade and it seems reasonable to assume that virtually all the silver 
exported from Japan in Asian ships travelled via this main trade network 
to China. The data we have suggests that between l560 and 1700 an 
estimated 1.7 million kilograms of silver reached China through this 
trade (see Table Three) .. 
TABLE THREE 
Estimated Quantity of Japanese Silver Reaching China Between 1560 and 1700 
via Sino-Japanese Trade 
Period Carrier Quantity (kilograms) 
1560-1600 Chinese and Japanese junks 11,250 
1600-1635 Japanese Red Seal ships 40,000 
1610-1660 Chinese junks l,soo,ooo 
166l-l684* - -
1685-1700 Chinese junks l80,000 
Total 1,731,250 
*No estimate has been ventured for the period 1661-1684 as it 
is not possible to determine how much Japanese silver left Japan 
in 'Chinese' ships during these years, or how much of this, if 
any, may have penetrated the depopulated Chinese coast. Similarly, 
no estimate has been ventured for the period of intense piracy 
prior to 1560. 
57 Kobata, "The Production and US.es," p. 252. 
58Robert K. Sakai, "The Satsuma-Ryukyu Trade and the Tokugawa 
Seclusion Policy, 1·1 1 Journal of Asian Studies, 23, 3 (May 1 l964)., pp. 391-403; 
Sydney Crawcour, "Notes on Shipping and Trade in Japan and the Ryukyus," 
Journal of Asian Studies, 23, 3 (.May, 1964), pp. 377-382. Crawcour feels 
the volume of trade. going via the Ryukyus was insignificant when compared 
to the Nagasaki trade. 
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The Macae-Nagasaki Trade. 
The other major trading mechanism whereby Japanese silver reached 
China was that of the Portuguese naos' or I Great Ships r I which sailed 
annually betwen Goa, Macao and Nagasaki from the 1560s until 1639. The 
Portuguese enjoyed an important advantage over their later European 
rivals in the Far East with their settlement on the China coast at Macao. 
Early frustrations in Si'no-Portuguese relations were overcome when Leonel 
de Souza obtained an agreement from Guangdong officials in l554 that 
allowed the Portuguese to trade in China and by 1557 they conducted this 
59 trade through a resident conununity at Macao. In Japan the Portuguese 
focused their trading operation through Nagasaki, with their 'Great Ships~ 
being regular annual visitors to the port by the l570s. 60 In both 
instances, in China and Japan, Portuguese trade was conducted under the 
monopoly of the crown. With a trading base in Macao and another at 
Nagasaki the Portuguese were well placed to take advantage of the 
restrictions on Japanese trade in China and they had soon carved themselves 
an important niche. as intermediaries between these two Asian powers. 
From Macao the Portuguese traded at the big biannual Guangzhou (Canton) 
fairs. Kach year one, and sometimes two, 'Great Ships' would sail from 
Goa in April. On arrival in Macao they would load with Chinese merchandise 
purchased at the mid-year fair (.May-Junet and then sail up the China coast 
and across the East China Sea to Nagasaki. Here the Chinese silks, sugar 
and porcelain would be sold for Japanese silver and the ships would return 
to Macao. This time they loaded with Chinese goods bought at the New Year 
61 fair ()Je.c.-Jan.l and then made the return voyage to Goa. 
59 Chang T 1 ie.n-tse, Sino-Portuguese Trade From 15l4·to 1644: A 
Synthesis of Portuguese and Chinese. Sources (.J.eiden, l969).. 1 pp. 88-89. 
6Q C.R. Boxer, Fidalgos. in the Far East 1550-l770 (The Hague, l958). 
pp. 1-5; and also his The Great Shipr pp. 1-3. 
61For a contemporary description of this trade see the letter of 
the Jesuit Manoel Dias (dated l8 April 1610}, translated by Coopert 
"The Mechanics," pp. 423-433; and for a contemporary account of 
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While the Po;r-tu9uese ;first brcmght pepper and spices to trade at 
Guangzhou 1 b.y the. 158Cls they were trading predominantly in silver.. For 
the most part it was silver which the Portuguese used, although 
they did supplement this with shipments brought each year from Goa, and 
between 1620. and 1642 with shipments from Manila. This silver brought 
via Goa and Manila was of Spanish-American origin. 
Each year Portuguese ships brought tpepper money' (cabedal da pimentaJ 
from Lisbon to Goa and, as the name implies, most of this was used to 
purchase pepper and spices. Exactly how much of this money was shipped 
each year is difficult to determine as the records of the Estado da India 
62 
were lost in the. l755 Lisbon earthquake. Calculated estimates have been 
made, however, with Frederic Mauro reckoning that by the end of the 
sixteenth. century the total value of gold and silver exported annually to 
Goa was around 100,000 crusadoes. 63 Similarly, Vitorino de Magal:riaes 
Godinho has uncovered data regarding shipments of reales de a ocho and 
reales de a cuatro from Lisbon to Goa between 1605 and 1626 which indicates 
64 that the annual shipments averaged around 130 ,ooo cr·usadoes. As was the 
case with China, the demand for precious metal in South Asia was by 
the early years of the seventeenth. century, so the Portuguese were able to 
sell off much of this gold and silver at a considerable profit. In 1629 1 
Portuguese trading at the Guangzhou fairs see 
Sixteenth Century 1 p. ~32. 
, China in the 
62The Portuguese organized their Indian Ocean trade under two 
umbrellas; the Estado de :India was the politico-administrative hierarchy 
which controlled the trading posts and the naval forces in the Indian 
Ocean. It was Lisbon based but its effective centre of power was Goa. 
The other organizational umbrella was the da Indi which was Lisbon 
based and controlled all ;from Asia. For a :t::ecent discussion of 
the differences of the two see Philip Curtin, Trade in 
World History (Cambridge, l984L 1 pp. 141-142. 
63 ; , • 1 1 1 1 ' ... 1 '1570 Freder~c Mauro,. ·I.e Portuga et A.t ant:tque au XVe s~ec e ~... -
16.70 etude economique (J?aris., 1960) , p. 424 .. 
64Godinho, Lteconomie, pp. 330-334. 
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for instance, a profit of 70. per cent was made on silver brought from 
. b d ld h t d 1 d . 65 L1s on an so to mere an s an money en ers 1n Goa. The Portuguese 
also profited through the sale of enforced protection, whereby Asian 
traders were pressured to purchase cartazes, or licences, which obliged 
them to pay customs duties in Portuguese-controlled ports in return for 
66 
a guarantee of safe passage. This profit made through the sale of 
protection and the sale of 'pepper money' enabled the Portuguese to send 
on to Macao almost twice as much. bullion as was sent annually from Lisbon 
to Goa; that is if we are to believe what Ralph Fitch tells us. Fitch 
was an English merchant travelling in Asia between l583 and 1591 and his 
is. really the. only clear indication of the volume of silver that was 
involved in the trade. He wrote of it: 
When the Portugals go from Macao in China to Japan, they carry 
much white silke, golde, muske, and porcelanes:. and they bring 
from thence nothing out silver. They have a great caracke which 
goeth thither every yere and she bringeth from thence every yere 
above sixe hundred thousand crusadoes: and all this silver of 
Japan, and two hundred thousand crusadoes more in silver which 
they bring yerely out of India, they employ to their great 
advantage in China: and they bring from thence golde, muske, 
copper, porcelanes, and many other things very costly and 
guilded.67 
Profits made in their Indian Ocean enterprise enabled the Portuguese to 
invest considerable sums of silver in their trade with China.. If Fitch 
is correct in stating that the Portuguese brought 200,000 crusadoes to 
China each year from Goa, then this would be equivalent to approximately 
13,800,000 crusadoes (352,742 kgs.)_ of silver for the period 1570 to 
1639. 68 
65A.R:~ Disney, FL'wiligl;J.t of the Pepper Empire: Portugues~ Trade in 
Southwest India in the Early Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 19781, 
pp. 103-104 and p. 164 Table 2.4. 
66For a discussion of the Portuguese use of cartazes,see Bailey W. 
Diffie and George D. Winius, Foundations of the Portuguese Empire 1415-l580 
Minneapolis, 1977)_, pp. 320-321. 
67Ralph Fitch, "The Voyage of Ralph Fitch," in Richard Hakluyt (ed.), 
The Principal Navigators (London, l907} III, pp. 309-310 .• 
68 ;.J The term crusauO 
to be equal to 400 f'eJ$1. 
signifies the Portuguese unit of account, taken 
Officially l 6:fU:Sa-do equalled 10 castillian rea 1 es, 
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Between 1620 and 1642 the Portuguese were also regular visitors to 
Manila, bringing Chinese goods purchased at the Guangzhou fairs and 
exchanging them for Mexican and Peruvian ran 1 ftS . 69 During the period 
of the 'Sixty Years of Captivity' (_1580-1620), when the Spanish and the 
Portuguese crowns were aligned, Portuguese ships were permitted to harbour 
in Manila Bay if necessary, but they were forbidden to trade there. Local 
officials generally ignored the prohibition on trade, however, and the 
Portuguese became regular visitors to the city. This very regularity 
did eventually cause some concern in Manila, as it was felt that the 
contraband trade resulted in a fall in revenue for the city. Joseph 
de Navada Alvarado wrote to Seville from Manila in 1636 claiming that 
the Portuguese had supplanted some Ch.inese from the Manila trade and as 
the Portuguese did not pay the customs duties paid by the Chinese, Manila 
suffered an important loss in revenue~ 70 As a consequence of Alvarado's 
letter the Spanish crown again reiterated the prohibition on Portuguese 
trade in Manila, but this did nothing to stop the practice. It was not 
until 1642, when the news of Portugal's break with Spain eventually 
reached the Far East, that this trade carne to an end. Some years later, 
in 1668, with the Treaty of Lisbon, Spain finally recognised Portugal's 
independence and Portuguese traders were again permitted to visit Manila. 71 
or 1. 25 ;pesos de a oc:ho. In Asia, however, the term was widely used as a 
unit of account considered equal to 1 pesos de a ocho. It is considered 
as such here. Thus 13,800,000 crusadoes are approximately equal to 
352,742 kgs. of silver, as one pesos de a ocho was equal to 0.025561 kgs. 
(.see appendix) . For discussions on the value of the CrU.iiiadO see Boxer, The 
Great Ship, p. 335; and Niels Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of 
the Seventeenth Century (Chicago, 1974}, pp. 417-418. 
69
chaunu, Les Philippines, pp. 153-160, shows that an average of 3 
ships. visited Manila annually from Macao between l62Q and 1642. 
70. E.H. Blair and J.A. Robertson (eds.), The Philippine Islands 
(Cleveland, Ohio 1 1903-9)_ XXV, pp. lll-144. 
71
c.R. Boxer, "Macao as a Religious and Commercial Entrpot in the 
16th and 17th Centuries," Acta Asiatica, 26 (_1974), pp. 73-81. 
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However, the. Portuguese.were infrequent visitors to the Spanish territory after 
this and it was only in the earlier period, between 1620 and 1642,that silver 
flowed regularly from Manila through Macao and into China. William Schurz 
suggests this trade reached its peak in the 1630s and that annual shipments 
were as high as 1. 5 million pesos (.38, 355 kgs .1 at this time. 7 2 Considering 
that this was a peak in the trade it is perhaps reasonable to estimate an 
annual average of 10,000 kgs., giving a total for the twenty-two year period 
therefore of 220,000 kilograms. As the Spanish reale? were valued more in 
China than Japanese silver, the Portuguese imports of silver via Goa and 
73 Manila were important supplements to their main source of silver in Japan~ 
By far the greatest portion of the silver imported into China by the 
Portuguese was of Japanese origin. As noted above, Ralph Fitch estimated 
that in the late sixteenth century in excess of 600,000 crusadoes (approx. 
15,366 kgs.) worth. of silver was shipped annually from Nagasaki to Macao 
74 in the Portuguese naos. Father Valignano, a Jesuit resident in Nagasaki 
wrote in 1593 that the Portuguese took approximately 20,000 kgs. of silver 
75 from Japan each year. We also know from the detailed study of this trade 
done by C.R. Boxer that the disappearance of the naQ on its return from 
Nagasaki in 1598/9 meant the loss of 400,000 crusadoes worth of silver 
72
william L. Schurz, The Manila Galleon 1565-1815 (N.Y., 1959), p. 132 
73Peter Mundy, a contemporary observer, noted that Japanese silver was 
valued 15 per cent less by weight in China than were Spanish .reale?: see his 
The Travels of Peter Mundy in Europe and Asia 1608,.;..1667 (London, 1919) 1 I, 
p. 311. Between 1603 and 1695 Japanese silver was minted 80 per cent pure, 
being reduced to 64 per cent pure after 1695; see Matsyo Takizawa, The 
Penetration of Money Economy in Japan and its Effects on Social and Political 
Institutions (N.Y., 1927), p. 39. Spanish ,real~~, by contrast, were, prior 
to 1728, supposedly issued 93.l·per cent pure; see Harry E. Cross, "South 
American bullion production and export 1 " 1550-17 50' 1 PMLMEMW 1 p. 398. 
74Fitch 1 uThe Voyage of," pp. 309...:310., 
75 Brown, Money Economy, p. 64. 
76 (approx. 10,244 kgs.).. Occasionally a ship was lost, but even 
during the years o£ Dutch piracy the Portuguese usually managed to 
continue their trade with.Japan. In response to the Dutch threat the 
Portuguese began sending smaller, faster and better armed galliots to 
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Nagasaki. In 1635 they exported 1,500 chests of silver from the Japanese 
port (approx. 56 1 700. kgs.l In the following year 1 when Japanese ships 
were no longer permitted to trade in foreign ports the Portuguese 
exported 2,350 chests of silver Capprox. 88,830 kgs.l- 1 which the Dutch 
fl . . 77 estimated to be worth 6,697 ,sao . onns. (_approx. 66,9.75 kgs.l. The 
year of maximum export was 1637¥ when 2,600 chests of silver (approx. 
98,280 kgs.) left Japan :tn Portuguese ships. Exports for 1638 were 
down to 1, 600 chests (approx ~ 60,480 .kgs, l and in the following year 
Japan instituted the final phase of its seclusion policy by expelling 
d . d h'· t d 
78 
all Portuguese from the. country an putt1.ng an en to t 1s ra e. 
On the basis of the reports of Ralph Fitch and Father Valignano it 
can be estimated that between 15,000 and 20,000 kilograms of silver were 
exported annually from Japan in the period 1560-1600. Total exports 
for this period would therefore have been between 600,000 and 800,000 
kilograms. Iwao Seiichi has estimated that from the turn of the 
seventeenth century on until the peak years of the mid .1630s, the annual 
5 5 '1 79 Portuguese exports averaged between 45,000 and 6,2 0. kl ograms. 
This seems rather high considering exports at the turn of the century 
76 Boxer 1 The Great Ship, p. 61~ 
77 Ibid., pp. 144-15L On p .. 338 Boxer states that one chest of 
silver contained around 1,00.0 tael§ of silver, 
78
rbid., pp. 155-157. 
79This es.timate of Iwao ls is cited by Yamamura and Kamiki 1 "Silver 
Mines and Sung Coins, 11 p. 35.1. 
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were only about 20( OQO_ kilograms annually. A more conservative estimate 
for the period between 1600 and 1639 would be 40,00.0 kilograms annually, 
giving a total for the period of l. 56 million kilograms. In total, 
therefore, from 1560 through until 1639, the Portuguese would have 
brought 500,000 odd kilograms of Spanish-American silver and 2.36 million 
kilograms of Japanese silver to China. 
Sventeenth_Century Dutch Trade in Japan 
The only other European power to profit from Japan"s output o;E 
precious metals in the seventeenth century was the United Provinces. 
English merchants had arrived in Japan soon after the Dutch_ early in the 
century but were unable to break into either the Chinese or the Japanese 
markets and abandoned their efforts in 1623. The Spanish, with a rich 
supply of precious metals in the Americas, were interested in Japan more 
for religious than economic reasons and the Tokugawa moves against 
Christianity saw them expelled from the country in 1625. The Dutch 
gained a great advantage over their European competitors in being permitted 
to continue to trade in Japan after the imposition of the seclusion policy 
by the Bakuf~ in the 1630s. After originally being permitted to trade 
through Hirado in 1609, the Dutch factory was shifted to Deshima Island 
near Nagasaki in 1636 and from this port Dutch merchants exported 
considerable amounts of Japanese gold, silver and copper throughout the 
remainder of the seventeenth century. 
In the very early years of their contact with Japan (l609-1620S') 
Dutch merchants exported only negligible amounts of silver, but from 
the 1630s through until 1668, when the Bakuf~ prohibited the export of 
silver, the volume of the metal exported by the Dutch was considerable. 
The peak years of Dutch_ export were those immediately following the 
prohibition on Japanese overseas trade. In 1635 Dutch merchants exported 
14,034 kilograms of silver; in 1636 this rose to 3Ci,l24 kilograms; in 
1.637 to 40,242 kilograms; in 1.638 to 47,538 kil.ogra,ms; $lnd in 1639 
to a peak of 75,956 kilograms.. The follow·i~g year exports dropped to 
20,805 kilograms of silver. Exports declined slightly in subsequent 
years until the ban on the export of silver was introduced in 1668. 
Table Four presents a compilation of the data available regarding 
this trade. 80 
TABLE. FOUR 
Du tcli Exports. of Silver from Japan, 1.622-1668 
Period Quantity Ckilogramst 
1622-1627 20,884 
1632-1639 217,338 
1640-1649 151,887 
1650-1659 131,512 
1660-1668 104,882 
Total (l622-1668). 626,503 
While the Dutch~ were more fortunate than their European rivals in 
being permitted to trade with Japan beyond the 1630s, they were never 
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able to establish a base on tlie Chinese coast as the Portuguese had done. 
Jan Pieterszoon Coen, Governor-General at Batavia from 1619 to 1623 and 
later from 1627 until his death in 1629 1 knew that if he was to realize 
his ambition of financing all of the Dutch Company's export trade to 
Europe from the profits of the inter-port trade of Asia, he would have 
80Tiiis data and that in Table Four is derived from Kato Eiichi, 
''unification and Adaptation, the early Shogunate and Dutch. Trade Relations," 
in L. Blusee and F.S. Gaa,stra (eds.L Companies and Trade (Leiden, 1981), 
pp. 207-239); and Kristof Glamann 1 Dutch Asiatic Trade, 1.62Q_..;.J.740 (The 
Hague 1 1.942)_ 1 p. 58. Kato notes that the years 1.628-1631 saw a temporary 
suspension of trade due to a conflict of Dutch and Japanese merchants 
on Taiwan. Both Kata and Glamann use the Koloniale Archieven Oost-
Indie ende kaap as their source and cite all their data in florinst 
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to gain for the Dutch .. direct access to the Chinese market. To do this 
he dispatched an expedition from Batavia under the command of Cornelius 
Reyertsz in 1622. The expedition unsuccessfully attached Macao and 
then sailed up the China coast to occupy Pehu in the Pescadores.8l When 
the local Chinese refused to immediately allow the Dutch to trade on 
their soil Reyertsz launched an attack. With so few ships, however, the 
Dutch. could not hope to defeat the Chinese and the only real success 
they had was in destroying 80 odd Chinese junks up and down the coast, 
something that would not have endeared th.em to the Chinese with whom 
82 they were hoping to trade. Both Coen and Reyertsz were relieved of 
their posts in ~623 and the attempt to force the Chinese to accede was 
given up. Martinus Sonck, Reyertsz ~s successor at Pehu, persuaded the 
new Governor-General at Batavia (De Carpentier} to allow the Dutch post 
to be shifted to Taiwan. In 1624 the Dutch established themselves at 
Casteel Zeelandia on Taiwan and were to remain there until forced to 
flee by the naval bombardment from the fleet of Zheng Chenggong in 1661/2. 
Whether the Chinese administration approved of the Dutch. presence on 
Taiwan is unknown, but no official attempt was made to remove them. 
Fujianese. officials had persuaded the Dutch to withdraw from the Pescadores 
to Taiwan and in return agreed to allow Chinese merchants to go there to 
83 
trade. This gave the Dutch indirect access to the Chinese market 
between 1624 and 1661 and much of the silver they exported from Japan 
flowed into China by this route. 
which. have been converted to kilograms at the rate of 1 florin (guilder) 
per 0.01 kg. 
81 For an eyewitness account of this expedition see William Ysbrantsz 
Bontekoe, Memorable Description of the East India Voyage-1618-'-1625 
(London, 1929}_. 
82M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofaz, Asian Trade and European Influence in the 
Indonesian Archipelago between 150(1 and about 1630 (The H.ague, 19621. p. 267. 
83John E. Wills Jnr., Pepper, Guns, and .Parleys: The Dutch East 
India Company and CW:na (.Cambridge, Massq· ~9741., pp .. 21..,.25 .. 
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In his analysis of Sino-Dutc~ relations in the seventeenth century 
John Wills bad written: •tTaiwan earned enormous profits for the Company 
(. c ). f . 10 84 V. 0. . _ as an entrepot or S1.11o-Japanese trade . . . • . While we do 
not have a detailed analysis of this entrepot trade we do have some 
indications as to the quantities of silver involved. Peter Nuyts, 
Governor-General on Taiwan in the late 1620s, estimated that approximately 
7,000 kilograms of Japanese silver were expended annually in trade with 
h . 85 C lnese merchants. In 1640, approximately 50,000 kilograms of 
Japanese silver were used to purchase Chinese goods, but by 165l this 
d d 5 5 k 'l 86 was own to aroun , 00 l ograms. This decline in the amount spent 
on the purchase of Chinese goods is a reflection of the decline in the 
export of Japanese silver by th.e Dutch from the peak years of l636-1639. 
Wills also notes that from 1653 onwards Zheng Chenggong tightened his 
grip around Taiwan and in.some years was able to prevent Chinese merchants 
from trading wi~ the Dutch. 87 Dutch ships were also attacked on their 
voyages between Taiwan and Nagasaki. It seems fair to assume, then, 
that in the decade preceding the Dutch expulsion from Taiwan in l66l the 
amount of Japanese silver reaching China via the Dutc~was minimal. 
Even when the entrepot trade of the Dutch. on Taiwan was at its peak, 
some of the silver they exported from Japan went to Batavia and was 
there trans-shipped for the east coast of India. Glamann's work on the 
flow of precious metals through Batavia in 1652-1653 shows that .134,943 
florin?. worth of it was silver from Japan, nearly all of which was sent 
on to India. From Table Four we know that the annual average volume of 
silver exported from Japan in the 1650s was approximately 1..3 million 
florin .. ?, which suggests that shipments to Batavia were only around lO per 
84Ibid., p. 23 
85Takekosh.i 1 The E.conomic ·Aspects, II, p. 123. 
86 
·1 d 1 1n 22 Wi ls, Pepper, Guns an Par eys, p. n. • 
87 
. ~d- 24 Ib1. • t p. . 
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88 
cent of the total exports of silver from Japan. After 1661, of course, 
all Dutch exports of silver from Japan would hav~ gone to Batavia as the 
Dutch no longer had access to the Chinese market. But these shipments 
would have lasted only a few years as the Japanese restricted the Dutch 
purchase. of monetary metals to copper and gold after 1668. 
After 1661 the Dutch sometimes sent ships to the China coast but 
these carried pepper and other Southeast Asian goods, not silver. The 
attempts to re-establish trade with the Chinese were frustrated by 
diplomatic difficulties and the concern of the Qing administration to 
control maritime activity so as to weaken the Taiwan-based Zheng network. 
Increasingly the Dutch. turned their attention to the developing trade 
in Bengal and Persia, where silks could be obtained without the frustrations 
encountered on the China coast. With the lifting of the maritime 
prohibitions by the Kangxi emperor in 1684 Chinese merchants began to 
return to Southeast Asian ports and the Dutch seemed content to conduct 
their trade with China through Batavia. 89 The silver which Chinese 
merchants obtained from trade with the Dutch in Southeast Asian ports 
was of Spanish-American origin and will therefore be discussed in a 
following chapter. 
While the Dutch established their base on Taiwan in 1624, it was not 
until after 1632 that their trade between Japan and China reached a 
significant volume. And, from the information set out above, it seems 
reasonable to assume that up until the mid 1650s less than 10 per cent 
of all Japanese silver exported by the Dutch went to Batavia. After 
that time remittances to Batavia would gradually have increased until 1661 
when all silver exported from Japan went there. On the basis of the known 
88Glamann, Dutch Asiatic Trade, pp. 58-60. In 1667-1668 84 per cent 
of the silver imported into Bengal was of Japanese origin; see Om Prakash 
and J. Krishnamurty, 11 Mughal Silver Currency- A Critique,u Indian 
Economic and Social His:tory Review, 7, 1 (March, 1970 ). , p. 143 Table I. 
Such. a high proportion of Japanese silver imports. to Bengal can only have 
of occurred in the short period between 1661-1668. 
89
wills Pepper, Guns, and Parleys, passim 
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quantities of silver exported from Japan by the Dutch_we can therefore 
estimate the volume of that silver which may have entered China via the 
entrepot trade of Taiwan between ~632 and 1660, The data presented in 
Table Five suggests that si:no-Dutch trade in this period saw around 
430,000 kilograms of silver enter China. 
TABLE ·FIVE 
Es.timated Volume of Japanese Silver Reaching China 
via the Dutcn Factory on Taiwan, 1632-1660. 
Peri.od Quantity Exported from Japan Estimated Quantity 
by the Dutch (kilograms) Entering China 
(kilograms}_ 
1632-1639 217,338 (x90%) approx. 200,000 
1640-1649 151,887 (x90%) approx. 140,000 
1650-1659 131,512 (x70%) approx. 90,000 
Total 430,000 
49. 
Total Imports of Japanese Silver to China 
By collating this information we have regarding the imports of 
Japanese silver to China it is possible to gain an idea of the changing 
volume of imports throughout the seventeenth century. The nature of 
the data is such that precise figures for the total volume imported at 
any particular point cannot be given, yet it is possible to describe 
an overall trend for the century. 
Imports of Japanese silver reached a peak in the ~63Us at which 
time over one hundred thousand kilograms were entering China each year 
(see Figure One).. The Tokugawa seclusion, which culminated in the 
expulsion of the Portuguese in 1639, brought an end to such high levels 
of imports, yet it did not mean that Japanese silver no longer reached 
China. Dutch and Chinese merchants picked up much of the trade which 
the Portuguese and Japanese ships could no longer enjoy. It was not 
until the Qing administration moved with vigour against those along 
the Chinese coast who resisted its rule that the flow of Japanese 
silver to China was halted. By closing ports and withdrawing the 
coastal population inland many miles, the Qing administration forced 
the Zheng maritime network to abandon its Chinese bases and retreat 
to Taiwan. 
FIGURE ONE Estimated Trend of Japanese Silver 
Entering China During the 
100,000 
Seventeenth Century. 
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This. in turn, meant the. Dutch-. were :t;orced from their base at Casteel 
Zeelandia and had to witlidraw to Southeast Asia~ Thus, hy the early 
1660s, both Japanese and Chinese merchants were prevented from sailing 
to foreign ports and none of the European carriers were able to profit 
from a role as intermediaries in this trade. With~ the mechanisms that 
facilitated Sino-Japanese trade broken, Japanese silver could no longer 
reach China. This remained the case until 1684 when the Qing 
administration had consolidated its control of the Chinese coast and 
was once more willing to allow its merchants to travel to foreign ports. 
By this time, however, the Bakufu was· more restrictive in its control 
of the export of precious.metals and the quantity of Japanese silver 
imported to China was never again to reach the very high levels 
attained during the early years of the seventeenth century. 
CHAPTER TWO 
Spanish-American Silver 
The Chinese among all peoples of Asia, are wild about 
silver as everywhere else are men about gold. 1 
The king of China could build a palace with the silver 
bars from Peru which are carried to his country 2 
The Spanish-American mining regions of New Spain and Peru are 
considered to have contributed as much as 80 per cent of the silver 
produced in the world between 1550 and 1800. 3 Possibly one quarter 
or one third of this silver found its way to China, either directly 
across the Pacific in the Manila galleons or indirectly via Europe 
d . . . . h . 4 an 1ts trad1ng l1nks w1t As1a. It is the intention of this 
chapter to investigate China's import of Spanish-American silver 
during the seventeenth century. Before doing so, however, it will 
be necessary to consider briefly how our understanding of the output 
from the mines of New Spain and Peru has changed, as it was from the 
results of the earlier of these studies that the speculation arose 
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that China may have suffered a dearth of silver in the early seventeenth 
century. 
Early estimates on the output from the Spanish-American mines were 
. '1 5 based on the 1mportant work of Earl J. Ham1 ton. From a study of the 
records of the Casa de Contratacion in Seville, Hamilton found that the 
1 From a letter by the Florentine Filippo Sassetti (dated 20 January 
1586t, cited by Frank Spooner, The International Economy and Monetary 
Movements in France, l493-1725 (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), p. 77. 
2Admiral Don Hieronimo de Banuelos y Carillo, "Relation of the 
Filip.inas Islands," translated and included in Blair and Robertson, 
The Philippine Islands, XXIV, p. 71. 
3 Cross, "South American bullion production," p. 397 and p. 403 Table 2. 
4 Chaunu, Les Philippines, pp. 268-269. 
5 '1 . Ham1 ton, Amer1can Treasure, 
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volume of precious metal entering Spain increased steadily throughout 
the sixteenth century, reaching a peak of 115 million pesos in the period 
1591-1600. In the early years of the seventeenth century imports of 
treasure declined gradually, until the 1630s, thereafter there was a 
'precipitous drop' in imports until 1660 1 when the compulsory registration 
of imported treasure was abolished and Hamil ton •·s analysis ends. By 
the decade 1651-1660 less than 18 million pesos of silver was imported 
legally from the. Americas. 6 As the Spanish crown controlled trade with 
the Americas, a decline in the volume of precious metals arrivi.ng:· in 
Europe was seen as indicative of a decline in output from the American 
silver mines. 
The trend portrayed by Hamilton was corroborated by the extensive 
study of the Chaunus on the carrera de Indias.7 Their work on this 
trans-Atlantic trade shows the years of maximum mercantile activity to 
have been from 1596 to 1620. From 1623 onwards, both the volume and the 
value of the American trade declined, so that by 1650, when the study 
ends, the whole nature of the Spanish-American relationship had changedj 
the sustained growth. experienced throughout the sixteenth century had 
been replaced by a severe contraction in the seventeenth. Basing their 
interpretation on the work of Woodrow W. Borah, the Chaunus attribute this 
decline in trade to a contraction of the market in New Spain, a contraction 
caused by demographic decline.8 While the white population of New Spain 
increased from 63,000 in 1570 to 125,000 in 1640, the Indian population 
declined from over 20 million in the early sixteenth century to less than 
9 three million in 1568 1 and just over one million by 1605. 
6
rbid., p. 1-42. 
The Chaunus 
7Pierre and Huguette Chaunu, Seville et !'Atlantique 1504-1650 
(Paris, 1955-9), 8 Volumes. 
8
rbid., VIII, 2:2, pp. 1557-1560. 
9 Woodrow W. Borah, New Spain's Century of Depression (Berkeley, 1951) 
pp. 2-5 and p. 18; and also Woodrow W. Borah and S.F. Cook, The Aboriginal 
Population of Central Mexico on the Eve of the Spanish Conquest 
53. 
feel that once the Indian population had dropped below the ~critical'· 
level of two million, the economy of New Spain became severely constrained, 
10 
with trans-Atlantic trade suffering as a consequence. As Spanish 
imports from the Americas were predominantly precious metals, a decline 
in trade in the early seventeenth century confirms the conclusions of 
Hamilton's research; that imports of silver from the Americas declined 
sharply in the seventeenth century. Again, this was seen to imply a 
decline in output from the Spanish-American mines. And as China was a 
destination for Spanish-American silver from the mid sixteenth century 
onwards, any decline in output from these mines would have affected it, 
just as it had Spain. 
The problem with this perspective, however, is that it was based 
on analyses of the Spanish end of the trade network. More recent studies 
on the American end of this network reveal that a decline in imports to 
Seville does not necessarily imply a decline in output in the Americas. 
Brading and Cross suggest that "The seventeenth century crisis was first 
and foremost a Spanish crisis ..•. Throughout the seventeenth century 
the mines of Mexico and Peru continued to produce great quantities of 
silver. '! 11 If this is true then perhaps China did not suffer a reduced 
supply of silver from the Americas during the seventeenth century; a 
Spanish Crisis does not necessarily imply a Chinese crisis, What, then, 
do we know of Spanish-American silver production in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth. centuries? 
(Berkeley, 1963) , p. 4 and p. 88. 
10Peter John Bakwell, Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico: 
Zacatecas 1546-1700 (Cambridge, 19711, pp. 226-236 1 contests the Chaunus' 
claim that two million was a critical level and points out that the 
most drastic population decline, from 20 million to 2.5 million Indians, 
occurred in the sixteenth, not the early seventeenth century. Bakwell 
also contests the view that the mines of New Spain were dependent on a 
large labour ,force. On p. 128 he notes that the total Indian labour 
fo.rce at Zacatecas was never more than 5 1 000 and that these were mostly 
free. labourers·. H-e relates output of silver to supplies of mercury, not 
to the level of available labour. 
11 · ·1 ' ' M ' d D.A. Brading and H.E. Cross, "Colon1al S1 ver M1n1ng: ex1co an 
Peru," Hispanic American Historical Review, 52 (1972). p. 576. 
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The. diHcovery p.nd development of the silver reserves of Spanish-America 
occurred at the. same time as the silver mines of Japan were being brought 
into production. Between 1545 and 1556 silver reserves were discovered 
throughout the cordilleras of the western Sierra Monte of New Spain. The 
most notable mining centres to develop from these discoveries were 
Zacatecas, Guanajuato, Pachiuca, Real del Monte, and Sombrerete, Another 
,I 
important mining site situated near Zacatecas~ San Luis Potosi, was not 
developed until later in the sixteenth century. In the Viceroyalty of 
" Peru the most i1nportant discovery proved to be that made at Potosi in 
1545. Other important Andean mines such as Porco and Oruru came into 
. . . d 12 product~on in the same per~o • There were also silver deposits in the 
Tegucigalpa region of Central America that were developed at this time, 
but their output was insufficient to meet local demand 1 let alone sustain 
the massive level of exports that came from the mines of New Spain and 
13 Peru. 
Production from the Spanish-American mines increased dramaticaliy 
with the spread of the mercury amalgam process.. It was a process 
whereby crushed ore was mixed with salt/ water and mercury to give. an 
. . 14 eas~ly refinable and separable substance, It was also a much cheaper 
way of producing silver than the older cupellation method and therefore 
allowed miners to profit from the working of lower grade ores., Mercury 
use spread rapidly through New Spain in the 1550s but did not reach 
,1 I 
Potosi until 1573. Production at Potosi immediately prior to the 
introduction of the mercury amalgam process had declined, from 2 1 599 1 720 
pesos (66,449 kgs.t in 1565 to ~,082,585 pesos (27,671 kgs._l in 1572, 
as the rich sur·fuce ore which had initially sustained high output began to 
12Pierre Vilar, A History of Gold and Money, 1450-1920 {London 1976) 
pp. 117-121. 
13Murdo J. Macleod, Spanish Central America: A socioeconomic History, 
1520-1720 (Berkeley, 1973), pp. 58-60. 
14Brading and Cross, "Colonial Silver Mining," p. 552, claim that 
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. ' ' 15 d1m1.n1sh. With_ the introduction of mercury and the conscription of 
I 
a large and regular labour supply production at Potosi soared. By 1585 
output had increased to 7,632,275 pesos (195,081 kgs.}. 
Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Viceroyalty 
in Peru demanded a constant 20 per cent of silver production as tax 
(quinto). Some silver would have inevitably escaped government account, 
yet it is doubtful whether this was of such a significant volume as to 
invalidate the long-term production trend that is revealed by the 
cartas cuentasjl or treasury records, of the administration. Harry E. 
Cross has studied these records and thereby has been able to determine 
, 
total output from the Potosi mines, as well as venturing estimates for 
th.e overall production from all silver mines within the Viceroyalty of 
; 
Peru. His estimates are based on the known output from Potosi and some 
other mines, as well as on the amount of mercury consumed by the whole 
Peruvian mining industry during these years. Figure Two presents his 
results graphically. 
mercury amalgam process was discovered in New Spain by a merchant from 
Seville in 1554; whereas Vilar, A History, pp, 117-1181 claims the 
process was introduced to the Americas from Europe in 1556-7. 
15
cross, ''South American bullion production,'' pp. 404-405p 
Cross uses pesos de a echo of 272 maravedis and converts to kgs. at 
a rate of 0.02875 kgs. of-0.981 fineness. I have converted from peso~ 
at a rate of 0 .. 025561 kgs. J?Ure silver (.see appendix). 
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This trend of a decline. in output from the Peruvian silver mines 
during the seventeenth century tends to support the impression gained 
from the Seville-based studies of Earl J. Hamilton and the Chaunus, 
although the decline is much less dramatic than what had been implied 
from their research. When we move from Peru to New Spain the situation 
is quite different, with production increasing 1 if only slightly, 
throughout the seventeenth century. 
, 
Whereas silver production i'1t Potosi was intense and shortlived, 
d . . . 1 . b . d 16 pro uct1on 1n New Spa1n was ess dramat1c ut more susta1ne • 
16silver production at Potosi declined gradually after its late 
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Administratively, the mines of New Spain were subordinated to those at 
.. 
Potosi. This. is shown by the fact that a decline in the supply of mercury 
from the Peruvian mines at Ruancavelicia resulted in supplies of 
, 
European mercury being redirected from New Spain to meet Potosi's needs. 
As a consequence, officials in New Spain showed a renewed interest in 
obtaining supplies of mercury from China. In 1612 two hundred quintals 
(approximately 10,000 kgs. ). of Chinese mercury had been sent across the 
Pacific in the Manila galleons, but the Spanish administrators in 
Manila were not able to obtain regular supplies of mercury from China 
and New Spain found it could not make up its deficit in this way,17 
With mercury in short supply many miners in New Spain were forced to 
revert to th.e smelting of ore. Some relief came after 1645 when mercury 
from the Almaden mines of southern Spain was once more sent to New Spain, 
yet these mines were past their peak and the supply was insufficient to 
meet demand. The consequence of this for the mines of New Spain was 
that they failed to meet their true potential, something that did not 
come until the e.ighteenth century when regular supplies of mercury were 
obtained from Europe and Peru. 
A study similar to that done by Harry E. Cross on the treasury 
records of the Viceroyalty of Peru has been undertaken by John J. \fePaske and 
Herbert s .Klein for New Spain. 18 Their work was frustrated, however, 
by the fact that the level of government taxation in New Spain did not 
sixteenth. century peak and although there was a modest rise again in 
the 1730s output never really climbed again. By contrast, production 
in New Spain rose slightly in the seventeenth century and only began 
to reach peak levels in the eighteenth century. 
17Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, VII, p. 237, contains 
the translation of a letter from Philip III thanking the Governor and 
Captain-General of the Philippines for obtaining this Chinese mercury. 
18 John J. TePaske and Herbert S. Klein, "The Seventeenth Century Crisis 
in New Spain: Myth or Reality?/' ·Past 90 (February 1 1981) , 
pp. ll6-135. 
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remain constant throughout the seventeenth century, as it had in Peru. 
Originally the tax was set at 20 per cent of production, yet as early 
as 1548 some miners were obtaining reductions that brought the level 
of taxation down as low as 10 per cent. Brading and Cross have noted 
how "In Zacatecas, the proportion of silver taxed at the old 20 per 
cent rate fell slowly in an uneven curve between 1559 and 1626, from 
19 
about a quarter to a seventh of the total." This variation in the 
level of tax imposed means that calculations as to the overall level of 
production which are based on the treasury records can only yield a range 
of estimates, somewhere within which the actual level of production 
would lie. 
The average annual revenue accruing to the administration in New 
Spain through its treasuries increased from 303,890 pesos in the decade 
1580-1589 to 469,150 pesos in the decade 1690..;169.9 .. 20 Throughout the 
century revenue increased slowly, with a peak of 623 1 810 pesos achieved 
in the decade 1670-1679. If the government taxed production at a rate 
of 20 per cent, this would indicate an increase in total production from 
0.38 million kilograms in the period 1580-1589, to 0.60 million kilograms 
in the period 1690-1699; whereas, if the government taxed production at 
a rate of only lO per cent this would indicate an increase in total 
production from 0.77 million kilograms to l.2 million kilograms over the 
same period. Actual production may have been anywhere between these two 
estimates. But the important thing to note is that production increased 
slightly throughout the seventeenth century. 
Silver production remained high in both New Spain and Peru during 
19Brading and Cross, ncolonial Silver Mining", p. 561. 
20 TePaska and Klein, "The. Seventeenth Century Crisis in New Spain," 
pp. 124-127 Table One. 
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the seventeenth century, with the sl:ight increase in output in New Spain 
being insufficient to offset the decline in output from the South American 
mines. Total Spanish-American production by 1700 was possibly only 
a little more than half what it had been at the beginning of the century. 
But this fall-of£ in output was not as great as was th.e decline of 
silver imported to Seville. The discrepancy is explained by a number of 
factors. Firstly, tne income and expenditure accounts of the various 
treasuries (.cajas_J confirm the suggestion made by John Lynch, that the 
proportion of precious metal retained in the Spanish colonies for the 
purposes of administration and defense increased throughout the 
21 
seventeenth century~ Secondly, contraband trade in the Indies increased 
during the century. From a study of Dutch sources and the reports of 
foreign ambassadors in Madrid, Michel Marineau has shown that while 
official imports of silver to Seville declined toward the middle of the 
seventeenth. century, contraband shipments increased from the 1660s 
22 
onwards. Thirdly, and most importantly for our discussion, evidence 
suggests that at the same time as Seville was suffering a reduced flow 
of silver from Spanish-America, the amount of Mexican silver shipped to 
the Philippines increased considerably. From a comparison of the quantity 
of public revenue remitted from New Spain to Seville with that remitted 
to the Philippines, John J. TePaske has found that between 1581 and 1800 1 
83 per cent went to Seville while only 17 per cent ll,l23, 000 kgs .1 went 
t h h 'l' . 23 o t .e P .l lpplnes. During the early years of the seventeenth century, 
however, remissions to Seville declined, while those to the Philippines 
increased to around 25 per cent of the total. Then in the 1640s over 
21 John Lynch, Spain and the Habsburgs: Spain and· America 1598-'-1700 ;rr 1 (Oxford, 1969), pp. 168 and 212-226. For a discussion of how Lynchts 
views. concur with the evidence of the treasury records see TePaske and 
Klein, "The Seventeenth Century Crisis in New Spain," pp. 131-135. 
22 
. I d 1 ' . d b F d B d 1 Mor1neau s data an cone us1ons are summar1ze y ernan rau e , 
The Wheels of Commerce (London, 1982), p.l74. 
23 John J. TePaske, "New World Silver 1 Castile and the Philippines, 
1590-1800, 11 PMLMEMW, pp. 425-445, particularly p. 434. 
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4Q per cent of the puhli.c revenue exported from New Spain went to the 
Philippines, Administrators in Manila had been requesting an increase 
in funding for many years and this redirecting of revenue away from 
Seville may well have been a belated response to such. requests. 
Commenting on this TePaske and Klein write: 
This shift in the flow of Mexican crown revenues may 
suggest a re-ordered colonial economy in which locally 
produced and Far Eastern goods came to replace 
European products.24 · 
What was Spain 1 s loss was, at least in part, China"s gain .. 
The Traffic of Spanish-American Silver to China 
The Philippines Connection 
The most important and most direct way in which silver from Spaints 
American colonies reached China was via the Spanish trade network across 
the Pacific. The foundation to this network was laid in 1564/5 when a 
Spanish fleet under the command of Miguel Lopez de Legaspi sailed across 
the central Pacific from New Spain, 
Philippines. After considerable difficulties a return route across the 
northern Pacific was discovered and the annual sailings of what became 
25 known as the ''Manila Galleons t began. Sailing west from Acapulco and 
then returning via the northerly route, these galleons facilitated a 
trade that was the lifeblood of the Spanish in the Philippines and the 
source of a great deal of silver for the Chinese. 
The Spanish shifted their settlement from Cebu to Manila Bay in 1571 
and the following year Chinese junks arrived in the harbour laden ~ith 
merchandise. The Chinese brought raw and woven silks, brocades, damasks, 
satins, some cotton cloth, musk, benzoin, and ceramics. In return, they 
took only silver. When describing this trade in his Sucesos de las Islas 
Filipinas, Antonio de Morga wrote: 
24TePaske and Klein, "The Seventeenth Century Crisis in New Spain," p. 135 · 
The purchase price is paid in silver and reals, tor the 
Sa_ngleys (Chinese merchants) do not want gold, or any 26 
other articles, and will not take other things to China. 
A profit of 400 per cent was reported for the shipment of raw Chinese 
silk from Manila to Acapulco in the late sixteenth century and the 
Viceroy of Peru claimed in 1594 that he could clothe his wife irt 
Chinese silks for half the price it would cost to do so in Spanish 
27 garments. 
Such a profitable trade is explained by the cheapness of Chinese 
goods in Manila as compared to the value of silver. In Spain and the 
61. 
New World, the relative value of silver to gold fell steadily from l2.l2:1 
in the period 1566-1608, to 13.13:1 in the period 1609-1642, to 15.45:1 
in the period 1643-l686, and finally to 16.48:1 in the period 1686-1700. 28 
From Table One we know that the relative value of silver to gold was only 
8:1 in China up until the 1630s. It fell to 10:1 and then to 13:1 at its 
lowest point in the period 1637-1640, thereafter rising again to 10:1 in 
the second half of the century. Thus, not only could Peruvian and New 
Spanish merchants. get better value for money by investing in Chinese rather 
than European merchandise, they could also realize considerable profits 
simply by shipping silver to Manila where the Chinese demand for it was 
great. 
25 Schurz, The Manila Galleon. 
26A full translation of Antonio de Morga, 'Sucesos de las Islas 
Filipinas," is found in Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 
Volumes XV and XVI; see in particular Volume XVI, pp. 178-182. 
27 Ibid. , XI, p. 111, contains a letter from the Royal Fiscal in 
Manila to the King of Spain in which the 400 per cent profit was reported. 
And the comment of the Viceroy in Peru is found in Woodrow W. Borah, 
Early Colonial Trade and Navigation Between Mexico and Peru (Berkeley, 1954), 
p. 122. 
28Earl J. Hamilton, American Treasure, p.71; and also Hamilton's, 
War and Prices in Spain, 1651-1800 (Cambridge, Mass., 1947)., pp. 24-25. 
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In the early years of this trans-Pacific trade the volume of exchange 
increased rapidly, so much so that merchants from New Spain and Peru were 
competing to invest in the cargoes of the galleons. In the Philippines, 
the Chinese population grew from about 40. in 1570 to more than 15,000 by 
1600 and each year large numbers of merchants sailed from the ports of 
Fujian and Gua11gdong to trade in Manila. 29 This sudden and dramatic 
increase in the volume of trade provoked an angry response from merchants 
in Seville, who realized they now had to face competition in the Spanish-
American markets. Intense pressure from these Sevillian merchants resulted 
in the Spanish crown imposing restrictions on the. galleon trade of the 
Pacific. In 1582 direct trade between the Philippines and Peru was 
prohibited and in 1587 Peruvian merchants were forbidden from investing 
in the galleon trade at Acapulco. Six years later the galleon trade was 
restricted to two ships annually, each to be no more than 300 tons, A 
limit, or eermfso' of 500,000 eesos was set on the amount of silver to 
be sent annually to Manila and in return only 250,000 pesos worth of 
30 
merchandise was to be brought back to Acapulco. 
These restrictions remained in force throughout the seventeenth 
century and were not amended until early in the eighteenth century. Yet, 
in practice, the volume of trade far exceeded that legally permitted • 
. Perul eros (.ships from Peru) were regular visitors to Acapulco and 
Borah estimates that 
.... the silver involved in the Mexican-Peru trade must have 
been upwards of two million and perhaps three million silver 
pesos ~Y the 1590~. Most of this total represented payment 
for Chinese merchandise bought in Acapulco, the silver being 
sent on to the Philippines, where a large part of it was 
29These figures on the Chinese population in Manila are given by 
Atwell, "International Bullion Flows," p. 73. 
30Translations of the edicts restricting trade are found in Blair 
and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, VIII, p. 316 and XII, pp. 46-47. 
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d 1 . d . 31 e 1vere to the Ch1nese. 
In its efforts to stop Peruvian silver being diverted into the Acapulco 
trade, the Spanish crown eventually prohibited all trade and shipping 
between Mexico and Peru (.in 1634) . Yet Peruvian silver continued to flow 
north, and it remained the case that it was more profitable to invest in 
Chinese goods at Acapulco than to invest in Spanish and European 
merchandise at Portobello on the isthmus of Panama. Mexican merchants 
also invested heavily in this profitable trade, despite the constant 
1 . f h . '11 32 comp a1nts o t e merchants 1n Sev1 e. 
When it comes to calculating the actual volume of American silver 
that left Acapulco for Manila we are faced with the same problem as 
encountered in other areas of this study, the lack of precise data, and 
this is particularly so in this case because of the illegal nature of 
the trade. Yet we do get some indication of the volume of silver involved 
from the reports of contemporary observers of the trade and from the 
recent work of John TePaske. For instance, the Archbishop of Manila, 
Fray Ygnacio de Santibanez, wrote in 1598 that "There comes each year 
from Nueva Espana a million in money, contrary to the mandate of your 
Majesty, all of which passes to the heathen of China." 33 In 1602, 
Fray Martin Ygnacio de Loyala estimated that the volume of silver 
. . 1 . 2 '11' 34 arr1v1ng annually from Acapu co was approx1mately m1 1on pesos. 
Writing thirty-one years later, Don Juan Cerezo de Salamanca estimated 
35 
that about 2 million pesos continued to flow yearly from Acapulco. 
31 Borah, Early Colonial Trade, p. 123. 
32
such complaints by the merchants of Seville are found in Blair 
and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, XIV, p. 214 and XXII, p. 279. 
33 b'd 145 Il.,X,p .. 
34 b'd 59 I 1 ., XXII, p. . 
35 b'd 292 I 1 . , XXIV, p . . 
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And in his admirable defence of the galleon trade, Juan Grau y Monfalcon 
noted that it was foolish to claim, as some of the critics of the trade 
did, that up to 10 or 12 million pesos flowed annually from Acapulco 
to Manila. How could two ships, he claimed, possibly carry all the 
36 
merchandise which such quantities of silver would buy. 
Thanks to the work of John TePaske we do know something of the 
quantity of public revenue sent from New Spain to the Philippines and 
he has also found that the Acapulco records reveal some data regarding 
h . . . 1 . th . d 37 t e quant1ty of pr1vate s1lver eav1ng e port for the Ch1na tra e. 
As has already been mentioned, this was an illegal trade and considerably 
more silver would have been shipped off than that which was recorded. 
But TePaske's data is useful, especially when combined with what we 
know of the tax collected on silver exported through Acapulco from the 
work of Pierre Chaunu, for giving an indication of the changing nature 
of silver shipments throughout the century. This data has been collated 
in Table Seven and suggests that the peak years of silver export from 
the Americas to Manila, and thence to China, were those between 1600 
and 1640. 
36 b'd 174 I 1 ., XXVII, p. 
37 TePaske, "New World Silver," p.445 Table 5. 
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TABLE SIX 
Silver Remitted from Acapulco to Manila, 1581-1700 
Period Public Sector Private Sector Almojarifazgo_ Total 
Pesos 
1581-1590 1,259,651 
1591-1600 466,016 
1601-1610 1,174,782 
1611-1620 2,541,652 
1621-1630 3,620,573 
1631-1640 3,672,874 
1641-1650 2,206,810 
1651-1660 1,508,388 
1661-1670 1,379,509 
1671-1680 1,628,439 
1681-1690 1, 952,190 
1691-1700 1,661,385 
Sources: 
Kilograms Pesos Kilograms Tax (pesos) 
32,198 - ·- -
11,912 578,170 141779 1,715,37 
30,030 3,516,513 89,886 7,467.00 
64,967 5,048,118 129,035 7,015.00 
92,545 5,423,822 138,638 8,245.20 
93,882 3,509,871 89,716 5,723.40 
56,408 1,759,706 44,980 3,980.20 
38,556 2,015,681 51,523 5,700.13 
35,262 
- -
2,991.97 
41,625 - - 3,792.70 
49,900 
- - -
42,467 - - -
Total 
TePaske, "New World Silver," Table 4 p.444 and 
Table 5 p.445. 
(KiJogram~ 
32,198+ 
26,691 
119,916 
1941002 
231,183 
183,598 
101,388 
90,079 
35,262+ 
41,625+ 
49,900+ 
42,467+ 
1, 14.8,309 
Chaunu, Les Philippines, pp. 135-143. The Almojarifazgo 
tax was a levy of 5/6th of 2% (1.67%) imposed on all 
silver passing through Acapulco on the galleons. 
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If this data was subdivided into five rather than ten year periods it 
would reveal that the fall-off in the export of silver from Acapulco 
occurred after 1635, not after 1640. This was a result of the arrival in 
Acapulco in 1635 of a new customs inspector, who immediately began a more 
vigorous· check on all commerce through the port. Discovering that far 
more cargo arrived on the galleons than was declared, the inspector, Don 
Pedro de Quiroga, placed an embargo on all goods and refused to allow them 
to be sold until taxes and fines had been paid. 38 Trade was disrupted 
for the next few years and little silver reached the Philippines. The 
situation was not helped when two galleons sent out in 1639 were wrecked 
b f h . '1 39 e ore reac 1ng Man1 a. As a consequence, many Spanish merchants in 
Manila were unable to meet the debts they had accumulated in their trade 
with the Chinese and the resultant tension erupted in a violent conflict, 
with many Chinese being killed. 40 The junk trade through Manila fell-
off in 1640 and 1641, but then increased once more in 1642. 41 The 
Chinese merchants seemed willing to forget the conflict and return to a 
stable trading relationship, yet the recovery was to be only temporary. 
This time it was events on the Chinese mainland which upset the trade. 
Following the Qing conquest of Beijing in 1644 the new administration 
found that resistance to its rule was strongest along the Chinese coast 
and the ensuing civil conflict in this region over the next forty years 
meant Chinese overseas trade was severely inhibited. The nadir in the 
Chinese-Manila trade, as with the Sino6apanese trade, was the period 
from 1661-1684, when China's ports were closed and the coastal population 
was drawn many miles inland. Figu~e Three shows how the volume of silver 
38 Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, XXX, pp. 50-52; and 
also Atwell, 11 Notes on Silver," p. 11. 
39Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, XXIX, p. 194 
40
rbid., pp. 208-258. More than 20,000 Chinese were said to have 
been killed in the Philippines during this conflict. 
41 Chaunu, Les Philippines, pp. 157-160. 
arriving in the Philippines changed in relation to the frequency of 
visits by Chinese junks to Manila, thereby revealing a possible trend 
in the volume of Spanish-American silver reaching China via the 
Philippines throughout the seventeenth century. 42 
67. 
42The data used to compile this graph comes from Table Seven and 
from Chaunu, Les Philippines, pp. 148-173. Chaunu himself gives a good 
diagramatic description of the volume of silver flowing through Manila 
.... 
into the Asian world in his article, "Manila at Macao, face a la 
conjoncture des XVIe at XVIIe si'ecles," Annales E.S.C., 17, 3 (Mai-juin, 
19621, pp. 555-580. 
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As this graph shows, it was the sealing off of China's coast in the 
1660s and 1670s which caused the most disruption to the Chinese-Manila 
trade. Earlier in the century, from around 1610 until 1625, there had 
been some disturbance to the regularity of the trade due to an outburst 
of Dutch piracy. Frustrated by their inability to establish for 
themselves a niche in the Far East, the Dutch took by force what they 
could get from others. Undoubtedly some Chinese junks were lost to the 
Dutch and many others would have been dissuaded from making the voyage 
to Manila, but the Spanish were concerned that the trade continue and 
fl f f h h . 43 sent out eets to ensure sa e passage or t e C lnese. Spanish-
American silver continued to reach China, despite the piracy, and once 
the Dutch obtained their base on Taiwan in 1625 they settled down to 
play a more pacific role in the East. From the perspective of the 
whole seventeenth century, the ~utch efforts to prevent silver reaching 
China were never as effective as was the policy of maritime prohibitions 
implemented by the Qing administration from 1661 until 1683. 
The China-Manila trade moved back into a regular rhythm after 1684, 
but it was a slow recovery and the peak years of the late 1620s and 
early 1630s were not to be relived during the remainder of the century. 
The Connection 
The longest and most convoluted silver routes to China were those 
via Europe. In his detailed description of the sixteenth century 
Mediterrannean world, Fernand Braudel emphasized the existence of an 
east-west axis linking the Spanish-American silver mines through the 
Mediterannean to the markets of Asia. He described this axis as a 
43Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, XIX, pp. 68-69 
contains a translation of an anonymous report on events in 1619-1620. 
It describes Spanish concern over this trade and how fleets were 
dispatched to ensure the Chinese junks reached Manila in safety. 
"structure, a permanent and outstanding feature of the world economy 
44 
which remained undisturbed until the twentieth century." Despite 
strong mercantilist resistance, this eastward flow of silver remained 
a permanent feature of Europe's relationship with Asia. 
The reasons for this constant loss of silver to Asia are twofold. 
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Firstly, as noted elsewhere, it was profitable to carry silver to Asia, 
and in particular to China. Secondly, Asia benefited directly from 
I • h I '1 • I 45 Europe s s~xteent century s~ ver revolut~on . The consistent 
population growth during the century combined with the massive influx 
of silver from the Americas to produce an increased aggregate demand 
in Europe, part of which was expressed in a demand for more Asian 
products. Generally the Europeans would have preferred to have been 
able to p~y for these Asian goods with their own produce. They found, 
however, that Asians wanted little else but silver and thus to redress 
trade deficits with Asian markets silver was exported to the East. 
Europe's own silver production declined in the second half of the 
sixteenth century. From a peak output of more than 90,000 kilograms 
annually in the 1520s and 1530s production from the central European 
mines had declined to about 28 1 000 kilograms.· annually in the first two 
46 decades of the seventeenth century. This decline in production is 
largely attributable to the massive influx of Spanish-American silver 
to Europe during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Each 
year from the ports of Vera Cruz and Portobello the flota de plata 
carried silver to Cadiz in Spain. In the early seventeenth century 
,; 
silver also escaped from Potosi down the River Plate to Buenos Aires 
44 Braudel, The Mediterranean, I, p. 500. Another description of 
this 'leakage' of silver from Europe to Asia is found in John Day, 
"The Great Bullion Famine," Past·and Present, 79 (May, 1978), pp. 3-54. 
45 Spooner 1 The International Economy, .P. 26. 
46John U. Nef, "Silver Production in Central Europe, 1450-1618," 
Journal of Political Economy, 49 (1941}, p. 590. 
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and from there it was shipped by the Portuguese to Lisbon. The volume 
of 'contraband' silver travelling this route probably declined 
throughout the seventeenth century as the Spanish became more rigorous 
47 in their efforts to prevent such losses. As the seventeenth 
century progressed, however, more 'contraband' silver was lost to Spain 
as English, Dutch, and French ships increased their presence in the 
Caribbean ports. While official imports of silver declined from 1600 
to 1650, contraband imports to Amsterdam and other north European ports 
48 
steadily increased, reaching their peak at the end of the century. 
But the principal mechanism of this Atlantic trade was the flota de 
silver annually to Cadiz. 
From Spain most of the silver was drawn out into the economies of 
Europe. Whether to finance the armies of the Spanish crown or simply 
to pay for the European merchandise which Spain transshipped to its 
American colonies, silver flowed out of Seville as fast as it flowed in. 
Fernand Braude! and Frank Spooner give a good description of this: 
The moment a silver fleet arrived from America, one money 
market after another in Europe experienced successively 
'largesses' or easy money conditions: that is to say, 
abundance of coin, of 'ready' cash and bills of exchange, 
the one usually accompanying the other ••• money cascaded 
from person to person and from money market to money market. 
However, symmetry and regularity were lacking in these 
movements: the circi1e· did not always complete itself. 
Bullion was constantly drained off by way of the Baltic, the 
Levant and the Cape of Good Hope to the Near and Far East. 49 
The oldest mechanism whereby silver was 'drained off' to the East 
was that of the Levant trade. This trade received a great boost with 
47Lewis Hanke, "The Portuguese in Spanish America, with special 
reference to the villa Imperial de Potosi:," Revista de Historia de 
America, 15 (June, 1961), pp. 1-48. 
48 Braude!, The Wheels of Commerce, p. 174. 
49 II ' • f 1450 Fernand Braude! and Frank C. Spooner, Pr1ces 1n Europe rom 
to 1750," in E.E. Rich and C.H. Wilson (eds.), The Cambridge Economic 
History of Europe, IV (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 374-480. 
with the increased flow of silver into Spain and especially from the 
1570s onwards as Genoese bankers gained control over the flow of coin 
and bullion in and out of Seville. The Genoese, in turn, sold much 
of this silver to the merchants of Venice and Florence, who then 
profited from investing it in the Levant trade. The parity of silver 
to gold fell steadily in the Spanish empire from 12.12:1 at the end 
of the sixteenth century to 16.48:1 at the end of the seventeenth 
century, whereas, in Ottoman lands, silver was more highly valued, 
rising from 11.01:1 in 1600 to 10.47:1 in 1618. 50 Asian products 
flowed into the Mediterranean either via the Red Sea, Cairo and 
Alexandria, or via the Gulf, Basra and Aleppo. Frank Spooner notes 
that in the period 1610-1614 official exports of silver from Venice 
alone to the Dalmatian coast and the Levant amounted to almost 6 per 
cent of the silver which at that time was imported into Seville from 
the Americas. "Could more precise and extensive details/' he writes, 
"have left a less impressive picture." 51 
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English and Dutch merchants, who had been trading in the Mediterranean 
world since the late sixteenth century, also purchased silver in the 
52 ports of Genoa, Leghorn and Venice for their transactions in the Levant. 
The Genoese lost some control over the silver of Spain, however, with 
the increasing involvement of Portuguese bankers in Seville and then 
with the signing of the Cottington Treaty in 1630. As a result of this 
treaty, English ships began to carry much of Spain's silver north to 
Flanders in return for bills drawn at Antwerp. Later in the century 
. . 53 Dutch ships took over the shipments of s1lver from Spa1n. 
5
°For sources to the Spanish data see Note 28. The Ottoman figures 
come from Halil Sahillioglu, "The role of international monetary and 
metal movements in Ottoman monetary history," PMLMEMW, p. 283. 
51 Spooner, The International Economy, p. 76 
52 Braudel, The Mediterranean, I, pp. 462-517, gives a vivid picture 
of this trade. 
53B.E. Supple, Commercial Crisis and Change in England 1600-1642: 
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As a consequence of tnese shifts in the flow of bullion not as much 
silver flowed into the Mediterannean world. But silver did continue 
to flow this way, and in sizeable quantities. In 1694, for instance, 
a Gujarati ship, the Canj-i Sawai, reportedly returned from Jeddha with 
54 5 million rupees worth of silver (approx. 56,650 kgs.). Similarly, 
Dutch records reveal that in the latter years of the seventeenth 
century, Asian merchants alone returned annually from the Red Sea port 
55 
of Mocha with around 6 million rupees worth of silver (approx. 67,980 kgs). 
These reports of large amounts of silver flowing through the Levant 
in the late seventeenth century tend to contradict the thesis of Niels 
Steensgaard, that a 'structural revolution' had occurred in Asian trade 
56 
earlier in the century. Steensgaard feels that the new corporate 
organizations, the English and Dutch East India Companies, did what the 
Portuguese had been unable to do; they caused a dramatic shift in the 
Asian-European axis, away from the Levant routes and to the sea route 
around the Cape. There is no doubting the fact that the Companies were 
well aware of the importance of the Levant trade. Sir Thomas Roe wrote 
to the English East India Company in London in 1616 that he felt gaining 
control of the traffic into the Red Sea was "more important than all 
other projects!1 He suggested that Company merchants should go with 
"the Gujaratis and trade for themselves for money, which is taken in 
abundance. . . • The profit exceeds all the trade of India." 57 
A Study of the Instability of a Mercantile Economy (Cambridge, 1959), 
p. 164 n.l; and for a more general discussion of this shift in bullion 
flows see Fernand Braudel, The Perspective of the World (London, l984),p.l70. 
54Aziza Hasan, "Mughal Silver Currency -A Reply," Indian Economic 
and Social History Review, 7, 1 (March, 1970), p. 155. 
55 Joseph J. Brennig, "Silver in seventeenth century Surat: Monetary 
circulation and the price revolution in Mughal, India," PMLMEMW; p. 481. 
56Niels Steensgaard 1 The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth 
57Balkrishna Govind Gokhale, Surat in Seventeenth Century: A Study 
in Urban History of pre-modern India, (London, 1979), p. 97. 
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Steensgaard feels that the joint Anglo-Dutch-Persian effort against the 
Portuguese at Hormuz in 1622 was a symbolic turning point, the focus 
of structural change, after which the English and Dutch ships diverted 
increasing quantities of Asian merchandise to the southern sea lanes. 
There is no doubt that during the seventeenth century the two 
companies developed their trade in Asia and that some of this was 
diverted around the Cape of Good Hope. But it should be remembered that 
both companies were involved in the inter-port trade of Asia, what the 
English called the 'country trade', and that this was an existing trade 
network that was centuries old. Dutch records of precious metal imports 
to Surat in 1643-44 show that there had not been a 'structural revolution' 
in Asian trade by this date. Only 28 per cent of the silver shipments 
to Surat in these years came via the Cape route. Another 19 per cent 
was silver brought by the Dutch from Japan, while 53 per cent came via 
58 
the Levant trade of the Red Sea and the Gulf. These Dutch records 
show that 26,795 kilograms of silver was imported to Surat in these 
years, while by the end of the century Indian ships alone were bringing 
59 
over 67,000 kilograms annually to Surat from Mocha in the Red Sea. 
Ashin Das Gupta has estimated that the total turnover of Surat at the 
end of the seventeenth century was well over 16 million rupees, of which 
60 
only 1.5 million would have been handled by European merchants. 
Rather than a structural crisis and subsequent decline in the Levant 
trade, it seems to have been the case that increasing amounts of 
silver were reaching Surat from the Mediterranean world by the second 
half of the seventeenth century. 
Surat was the great commercial centre of northwest India in the 
58Brennig, "Silver in seventeenth century Surat," p. 479. 
59Ibid., pp. 479 and 481. 
60Ashin Das Gupta, Gujarati Merchants and the Red Sea Trade 1700-
1725," in Blair B. Klinq and M.N. Pearson, The Age of Partnership 
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seventeenth century. Nearly 25 per cent of all Mughal silver rupees 
up until 1685 came from the mints of this city. 61 All coin and bullion 
imported to Mughal India had to be cast into silver rupee~ and once 
part of the Mughal currency system very little of it re-emerged to be 
exported to other regions. The Dutch did carry some rupees from Surat 
to Batavia between 1699 and 1702 and Chinese merchants may have 
received these through their trade in Southeast Asia. However, there 
is no record of regular shipments of rupee~ from Surat to Batavia 
b f h . . 62 e ore t 1s t1me. 
The alternative way for rupees to reach China in the seventeenth 
century was via the channels of trans-Himalayan trade. From Akbar's 
time (1556-1605) silver rupees were used to purchase Tibetan wool, salt 
and musk. The Malla dynasty in Kathmandu and the administration in 
Coach Bahar had beth established mints by the 1560s and were using their 
own silver coinage in trade with Tibet. Similarly, the Assamese traded 
silver for Tibetan goods and even cast one of their coins with the 
h • 1 , , 63 C 1nese inscription Zang Baa~ or T1betan co1n. Up unil the 1640s 
these kingdoms competed in the trade with Tibet and sizeable amounts of 
silver may have crossed the Himalayas northwards. Shortly before 1650, 
however, the Malla dynasty of Nepal invaded Tibet and as a consequence 
of the victory took over control of Tibetan coinage. From that time 
onwards Tibetans were required to provide silver for this coinage or pay 
(Honolulu, 1979), p. 124. Das Gupta's book, Indian Merchants and the 
Decline of Surat c. l700-c.l750 (Weisbaden, 1979) is one of the best 
counters to the arguments put forward by Steensgaard. 
61 Surendra Gopal, Commerce and Crafts in Gujarat; Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries (New Delhi, 1975), p. 132 n. 76. 
62 Glamann, Dutch Asiatic Trade, p. 67. Between 1699 and 1702 the 
Dutch exported from Surat Indian rupees, Spanish reales, and 'Moorish 
ducats to the value of 0.5 million florins (i.e. approximately 5,000 
kigs. of silver). 
63N.G. Rhodes, "The Development of Currency in Tibet," in Michael 
Aris and Aung San Suu Kyi (eds.) Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh 
Richardson (Oxford, 1979), pp. 261-268. 
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for it with gold. No longer did silver disappear north across the 
Himalayas, much of it would have returned to be cast as Tibetan coins. 
Private trade across the Himalayas was also restricted by the 
difficult geography of the region; this did not stop the trade but it 
did inhibit large quantities of merchandise being carried. The journal 
of the Armenian merchant Hovhannes reveals that in the 1680s merchants 
were carrying silver from India to Lhasa and then on to Xining in China. 
Hovhannes reported that the parity of silver to gold in Xining at this 
time was 7:1, showing that the trade was a profitable one for those who 
were willing to endure an arduous journey. 64 Yet the scale of this 
trade does not seem to have been great and it is difficult to imagine 
large amounts of silver reaching China in this way. 
Very little silver arrived in China by other Central and Inner Asian 
routes in the seventeenth century as east-west trade along the famous 
silk routes had declined by this time. The more central of these routes 
ran north of the Black and Caspian seas, through Astrakan to Khiva, 
Tashkent, Hami and on to China, while the southerly route went from 
Istanbul to Erzurum, Tabriz, Meshed, Bukhara, Kashgar, Aksu, Turfan, 
and also Hami before reaching China. The increased traffic through the 
Levant to the Arabian Sea and that around the Cape of Good Hope from 
the mid-sixteenth century onwards led to a decline of these long and 
difficult land routes. The English merchant Anthony Jenkinson noted 
that trade in Bukhara was poor in 1558, and that no Chinese merchandise 
65 had been seen in the city for three years. Similarly, tribute trade 
64Lvon Khanchikian, "Le registre d'un marchand arnrenien en Perse, en 
Inde et au Tibet (1682-1693) ," Annales E.S.C., 22, 2(rnai-avril, 1967), 
pp. 241-244. The parity of silver to gold fluctuated from around 17:1 to 14:1 
1n the Xudian Subcontinent at this time. 
65 E.D. Morgan and C.H. Coote (eds.), Early Voyages and Travels to 
Russia and Persia by Anthony Jenkinson and other Englishmen (N.Y. , 1966) , 
I, pp. 87-92; also of value for Central Asian trade at this time is 
H.C. D'Encausse, "Les 'l"outes cornrnerciales de l'Asia Centrale et les 
tentatives de reconqu~te d'Astrakhan," Cahiers du Monde Russe et Sovietique 
11, 3(juillet-septembre, 1970), pp. 391-420. 
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reaching China from Central As.ian powers had declined by the seventeenth 
century, with only one mission arriving from Samarkand between 1600 and 
66 1644, and then no more for the rest of the century. It is unlikely, 
therefore, that the Chinese gained much silver from any of these Inner 
Asian sources. 
Nor did China obtain silver from Russia in the seventeenth century. 
Trade between the two empires did increase during the century, and 
particularly following the signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, 
but the Russians saw China as a source of silver, their demand for it 
b . . th h' 67 elng as lntense as was e C lnese. Russian envoys to China were 
consistently advised to seek permission to export not only Chinese silks, 
but also Chinese silver. Sparfarii, who left Moscow in 1675, was 
instructed to negotiate for the right to purchase each year 4,000 poods 
(approx. 86, QOO. kgs .1 of silver in return for Russ ian furs. Similar 
instructions were issued to both previous and subsequent envoys, a 
situation which had not changed by the early eighteenth century. The 
Russian Board of Commerce issued its envoy in 1719 with the following 
directive: 
All potentates strive to bring silver, both in ingots 
and in the form of money, into their hands and to abstain 
from exporting it ... and we fully recognize that6~is 
must be the main concern of all European nations. 
66 J.K. Fairbank and S.Y. Teng, Ch'ing Administration: Three Studies 
(Cambridge, Mass., l96Ut, p. 157. 
67 M.L. Sladkovskii, History of Economic Relations Between Russia 
and China (Jerusalem, 1966), notes on p. 9 that "data on trade at Tomsk 
in 1640, l652 and 1653 (when the town was the centre for Russian trade 
with the Kalmucks, Bukharans, Mongols, and Persiansl shows that no 
Chinese goods penetrated into Russia at that time, either directly or 
through middlemen." As the Russian presence pushed further east into 
Siberia during the century the incidence of exchange with Chinese and 
Inner Asian merchants would have increased, but it was not until the 
treaties signed at Nerchinsk in 1689 and Kiakht~ in 1729 that this trade 
obtained an organized framework. 
68
rbid., p. 29. 
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The Ruas.ians did not have much success in getting silver from China, 
but they did fair better than other European powers in that they did 
manage to conduct a trade with China without drawing on their own 
meager reserves of the metal. 
The Russian failure to obtain silver from China was a singular one; 
in their trade with other regions they were much more successful. The 
Ottoman chronicler, Na'ima, for instance, complained that the "Muscovites 
sell us expensive furs but purchase nothing in the Ottoman dominions and 
69 keep the money for themselves." Similarly, Russian merchants sold 
furs and sables for silver at the markets in Briansk, Smolensk, Mogliev, 
Wilno, Novgorod, the Baltic ports of Reva and Narva, and, after 1553, 
70 
with the. English.and Dutch whn sailed north to Archangel. Mark Mancall 
notes how "Fur was used as a medium of exchange because the Russian 
economy did not yet produce sufficient quantities of gold and silver to 
. 71 
support a monetary system" But the transition to a monetary economy 
was well under way and the demand for silver intense. Thus, although 
silver flowed into Russia from Europe and the Ottoman empire, the 
resistance to its flowing on further east was great. China may well have 
acted like a great 'suction pump~, drawing in silver from around the 
world, but so too did Russia, and this meant that the trade which 
developed between these two empires in the seventeenth century was a 
trade in textile commodities, silks and furs, not a trade in silver. 
69Halil Inalcik1 "The Ottoman Economic Mind and Aspects of the 
Ottoman Economy," in his book, The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization 
and Economy (~ondon, 1978), p. 215; also on this trade see A. Bennigsen 
and C. Lemercie.r..,.Quelquejay, "Les marchands de la cour ottomane et le 
commerce des fourrures muscovites dans la seconde moti~ du XVIe siecle," 
Cahiers du Monde Russe at Sovietique 1 11 1 3 (juillet-septembre, 1970}, 
pp. 363-390. 
70Paul Bushkovitch, The Merchants of Moscow, 1580-1650 (Cambridge 
19801.; and Raymond Henry Fisher, The Russian Fur Trade, 1580-l700 
(Berkeley 1 19431 • 
71Mark Mancall 1 Russia and China: Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728 
(.Cambridge 1 Mass. 1 19711. 1 p .l3. 
79. 
Fina.ily we. mus.t consider the trading mechanism of the two north 
European East India Companies. Founded at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, the English and the Dutch. Companies· came to play an increasingly 
important role in the trading world of Asia and both exported considerable 
quantities of silver to the East. 
Between 1600 and 1640 the English East India Company exported 
£ 1,390,436 worth of coin and bullion to the Asian world, and most of 
h • . th f . h 1 72 t ~s ~n e orm of Span1s rea es. The Company established a 
special 'Committee for Rials' to govern the finance of its trading 
operation and through this committee purchased silver from all over 
Europe, although, after the Cottington Treaty was signed in 1630 and a 
regular supply of the Spanish coin was obtained for England, the 
committee needed spend. :lesE>" time in· this task o£ hunting. dow:n cheap 
sources of silver. By 1613 the English East India Company had built 
two main factories in Asia, one at Surat and one at Bantam, and it was 
to these factories, in particular the one at Surat, that the silver was 
channelled. In the Far East itself the English had found it impossible 
to break into the existing trade networks and in 1623 Richard Cocks and 
his colleagues abandoned their efforts.. 73 The English withdrew to 
Bantam, but concentrated mos.t of their attention on the north Indian 
markets through their Surat factory. Consequently, very little of the 
silver exported by the English East India Company in the first half of 
the seventeenth century would have reached China. Some may have been 
72K.N. Chaudhuri, 'The East India Company and the Export of Treasure 
in the early Seventeenth Century," Economic History Review, 2nd. Series, 
16, 1 (August, 1963), pp. 23-38. 
73Richard Cocks, The Diary of Richard Cocks: Cape-merchant in the 
English Factory in Japan, 1615-1622 (N.Y., 1966), gives a good 
description of East Asian trade at this time and the difficulties the 
English encountered. 
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purchased by Chinese merchants trading at Bantam, but the scale of the 
English operation there was dwarfed by that of the Dutch and it is 
unlikely this trade was of any great consequence. 
The English East India Company's trading operation increased 
considerably in the second half of the seventeenth century, especially 
from the 1680s onwards, with gold and silver accounting for between 70 
74 
and 90 per cent of its exports in these years. The Company shipped 
702,852 kgs. of silver to Asian ports between 1660 and 1700, with most 
of it still going to the Indian subcontinent. Another attempt was made 
to break into the Chinese market in the 1670s when the English gained 
permission from the Zheng family to open a factory at Tainan on Taiwan, 
yet little success was achieved there and with the Qing conquest of Taiwan 
75 the English were again forced from the China coast. In 1682 the 
factory at Bantam was closed and the Company concentrated all its enterprise 
on India. It was not until the eighteenth century that the trade of 
English private merchants at Canton drew the Company back to the China 
coast and significant volumes of silver carried by the English began to 
flow into China. 76 In the seventeenth century, however, silver carried 
by the English East India Company was used principally in Indian markets, 
with little, if any, of it reaching Chinese hands. 
The shipment of precious metal from Europe to Asia by the Dutch East 
India Company, or Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (V.O.C.), has been 
77 the subject of a recent study by F.S .. Gaastra. Working from the 
74K.N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East 
India Company, 1660-1760 (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 153-189. 
75 
· h b ' ' d F ' T k M. Paske-Sm~t , Western Bar ar~ans ~n Japan an ormosa ~n o ugawa 
Days 1603-1868 (N.Y. 1968), pp. 83-106. 
76Dermigny, La Chine et l'Occident. 
77 F.S. Gaastra, "The exports of precious metals from Europe to Asia 
by the Dutch East India Company, 1602-1795," PMLMEMW, pp. 447-475. For 
a general discussion of the activities of both the English and Dutch 
81. 
records of the Company's directors, the Rereen XVII, Gaastra has shown 
how Dutch exports of silver to Asia remained fairly static throughout the 
century, rising only after 1668 when the Japanese prohibited the 
Company from purchasing silver in Nagasaki. Up until that time the 
Dutch had relied on Japanese silver and also the silver they purchased 
in other Asian ports to meet the requirements of their trade in Asia. 
But with the Japanese ban and the flourishing of the Company's trade in 
Bengal, shipments from Europe increased considerably: whereas 86,352 kgs. 
were shipped out of Rolland in the decade 1650-1660, by the period 
78 1690-1700 exports of silver were up to 259,518 kgs. The V.O.C. began 
its trading operation in 1602 and from that time until the end of the 
seventeenth century it shipped to the East 1,177,732 kgs. of silver from 
Europe. 
In Asia itself the Dutch Company channelled most of its trading 
operation through its bases on Java, first at Bantam and later Batavia. 
All oL the silver exported from Europe would have passed through one of 
these bases before being redirected to where the Company's trade 
required it, some staying in Southeast Asia and some being shipped off 
to eastern India. As has been already mentioned, the V.O.C. had little 
direct contact with the Chinese, and during the time it did the silver 
traded was of Japanese origin. The only way that silver exported by the 
Dutch. from Europe would have entered China was in the holds of Chinese 
79 junks which had sailed to Southeast Asian ports to trade. The rhythm 
Company trade in Asia see Holden Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in the 
Orient, 1600-1800 (Minneapolis, 1976).. 
78 Gaastra, "The exports," p. 4 75 Appendix 5. 
79Both Glamann, Dutch Asiatic Trade, p. 54 and Meilink-Roelofsz, 
Asian Trade, pp. 245-2461 describe how Chinese merchants purchased 
Spanish reales and Dutch rixdaller~. in Southeast Asian ports. 
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of this trade would have shown much the same sort of pattern as did 
Chinese trade in Manila; the Philippines were a closer and more favoured 
source of Spanish-American silver than were the ports of Southeast Asia 
and if junks were not reaching Manila it is most unlikely that they would 
have been seen in Bantam or Batavia. Thus, the Chinese trade in Southeast 
Asia during the seventeenth century probably peaked during the first part 
of the century, falling off after the 1640s to be non-existent by the 
1660s and 1670s. After 1684 recovery would have been slow, much as it 
was in Manila. Quantifying the volume of silver entering China in this 
way is impossible, and is perhaps not important. This silver was a very 
minor supplement to those major sources of supply for China, Japan and 
the Spanish-American Philippines trade network. 
Overall Perspective on Silver Entering China 
What sort of picture has emerged regarding the volume of silver 
available to the Chinese throughout the seventeenth century? We know that 
very little of the metal was mined domestically and that the volume in 
circulation in China around 1580 was less than the volume of silver in 
use in Europe at this time. But Europe's great 'silver rush' was coming 
to an end by the 1580s, whereas China's was just about to begin. From the 
1580s on through to the 1640s a tremendous amount of foreign silver 
flooded into China. The peak years were those of the late 1620s and 
early 1630s and it is possible that as much as one and a half thousand 
kilograms of silver were entering China annually at this time. From the 
1640s on imports declined, falling off to be virtually non-existent 
during the 1660s and 1670s, then recovering only slowly through the 
remaining years of the century. To be explicit about the exact amount 
of silver entering at any particular point in time is impossible, the 
data does not allow such precision, yet we do have enough information 
to observe this changing trend throughout the century. 
It seems that domestic factors were of primary importance in 
determining the volume of silver that was able to reach Ch'ina. Even 
though output from the mines of Japan and those at Potosi decreased 
gradually during the century, there was no drastic fall off in 
production which suddenly saw China deprived of silver. Disturbances 
to the trading mechanisms which facilitated the flow of silver to 
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China were of much more importance, with the expulsion of the Portuguese 
from Japan being the most serious of these. Dutch and Chinese ships 
did pick up some of the trade which the Portuguese were forced to 
abandon, but after 1639 no group of foreign merchants had both a 
consistent supply of silver and a base on the Chinese mainland through 
which. to channel that precious metal. This meant that the critical 
factor controlling the flow of silver into China became the ability 
of Chinese merchants to engage freely in trade; if junks were restricted 
from sailing to foreign ports to trade and purchase silver, then silver 
did not enter the empire. And this is precisely what happened in the 
1660s and 1670s when the Qing administration closed China's ports and 
withdrew the coastal population many miles inland. This coastal 
evacuation policy was particularly drastic in the provinces of 
Guangdong and Fujian, the very provinces which had been most active in 
the silver trade. 
Thus, China's seventeenth century crisis was not preceded by a 
contraction in the supply of precious metals, as was the case with 
the crisis in Spain. In fact, the opposite was true, with the 
contraction in imports following not preceeding the crisis. The late 
Ming years saw an unprecedented volume of silver flood into China and 
although the peak years had passed by 1644, great quantities of the 
metal were still imported when the Chongzhen emperor committed suicide 
and the Qing administration took over in Beijing. This new Qing 
administration was even willing to restrict imports of silver in order 
to consolidate its control over the coastal regions of the Chinese 
empire. Political factors were given priority over monetary ones. 
Perhaps that is also how our judgement of factors involved in China's 
seventeenth century crisis should be weighted. The vicissitudes of 
international movements of bullion seem to have played no part in 
precipitating the crisis. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Silver and Society 
Silver cannot be worn when one is cold, nor 
eaten when hungry; it must be exchanged for 
things of use as food or clothing. Yet what 
alternative has there been but to employ 
silver and throw aside copper cash?1 
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The great influx of foreign silver to China from the mid-sixteenth 
century onwards facilitated an increased monetization of the Ming 
economy and this was a trend which was not welcomed by all. The 
quotation cited here, from an official memorial written around 1570, 
reveals a fear that the effect of the increased use of silver would be 
an undermining of the traditional basis to Chinese society. It was 
felt that agriculture would become subservient to commerce and peasants 
would suffer at the hands of a few profiteers. The official continues 
his memorial thus: 
As copper cash increasingly has been thrown aside, silver 
increasingly has dominated in circulation, and as it 
increasingly has dominated in use it has increasingly been 
removed to storehouses, and so silver has become increasingly 
expensive. But as goods have become increasingly cheap 
(relative to silver) , the transaction of converting their 
produce into silver to pay taxes has become increasingly 
difficult (for the commoners). Exploiters have taken 
advantage by buying cheaply (when the commoners all have 
to pay their taxes) and then selling when prices have 
become more expensive. The silver which has come to be 
hoarded by those exploiters continues to pile up, while 
what circulates in the empire diminishes. If this were 
to go on for a few decades more, we do not know where it 
will end. 2 
Implicit in this memorial is a criticism of the court for accumulating 
silver at the expense of the administration and the populace, while 
more explicit criticism is directed at the fiscal innovations of the 
1From the Ming Shi, 214, 5669-70; translated and quoted by Willard 
J. Peterson, Bitter Gourd: Fang I-chih and the Impetus for Intellectual 
Change (New Haven, 1979), p. 69 
2Ibid. 
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Single Whip Reform, whereby landholders could no longer meet their tax 
obligations with grain but had to sell their produce in order to pay 
the state with silver. The spread of cash cropping and the intensification 
of rural marketing networks had been a feature of much of the Chinese 
countryside during the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but it 
was the introduction of the Single Whip Reform and its requirement that 
taxes be paid in silver which did most to encourage the increasing 
monetization of the late Ming economy. As John R. Watt has so succinctly 
remarked, the introduction of the Single Whip Reform meant that the 
fiscal solvency of landholders depended not just on their ability to 
produce, but also on their ability to sell; and this 
obviously favoured thosemore strongly placed to sell 
their produce, through proximity to the market, extent 
of land owned, type and quality of crops produced, size 
of net surplus, or influence within the market system.3 
It was this greater dependence on the market which the memorialist 
feared would result in an increased tension within late Ming society. 
Concisely, then, this memorial directly relates changing patterns of 
money use to emerging social conflict. Such a relationship is the 
concern of this chapter. 
Commercial Expansion: 
The commercial expansion of the late fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries had drawn many peasant households into closer contact with a 
marketing network and a monetary economy. The state itself had contributed 
to this through the demand it created for food and clothing to provision 
its armed forces and administrative services, but the simple fact of 
an increasing population and increasing production led to a more complex 
3 John R. Watt, The District Magistrate in Late Imperial China 
(N.Y., 1972}, p. 156. 
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and sophisticated commercial economy. The staple grains of wheat and 
rice continued to dominate Chinese agriculture, yet more and more 
peasants were moving from the exclusive cultivation of food crops to 
diverse range of products, many of which were intended for sale rather 
than consumption within the household. This transition to a more 
commercially orientated agriculture was most pronounced in the provinces 
of Nan Zhili, Zhejiang and Fujian, where such cash crops as cotton, 
tobacco, mulberry trees, sugar cane and indigo began to supplement and 
replace the cultivation of rice. 
Of all the cash crops involved in this commercial expansion cotton 
was the most widespread. Craig Dietrich estimates that in the late Ming 
and early Qing periods between three-fifths and four-fifths of the 
4 districts in the empire manufactured some cotton cloth. Cotton had 
first appeared in China during the late Song period and by the sixteenth 
century it had become the most important fibre plant in the empire. A 
late fifteenth century commentator, Qiu Jun, wrote that "cotton has 
spread throughout the empire. It is used a hundred times more than 
5 
silk or hemp." While not as strong as silk or as warm as wool, cotton 
had the advantage of being cheaper than both to produce and also of 
being more comfortable than the cloth made from ramie or hemp. 
Xu Guangqi, in his treatise on Chinese agriculture (Nongzheng 
chuanshu,l628l wrote that over half the cultivated land in the Shanghai 
area was devoted to cotton, whlle in the districts of Jiading and 
Taicang in Suzhou prefecture as much as seventy per cent of the land 
4
craig Dietrich, "Cotton Culture and Manufacture in Early Ch'ing 
China," in W.E. Willmott (ed.), Economic Organization in Chinese Society 
(California, 1972), p. lll. Cong Hanxiang is a little more conservative 
in his estimate. For the Ming period as a whole Cong feels that between 
one quarter and one third of all xian in the empire produced cottoni see 
a pr~cis of "A Preliminary Study of the Development of Cotton Planting 
and Textile Industries During the Ming Dynasty," in Albert Feuerwerker 
(ed.), Chinese Social and Economic History From Song to 1900 (Ann Arbor, 
19821 pp. 81-82. 
5Mi Chu Wiens, "Cotton Textile Production and Rural Social 
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was taken up with the cul tivati:m of cotton bolls. 6 These districts 
were part of the productive coastal region of Jiangnan, a densly 
populated area stretching from Nanjing east to the mouth of the Changjiang 
River and south to Hangzhou,and this was the great weaving centre of 
the empire. Raw cotton was transported to Jiangnan from the provinces 
of Huguang, Henan and Shandong, with the finished cloth being returned 
to the markets of these provinces for sale. Zhong Huamin described 
this process when he wrote in 1594, that 11 Half of the fertile land in 
Honar (Henan) is planted with cotton, which all goes into the hands of 
the merchants. Cotton cloth worn by the people here is provided through 
7 the market." The cotton looms of Jiangnan also provided cloth to the 
northern provinces and to Fujian and Guangdong provinces in the south. 
Chu Hua wrote in his Cotton Manual of how 11 people from Fukien ( Fujian J 
and Kwangtung (Guangdong) with boatloads of sugar come to Shanghai 
in the second and third lunar months and in the fall they purchased 
ginned cotton and loaded them [sic) in hundreds and thousands of boats 
8 
to bring them back home." 
Jiangnan looms also supplied the government with cotton cloth. It 
has been estimated that as much as 15 million bolts of cloth were 
required by the government each year so that it could meet the clothing 
needs of soldiers and of officials, as well as of the imperial families. 9 
In order to meet the demand for such a large quantity of cloth the 
Transformation in Early Modern China," Chung-kuo.wen-hua yen-chiu-so 
)\siieh-pao, 7, 2 (December,l974), p. 516. 
6
rbid. I p. 519. 
7Ibid, p. 520. 
8
rbid. 
9
wiens, "Socioeconomic Change,'' p. 116. 
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government was often forced to convert some of the grain tax for the 
Jiangnan region to a specified quantity of cloth. The usual mechanism 
for obtaining cotton cloth, however, was to assign a number of wealthy 
households within a district the responsibility for forwarding a certain 
amount of cloth. These cloth-remitting households (jiehu) usually 
purchased the cloth for the government from the larger urban loom 
houses, as it was only they who could produce the high quality 'three-
shuttles' cloth which the government required. The urban loom houses 
employed specialized workers in the various activities of ginning, 
bowing, carding, spinning, weaving, dyeing and calendering which enabled 
them to produc:e a high quality product. By comparison, most rural 
households had little capital to invest and produced a poorer quality 
cloth which was not wanted by the government. However, the cloth-
remitting households passed on part of the government quota to the smaller 
rural producers, and, as they could not themselves supply 'three-shuttles' 
cloth, these smaller producers had to sell their own poorer quality 
product at the local market so that they could pay the cloth-remitting 
households in silver. This money was used to purchase the good quality 
cloth the government required. 
From the growing of the raw product through to the spinning and 
weaving of cloth, the production of cotton provided an important supplement 
to the income of many househods; and in the urban weaving centres of 
Jiangnan, such as Suzhou and Hangzhou, cotton became the principal 
source of income for many households. This reliance for income upon a 
cash crop drew these households into an increasing dependence on the 
marke.t network and its bimetallic monetary economy: silver followed 
in the wake of cotton. 
The other major textile product of the late Ming economy was silk. 
In the early years of the dynasty sericulture had been practised in most 
districts of the empire, but by the sixteenth century it was confined 
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largely to the Jiangnan region, and, in particular, to the land 
surrounding Lake Taihu. 
Government demand determined the nature and structure of the silk 
industry even more than was the case with the cultivation and production 
of cotton. The Ming administration commissioned large government-owned 
factories to produce high quality satins and luxury silks which were 
used to supply the court and senior officials, as well as for gifts to 
visiting tribute missions. Early in the dynasty there had been 
twenty-five Imperial Silk Weaving Factories, but by the end of the 
fifteenth century most of these had closed down and production became 
concentrated in the three large factories in Hangzhou, Suzhou and 
.. 10 NanJ~ng. Raw silk to supply the imperial factories was procurred 
through taxation and the administration also obtained a large amount of 
ordinary silk cloth through the fiscal system which was used to help 
pay government officials. That the government controlled a large amount 
of silk production outside of the imperial factories is shown by the 
fact that during the Wanli reign as much as 200,000 bolts of ordinary 
silk were collected as tax each year, while only about 47,000 bolts of 
satins and luxury silks were required of the imperial factories. 11 This 
government dominance of the silk industry declined during the Qing period 
as the growth of inter-regional and overseas trade saw the focus of the 
industry shift away from the imperial factories and increasingly towards 
the private production and distribution of silks. Also, with the 
continuing spread of a monetary economy, silk played a less important 
part in the administrative finances of the empire. These changes had 
their origin in the commercialization of the late Ming period yet they 
10Lillian Li, China's Silk Trade: Traditional Industry in the Modern 
World, 1842-1937 (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), p. 40. 
11Ibid., p. 42. 
did not become of significance until the eighteenth century. Lillian 
Li feels that throughout the Ming and early Qing years the imperial 
factories continued to dominate the silk industry. 12 
In the early years of the Ming dynasty the imperial factories had 
91. 
obtained their workforce from a group of registered artisans whose right 
to employment in the silk industry was hereditary. In 1562, however, 
this system of registered artisanship was abolished and the government 
came to rely completely on hired labour. By the beginning of the 
seventeenth century it is possible that the three large imperial factories 
were employing several thousand workers each, all of whom were paid 
. f h . . 13 1n money or t e1r serv1ces. Work was also contracted out to private 
loom houses and through them to independent weaving establishments, each 
14 
of which generally contained only four or five looms. The 
proliferation of these independent weaving establishments was such that 
when Cao Shipin was asked to report on the Suzhou weavers strike in 
1601 he wrote telling the government of how nearly every household in 
the city contained either a loom or someone involved in the silk industry. 15 
More people were involved in the silk industry in suzhou that in either 
Hangzhou or Nanjing, but in all three cities the industry was large and 
through it thousands of people were drawn into a monetary economy. 
Similarly, the handling of silver became an increasingly familiar 
phenomenon for those rural households involved in sericulture. Writing 
in the middle of the seventeenth century, Tang Zhen noted: 
The silk produced in the lake T'ai( Taihu) area clothes 
the empire ••••. In lunar May merc~ants load piles and 
12Ib1'd., 44 45 pp. - • 
13Yuan Tsing, "Urban Riots and Disturbances," in J.D. Spence and 
John E. Wills Jnr. (eds) ., From Ming to Ch'ing; Conquest, Region, and 
Continuity in Seventeenth Century China (New Haven., 1979) , p. 288, notes 
how a skilled weaver in Suzhou at the turn of the seventeenth century 
was earning around 0.8 taels per month. 
14 . L1, Silk Trade p. 53. 
15 1 . h' 278 E v1n, The Pattern of the C 1nese Past, p. • 
piles of silver to Shuang-lin for trade and this region 
profits thousands and millions of silver every year. 
Therefore, though the tax quota is high, the people 
are spared from being empty-handed.l6 
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Most peasants involved in the growing of mulberry trees and/or the rearing 
of silkworms and the reeling and spooling of raw silks operated on 
borrowed capital, so much of the income they derived from such industry 
was lost in the repayment of debts and through taxation. This meant 
thatpe_a:sant households involved in sericulture were left with little 
capital for re-investment and the rural sector of the silk industry 
continued to be based on small-scale household-orientated enterprises, 
just as was the case with the rural sector of the cotton industry. Yet, 
small-scale as these enterprises were, the expansion of the textile 
industry from mid-Ming times onwards saw their number steadily increase, 
thereby ensuring that a monetary economy intruded more extensively into 
those areas of the Chinese countryside where people were involved in 
the production of cottons and silks. 
While textiles predominated in Jiangnan, to the south, in Fujian 
and Guangdong provinces, sugar cane was the principal cash crop. Sugar 
was grown in Sichuan, Zhejiang and Jiangxi, but it was the two southeastern 
provinces which supp+ied most of the domestic market and also were able 
th . 17 to export sugar to Japan, Luzon and Sou east As~a. The growth of 
foreign trade during the sixteenth century had made it profitable for 
farmers to cultivate sugar cane rather than rice: Chu Dajun wrote that 
in the mid-seventeenth century between 40 and 60 per cent of the cultivated 
land in the Guangdong districts of Fanyu, Dongguan, Zengcheng and 
Yangjun was devoted to sugar; and sugar was grown extensively throughout 
the Fujianese districts of Zhangzhou, Chuanzhou, Xinghua and Fuzhou. 18 
16
wiens, "Socioeconomic Change," p. 132, 
17Rawski, Agricultural Change, p. 66. 
18
wiens, 11 Socioeconomic Change," p. 102. 
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The bulk of this sugar was shipped to Jiangnan, although some was also 
carried on into northern China. In return, the Fujianese and Gunangdong 
merchants purchased silks, cottons and ceramics, many of which were 
subsequently exported, helping to procure the much needed foreign silver. 
Fujianese traders also carried indigo and tobacco north to Jiangnan. 
Fujian was noted for its high quality indigo and this was a product that 
. t d d d t . . . h d . f . 1 19 was ~n grea eman ue o ~ts extens~ve use ~n t e ye~ng o text~ es. 
Wuhu, upstream from Nanjing on the Changjiang river, had become an 
important dyeing centre in the late Ming period, and as well as Fujianese 
indigo, safflowers from Sichuan and Shaanxi were brought to this centre 
f th d . . 20 or e ye~ng of cotton and s~lks. 
Tobacco was one of the products that had reached China from Spanish-
America; along with maize, the sweet potato, the peanut, and, of course, 
. 21 s~lver. The food products amongst these were to cause a demographic 
revolution in eighteenth century China, but in the late sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries it was only tobacco that had made a significant 
impact on Chinese agriculture. The popularity of tabacco smoking spread 
rapidly through the Chinese population and a late Ming chronicler noted 
that 11 Nowadays everybody ranging from scholar-officials to commoners 
and women likes tobacco, so the peasant household greatly profits from 
22 
c·u.ltivating this crop." Jiangnan farmers increasingly turned to this 
new crop during the seventeenth century, but in late Ming times Fujian 
19Ng Chin-keong, "A study of the Peasant Society of South Fukien, 
1506-1644," Nanyang University Journal, 6 (1972), pp. 189-212. 
20 Gernet, Chinese Civilization p. 426. 
21 For the impact of Spanish-American products on China see L. Carrington 
Goodrich, "The Columbian Discovery; China and the New World," Chinese 
Studies in History, 8, 4 (Summer, 1975) 1 pp. 3-14; Ho Ping-ti, "The 
Introduction of American Food Plants into China," American Anthropolgist, 
57, 2 (April, 1955) 1 pp. 191-201; andl)wight H. Perkins, Agricultural 
Development in China, 1368-1968 (Edinburgh, 1969), pp. 50-51. 
22
wiens, "Socioeconmmic Change," p. 101. 
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remained the principal source of tobacco1 and to satisfy a growing demand 
it was continually shipped off to the markets of other provinces. 
The agricultural sector dominated the late Ming economy, but there 
were isolated centres of significant industrial production. The most 
notable of these was the porcelain industry centred around Jingderzhen 
. h . . 23 1n nort eastern J1angx1. As with the silk and cotton industries, it 
was the demand created through the patronnage of the Ming administration 
that stimulated the ceramic industry and saw Jingderzhen rise to be an 
important industrial centre by the sixteenth century. The Ming 
administration never actually established an imperial kiln at Jingderzhen, 
similar in kind to the imperial silk factories; rather, it operated 
through a purchasing and transporting depot, contracting out orders to 
privately operated kilns. This system was known as guanda, minshao 
(government assisted, privately fired) . Government orders for porcelain 
increased from 2,570 pieces in 1529 to 105,770 pieces in 1571. 24 Demand 
from the private sector for both basic and high quality wares also increased 
during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, especially with the 
growth of a more conspicuously luxurious lifestyle amongst the urban 
elite of th.e Jiangnan region .. 25 Ceramics were also in high demand 
with foreign traders and Michael Dillon estimates that between 1602 and 
26 1657 nearly three million pieces of Ming Pottery were exported to Europe. 
Just as other sectors of the Ming economy saw a shift from registered 
23
on porcelain production at Jingderzhen see Margaret Medley, "Ching-
te-chen and the Porcelain of the Imperial Kilns," Bulletin of the School 
of Oriental and African Studies, 39, 2 (1966), pp. 326-338; Michael 
Dillon, "Jingderzhen as a Ming Industrial Centre," Ming Studies, 6 (Spring, 
1978), pp. 37-44; and Yuan Tsing, "The Porcelain Industry of Ching-te-chen," 
Ming Studies, 6 (Spring, 1978), pp. 45-53. 
24
nillon, "Jingderzhen," p. 38. 
25
on the elite culture of late Ming times see F.W. Mote, "The Transform-
ation of Nanking," in G. William Skinner (ed.), The City in Late Imperial 
China (California, 1977) , p. 151; and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth 
Century pp. 268-269. 
26
nillon, "Jingderzhen," p. 42. 
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artisanship to wage labour during the sixteenth century, so too did 
the ceramics industry. Seasonal labour was drawn into Jingderzhen 
from the surrounding countryside, attracted by the opportunity to 
1 1 . 27 supp ement rura ~ncomes. Most of the production from Jingderzhen 
kilns was sold through state licensed brokers resident in the area. 
Merchants would negotiate through these brokers for the purchase of 
procelain from individual kilns and only in a small number of cases 
did merchants directly control production through investment in a 
kiln. The porcelain industry was characterized by small-scale units 
of production and distribution, just as was the case with most of the 
commercial sector in late Ming times. 
Other centres of industrial production were the iron works at 
Cuxian in Huguang and at Fatshan in Guangdong. These works supplied 
agricultural and household implements to surrounding areas and urban 
centres. Also to be noted is that thirty paper mills in Jiangxi are 
estimated to have employed around 50,000 workers by the end of the 
28 
sixteenth century. Industrial production was limited, however, and 
it was the agricultural sector of the economy that was most affected 
by tne commercialization of the .late Ming years. A part of the 
production of high quality ceramics was responsible for drawing in 
foreign silver to the Chinese economy and the distribution of pots, 
iron ware and paper goods facilitated the circulation of a certain 
volume of silver, as did the payment of workers involved in these 
industries. But it was the agricultural sector with its extensive 
marketing network that did most to stimulate the circulation of silver 
through the late Ming economy. 
27 b'd 41 I ~ ., p. . 
28Gernet, A History of Chinese Civilization, p. 426. 
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The bases to this marketing network were what G. William Skinner 
has called 'standard marketing towns'. These markets serviced the peasant 
households within a days walking distance of them and they were the 
starting point for the "upward flow of agricultural products and craft 
items into higher reaches of the marketing system, and also the termination 
of the downward flow of imported items destined for peasant consumption. 29 
Most standard marketing towns had only a few permanent buildings; a 
teashop or two, a wineshop, and several general stores. They also had 
what Skinner has called "a modest financial dimension." 30 By this he 
means that landlords, shopkeepers and merchants would offer credit to 
peasants for the larger purchases they made on market day (such things 
as a weaving loom were most likely to be bought on credit) . Landlords 
also had rent collecting offices in these small market towns. By far 
the most frequent visitors to these markets were small-scale merchants 
who generally travelled between only a few towns within a particular 
marketing area. However, if a town was the centre of a productive region 
and had access to a good transportation network then merchants operating 
on a larger scale, with greater capital reserves, would also have been 
frequent visitors. 
The number of standard marketing towns within a district depended 
not only on the size of the local population and the vigour of the local 
economy, but also on the availability of cheap transportation. Few 
merchants owned their own transport and they were therefore required to 
pay boatmen, pony-drovers and the like to get their goods from one 
marketing area to another. Transport was slow, especially if long 
distances were involved, and in south China, where most travel was done 
29 G. William Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China, 
r,"Journal of Asian Studies, 24, 1(1964) I p. 6. 
30 b'd 20 I l • I p. . 
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by water, the trans-shipment of goods was often necessary as boatmen 
31 tended to operate within restricted areas. Thus, access to efficient 
transport was vital to a market, so much so that Evelyn Sakakida Rawski 
feels that the distribution of canals and waterways within an area 
. d d t 1 t t If. d f 't . 1' . " 32 prov1 e o a arge ex en , an 1n ex o 1 s commerc1a 1zat1on • 
It is this importance of access to waterways which helps to explain 
the geographical nature of the commercial expansion in late Ming times. 
Commercial growth was concentrated along and about three main arterial 
routes, each of them an important waterway, and each of them connected 
to the dynamic heartland of Jiangnan. And because silver was used 
principally in the wholesale sector of the economy, any attempt to describe 
the direction and frequency with which silver flowed throughout the 
empire would find itself also tracing a pattern which had as its main 
features these same three arterial routes. 
The first of these waterways was the Grand Canal, connecting the 
capital Beijing with Jiangnan. Most boats travelling the Canal carried 
grain, but a whole range of products were shipped north to cater for the 
sophisticated tastes of the court and the empire's administrative elite. 
Zhang Han, an official who wrote several essays on merchant life during 
the sixteenth century, noted how "the possessions of the empire are 
amassed in the capital, yet half are produced in the southeast, which is 
where the people with craft skills come from." 33 The traffic up and 
down the Grand Canal was of considerable benefit to the countryside 
immediately surrounding it, as has been shown by Leif Littrup's recent 
31 " ' 0 . t' D ' th M' Ramon Myers, Some Issues on Econom1c rgan1za 1on ur1ng e 1ng 
and Ch 1 ing Periods: A Review Article 1 11 Ch t ing-shih Wen-t' i, 3 1 2 
(December, 1974), pp. 81-83. 
32Rawski, Agricultural Change, p. 5, 
33Timothy Brook, "The Merchant Network in 16th Century China: A 
Discussion and Translation of Zhang Han's 10n Merchants', "Journal of 
the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 24 1 2 (.May, 1981), p. 191. 
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study of Jinan prefecture in Shandong province. 34 Yet outside of the 
capital and its lifeline to the south, north China felt little of the 
commercial dynamism which so characterized the southeast. Merchants from 
Shaanxi and Shanxi provinces did play a prominent role in commercial life, 
but this arose from their important work in provisioning the border 
garrisons, not from the vigorous nature of the agricultural economies of 
the provinces in which they lived. 35 Henan and Shandong were much better 
placed than either Shaanxi or Shanxi to benefit from the spread of 
cash-cropping, and both grew cotton to supply the looms of Jiangnan. 
Generally, however, the expansion of the marketing network was much less 
dramatic in north China than it was in the southeast, and it is probable 
that the expansion which did occur proceeded at a similar rate to the 
increase in population. 
The second of the arterial routes was that of the Changjiang River, 
connecting what was the 'rice bowl' of China by late Ming times, Huguang 
province, with the more commercially orientated Jiangnan region. In 
the early eighteenth century it has been estimated that between 8 and 13 
million shi of rice was shipped annually from Huguang down to Jiangnan, 
and, considering the time it took to recover from the turmoil of the Ming-
Qing transition, it is possible that a similar quantity of rice was 
36 
travelling the river at the beginning of the seventeenth century. In 
return, the textile and craft products of Jiangnan were carried up the 
river to be distributed amongst the markets of Huguang. Sichuan province 
was partially connected to this trade route, with some of its rice 
production being shipped east through the Changjiang gorges, into Huguang, 
. 37 
and then on down to J1angnan. 
34Littrup, Subbureaucratic Government, pp. 21-22. 
35 Myers, "Some Issues," discusses the important role played by 
Shanxi and Shaanxi merchants. 
36
ch'uan Han-sheng and Richard A. Kraus, Mid-Ch'ing Rice Markets and 
Trade: An in Price (Cambridge, Mass., 1975}, p. 77. This 
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In contrast to ~e two other arterial routes, the third was a coastal 
sea lane, connecting Jiangnan with the two southeastern provinces of 
Fujian and Guangdong (the mountains of northwest Fujian prevented the 
overland transportation of goods) • The products traded along this sea 
lane were diverse, perhaps more so than any other trade within the empire, 
but the principal items involved were sugar cane, fruits and indigo, 
and, in return, grain, textiles and ceramics. Fujian was a rich province 
and cash-cropping is known to have been practised there since at least 
Song times. What distinguished Fujian by the turn of the seventeenth 
century, however, was that it was the focus for overseas trade. It was 
through Fujian that most foreign silver flowed into China and the profits 
from this trade were great: Evelyn Sakakida Rawski estimates that 
investment in overseas trade offered a return of as much as 900 per cent, 
compared with between 40 and 80 per cent for moneylending and 10 per cent 
38 from land. The input to Fujian from foreign trade helped to make it 
as commercially dynamic a region as was Jiangnan in late Ming times, and 
this was reflected in an expansion of the marketing network which far 
exceeded the growth in population. In Zhangzhou prefecture, for 
instance, the population increased only 50 per cent between 1491 and 1573, 
while the growth in periodic markets was of the order of 245 per cent, 
and between 1573 and 1628 the population grew by 32 per cent, while the 
39 
number and frequency of markets grew by 71 per cent. Foreign silver did: 
much to stimulate this existing commercial growth and once inside the 
empire silver flowed quickest to those areas which were most commercially 
dynamic; that is, to those areas which were serviced by the three main 
arterial waterways. 
study covers the period 1723-1735. 
37 Brook, 11 The Merchant Network, 11 p. 195. 
38Rawski, Agricultural Change, pp. 86-87. 
39
rbid., p. 70. 
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Not all merchants enjoyed the huge profits that were available from 
investment in overseas trade. In fact the scale of domestic merchant 
operations varied considerably. Most were simply itinerant traders 
(keshang), the smallest in scale of which were the street pedlars who 
carried their whole operation with them and generally travelled between 
40 
only a few standard marketing towns. From these street pedlars up, 
the scale of any merchant's operation would have depended on the am?unt 
of capital at their disposal and on the goods available in the domain 
within which they operated. For most, the accumulation of capital was a 
slow business and it was only a few who were well placed to profit from 
an involvement in the lucrative interregional trade. There were many 
factors frustrating mercantile activity. Transportation was slow and 
long-ransecredit facilities poorly developed. It was difficult to get 
current information on the price of goods in distant markets as the 
non-official postal network was slow and often non-existent. These were 
all factors which contributed to a poor market transparency and they were 
partially responsible for the generally atomized nature of late Ming 
trade. As with production, distribution was primarily based on a 
proliferation of small-scale enterprises, restricted in both capital 
investment and scope of operation, what Ray Huang has called "cash and 
carry" businesses. 41 The advantage with this atomized structure, 
however, was that those with limited finance were not inhibited from 
40Yang Lien-sheng, "Government Control of Urban Merchants in Traditional 
China," Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies, 8, l-2 (August, 1970), 
pp. 186-209. 
41Ray Huang, "Zong 'sanyan' kanwan Ming shangren" (Merchants in the 
late Ming as presented in the sanyan stories) , Journal - Institute of 
Chinese Studies- Chinese University of Hong Kong, 7, 1 (December, 1974), 
pp. 133-154. Huang gives a good description of the small-scale nature 
of most trade but overemphasizes the inhibiting role of the state. His 
views should be contrasted with those of Myers, "Some Issues," and Thomas 
Metzger, "The State and Commerce in Imperial China," Asian and African 
Studies, 6 (1970), pp. 21-46. 
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becoming involved in production and distribution. The commercial 
expansion of the late Ming was based on this very fact; it was a grass 
roots development, what Thomas A. Metzger has called "development from 
below", whereby part of the production of a large number of households 
was drawn into the commercial sphere through the proliferation of many 
11 . d 1 k . 42 sma atom1ze rura mar et1ng areas. And it was this fact which 
ensured that silver filtered out from the main arterial routes and into 
the smaller markets of the empire. 
For those few merchants who were involved in overseas and interregional 
trade the profits were great. Particular groups of merchants came to 
dominate these sectors: merchants from Zhangzhou and Chuanzhou in Fujian 
were most prominent in overseas trade, while in the domestic interregional 
trade the most important groups of merchants came from Pingyang, Zhezhou 
and Luan prefectures in southern Shanxi, from Shaanxi province, and from 
. h . h h h . . f h '1' 43 Hu1z ou prefecture 1n t e sout ern An u1 reg1on o Nan Z 1 1. Yet 
wealth did not automatically guarantee prestige and power to these 
merchants. This is obvious from the fact that most merchants who were 
able to attempted to enter the scholar-official elite of society. Wang 
Daokun, the descendent of a Huizhou merchant family, who had gained the 
jinshi degree in 1547, noted how a merchant who accumulated considerable 
savings was able to "encourage his descendents, in planning for their 
future, to give up trade and take up studies." 44 
The early Ming administration had reinforced the traditional Confucian 
42 Metzger, "The State and Commerce," passim. 
43For a discussion of these merchant groups see n.(35); and Harriet 
T. Zurndorfer, 11 Local Lineages and Local Development: A case study of the 
Fan Lineage' Hsiu-ning hs; en_, Hui-chou 800-1500 ," T I oung Pao' 70' 1-3 
(1984) , pp. 18-59; as well as her article "The Hsin-an ta-tsu chin and 
the Development of Chinese Gentry Society," T'oung Pao, 67 (1981), pp. 
154-215. 
44 Ho Ping-ti, The Ladder of Success in Late Imperial China (N.Y. 1962), 
p. 73. 
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disdain of commercial endeavour when it emphasized the fourfold 
categorization of Chinese society. This had been originally outlined 
in the eclectical classical text, the Guanzi, and placed merchants 
lowest in the heirarchy of hereditary occupations, behind scholar-
officials, peasants and artisans. Actual attitudes towards merchants were 
probably never as rigid as this categorization implies. Nevertheless, 
education was seen as offering a way out of a social grouping which, to 
many at least, was still a source of considerable social opprobrium. 
As.ide from success in education, another way that wealthy merchant 
families could improve their prestige and acceptability amongst the 
elite of society was through the collection of art and the patronage of 
h 1 d . 45 sc o ars an art1sts. Commercially dynamic regions were also 
culturally dynamic. Zhang Han felt Fujian to be "first on the continent" 
as far as the vitality of cultural life was concerned, and the large and 
prosperous cities of Jiangnan were noted for their flourishing cultural 
activity. That the S Whip Reform saw people taxed solely on their 
landholdings and not on their wealth meant it was no longer necessary to 
conceal fortunes, and this is considered to have been "conducive to 
. . . . . ..46 
ostentat1ous consumpt1on 1n the c1t1es. 
Commercial wealth also stimulated changes in the nature of artistic 
endeavour itself. Largely through the dominant influence of the most 
prestigious painter of the period, Dong Qichang, amateurism remained 
the ideal in art. In practice, however, James Cahill remarks on how 
45 Nelson Wu, "Tung ChI i-ch I ang (1555-1636) : Apathy in Government and 
Fervour in Art," in A.F. Wright and D. Twitchett (eds.), Confucian 
Personalities (California, 1962), pp. 260-293; and for the eighteenth 
century Ho Ping-ti, "The Salt Merchants of Yangchow ," Harvard Journal 
of Asiatic Studies, 17 (1954), pp. 130-168. 
46 Mote, "The Transformation of Nanking," p. 151; and for the comments 
of Zhang Han see Brook, "The Merchant Network" , p. 201. 
the theoretical insistence runs counter to reality: in 
this period when the superiority of the amateur ideal 
was being propounded over and over so forcefully as to 
nearly silence opposing voices, the major painters, 
excepting Tung Ch'i-ch'ang (Dong Qichang), were all 
professionals.47 
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The wealth derived from commercial success enabled urban sophisticates 
to buy into the elite culture and thereby encourage a greater professional 
orientation amongst the artistic community. Perhaps the very vociferous 
way in which the amateur ideal was propounded is evidence in itself of 
the undermining effects of commercialism. Dong Qichang himself was at 
one time employed as a tutor by Xiang Yuanbian, a wealthy merchant of 
h . 48 Kas ~ng. Despite such patronage by wealthy merchants and the debate 
over the purity of artistic endeavour, urban culture remained very much 
an elite culture. Painting and literature were closely associated with 
scholarship and the artistic traditions of the empire. Furthermore, the 
values expressed in such traditions were "demonstrably concerns 
appropriate for only one social class, the educated elite, and among 
th.em the weal thy and leisured stratum of that class. " 49 :ttn of 
suggests that while a mercantile background did not preclude people from 
entering the elite of society, commercial success, in itself, did not 
guarantee status and acceptability. Commercial endeavour remained a means 
to achieve the wealth which could then be used to improve a family's 
academic standing and social prestige; it enabled a few wealthy merchants 
to enter the elite of society, but it did not result in a popularizing of 
47James Cahill, The Distant Mountains: Chinese Painting in the Late 
MingDynasty, 1570-1644 (N.Y., 1982), p. 33. 
48 Wu, "Tung Ch'i-ch'ang 1 " p. 270. 
49Robert E. Hegel 1 The Novel in Seventeenth Century China (N.Y., 1981)., 
pp. 2-3. In contrast to Hegel, Joanna F. Handlin, "Lu K 'un •·s New Audience: 
The Influence of Women's Literacy on Sixteenth Century Thought," in 
Margery Wolf and Roxane Witke (eds.), Women in Chinese Society (Standford 
1975)_, argues the case for a spread of ll'teracy in the late Ming years, 
particularly amongst women of the elite. She feels that the shift towards 
a more vernacular literature "created an unprecedented bond between the 
elite and commoners," Cp.l6l. Of the two views, I find Hegel's the more 
persuasive. He notes the shift towards a more vernacular literature, 
but shows this was a form of artistic experimentation undertaken and 
appreciated only by those already familiar with convential literary form$. 
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the high culture of that elite. 
Similarly, the importance of land did not diminish as a consequence 
of the commercial expansion of late Ming times. While land did not offer 
the kind of short-term profits that could be gained from moneylending 
or commerce, it continued to be seen as a secure investment, and, more 
importantly, an, investment which conferred prestige upon the owner. In 
seeking to explain the decline of the industrial spirit in late nineteenth 
and twentieth century England, Martin J. Weiner has noted how the 
forces of industrialization were continually adapted to suit the cultural 
orientation of English society, a process which he describes as the 
"gentrification" of the bourgeoisie. It was, he writes, a process of 
social absorption, whereby "the zeal of work, inventiveness, material 
production, and money making gave way within the capitapist class to 
the more aristocratic interests of cultivated style, the pursuit of 
. . . ' . ..so le1sure, and pol1t1cal serv1ce. This type of process, the mechanism 
of 'gentrification', seems much the same as what was occurring in 
sixteenth and early seventeenth century China. ·weinQr quotes an excerpt 
from the Economist of 1870 which could easily have been a replica of 
something that may have been found in a Chinese periodical of 1670: 
Social Consideration is a great and legitimate object of 
desire, and so great is the effect of this visibility of 
wealth upon social consideration that it would pay a 
millionaire in England to sink half his fortune in buying 
10,000 acres of land to return a shilling per cent, and 
live upon the remainder, rather than to live upon the 
whole without land. He would be a greater person in the 
eyes of more people.Sl 
In both cases, in England and in China, land retained a social value 
It was not a shift toward a more popular literature, not a popularizing 
of elite culture. 
50Martin J. Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial 
1850-1980 (Cambridge,l98lt , p. 13. 
51Ibid, p. 12. 
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which was just as important as any material benefit it may have offered 
to its owner. 
But land also attracted mercantile wealth through the potential for 
profit which it held. Some perspectives on the period suggest that 
commercial expansion drew investment away from land. Jacques Gernet, 
for instance, writes: 
From about 1520 capital, which until then had been 
attracted to the land, moved away from it towards 
commercial and craft enterprises. Land prices 
continued to fall and were to collapse quite suddenly 
in the last few years of the sixteenth century. The 
phenomenon was particularly noticeable in the maritime 
provinces of the south and in the area from Hangchow 
(Hangzhou] to north-eastern Kiangsi ( Jiangxi) -
everywhere in fact where the monetary economy based on 
ingots and imported silver coins was in the ascedent. 
In these region? the agrarian economy declined in 
proportion to the upsurge of mercantile and craft 
activities.52 
Yet, from the evidence we have, exactly the opposite seems to have been 
the case. 
In Zhangzhou prefecture, part of one of the 'maritime provinces of 
the south', the wealth accruing from domestic and foreign trade resulted 
in a greater competition for land, and this pushed up its purchase price. 
According to a report of 1572, land in Zhangzhou was selling for 8 taels 
of silver per mu, and further north in Haicheng prefecture it was selling 
for between 7 and 10 taels per mu. This contrasts with the inland 
prefectures of Fujian, which had not experienced the same intensity of 
commercial growth, where land was selling for between 2 and 4 taels of 
silver per 53 mu. 
52 Gernet, A History of Chinese Civilization, p. 425. 
53Rawski, Agricultural Change, p. 77. 
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Commercial expansion brought new investment to agriculture, and this 
was particularly so following the implementation of the Single Whip Reform. 
As the basis of the tax assessment shifted solely to land with the Single 
Whip, it could be assumed that commerce would seem a more attractive 
investment than agriculture. Yu Shenzing commented in the late sixteenth 
century; "The Single Whip tax is assessed on the basis of one's land 
irrespective of one's wealth, so (people in) agriculture are in distress 
whereas those in commerce are at ease." 54 Comparatively, however, many 
landholders paid less tax after the reform than they did before. To 
accompany the spread of the reform, the senior grand secretary, Zhang 
Juzheng, initiated what was intended to be a complete resurvey of all 
cultivated land within the empire. However, with Zhang's death in 1582, 
the survey was abandoned and its scope was never as extensive nor was it 
as efficient as Zhang had hoped. Yet despite this, a great deal of 
previously concealed or unregistered land was brought to the government's 
attention. For instance, the registered taxable land in Guizhou province 
increased 70 per cent as a result of the survey, and in Shandong the 
. d 5 55 ~ncrease amounte to 0 per cent. 
Following the survey new land registers were compiled for each 
district. Known as Fuyi Quanshu, The Complete Books of Taxes and Labour 
Services, these registers recorded the total amount of cultivated land 
within a district and the amount of tax due each landholder could be 
determined from a standard value per rnu for the whole district. This 
made it much more difficult for powerful landholders to shift part of 
their tax obligation to others. Large areas of imperial estate which 
had been previously ignored were also now included within the tax 
structure. And as assessment was based on land rather than on the number 
of adult males within a household, families were no longer penalized for 
54
wiens, "Socioeconomic Change," p. 9 2. 
55Huang, "Fiscal Administration", p. 86. 
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having many sons. The local gazatteer for Shanyuan district in Jiangning 
prefecture, Nan Zhili, notes that after the implementation of the Single 
Whip labour services became much less of a burden and 
people began to appreciate the benefit of cultivating 
land. Wealthy households in the city began to invest 
in land ... (and] because wealthy people invest in 
land, the land prices go up now.56 
Local gazatteers for Suzhou and Songjiang prefectures (Nan Zhili) , and 
also for Zhangqiu county in Shandong, all show that land prices rose 
57 following the Single Whip Reform of the late sixteenth century. 
In areas such as Huguang province and the Anhui region of Nan Zhili, 
where cash-cropping had made less impact than in Jiangnan and Fujian, 
agriculture continued to attract investment. Hilary J. Beattie's study 
of Tongcheng county, Anhui, has shown that local and long-distance trade 
in this area in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was still basically 
in food crops; grain, fish and salt. 58 And Tongcheng benefited from 
the increasing demand for grain in areas such as Jiangnan where land 
was increasingly being devoted to cash-crops. Thus, "the effect of 
greater commercialization was not to divert people away from traditional 
occupations but to increase interest in them." 59 
In areas of commercial expansion, as well as elsewhere, land and 
agriculture continued to attract capital, with land prices rising not 
falling; and rising most dramatically in coastal Fujian where overseas 
trade and imported silver had had their most direct impact. As Fransesca 
56
wiens, "Socioeconomic Change," p. 94. 
57Ibid., p. 95; and also Hilary J. Beattie, Land and Lineage in China: 
A Study of T'ung-ch'eng, Anhwei, in the Ming and Ch'ing Dynasties 
(Cambridge, 19 791 , p. 13. 
58 
. d d . 36 Beatt~e, Lan an L~neage, p. . 
59 Ibid. Beattie does not compare the rate of return of investment in 
land with other options available to Tongcheng residents. It seems fair 
to assume, however, that as there were few wealthy merchants in the area 
but many prosperous landowning families, agriculture continued to be 
more attractive than was commerce to local investors. 
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Bra.y has. noted, ••one did not make a fortune through. being a landlord, one 
became a landlord through making a fortune." 60 The commercial expansion 
of the late Ming years was intimately associated with China's agrarian 
economy. Increased investment in commercial and food crops was a direct 
benefit to rural household producers, it was investment in agriculture, 
investment in land. Mercantile wealth derived from trade in 
agriculturally-based food and textile crops, which meant that commercial 
expansion resulted in a more dynamic and diverse agriculture, not a 
decline of the agrarian economy. 
Social Conflict 
The diversification of the agrarian economy did give rise to new 
tensions in society, but these never became a direct threat to the Ming 
state. It was in northwest and north-central China, where silver had 
penetrated least, that rebellions erupted which developed into powerful 
forces intent on capturing the Mandate of Heaven. Whereas, in southeastern 
and south-central China, the tenant and bondservant revolts that flared 
up during the seventeenth century were always limited campaigns, specific 
in intent, and supported because they aimed to improve the social status 
and economic position of the participants; their goal was not the Mandate 
of Heaven. 
The first major tenant uprising in Ming times had been in Fujian 
province in 1448, when a revolt led by Deng Maoqui spread through at 
. . . . . . 61 least twenty counties and provoked upr1s1ngs 1n ne1ghbour1ng prov1nces. 
This revolt left little permanent impact, however, and it was not until 
60 Fransesca Bray, Agriculture: Science and Civilization in China, 6, 
2 (Cambridge, 1984), p. 608. 
61
wiens, "Socioeconomic Change," pp. 321-322; and Elvin, The Pattern 
of the Chinese Past, p. 245. 
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the 1630s and 1640s that tenants again began to organize no-rent 
campaigns and attack the homes and granaries of landlords. This new 
outbreak of agitation had its roots in a number of factors. Such things 
as continued poor harvests and devestation caused by the spread of 
epidemics could precipitate revolt, although these were of more serious 
62 
consequence in north and central China than they were in the southeast. 
Tenant revolts were stimulated more by economic factors. The spread of 
cash-cropping had resulted in a greater incidence of debt-bondage 
amongst peasants and tenants, and the increase in the number and 
frequency of local markets drew tenants into closer and more regular 
contact with bondservants, agricultural labourers and poorer peasants 
h . h f f 'd . 63 w ~c enabled them to orge a stronger sense o sol~ ar~ty. The 
timing of the revolts shows that they were also a consequence of the 
weakening political authority of the late Ming administration. Yet, 
underlying all of the tenant and bondservant revolts of the 1630s and 
1640s was a general desire to capitalize on the new economic opportunities 
which accompanied the spread of cash-cropping and the intensification of 
the rural marketing network. Some peasants benefited from these 
developments and this encouraged others to try to do likewise. 
Tenantry was widespread in late Ming times. In Jiangnan, for instance, 
landholdings had become more concentrated during the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries and by the Chongzhen reign (l627-1644) it has been 
estimated that of the wealthy families in the region, "60 to 70 per cent 
had several hundred mou (mu) of land, 30 to 40 per cent had several 
thousand mou (muJ of land, and 1 to 2 per cent had several ten thousand 
62 Helen Dunstan, "The Late Ming Epidemics: A Preliminary Survey," 
Ch'ing-shih Wen-t'i, 3, 3 (November, 1975), pp. 1-59. 
63Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past, p. 245. 
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mou (mu]. "64 As a landholding of 20 to 30 mu is considered to have been 
the maximum size that one family could operate itself, it is obvious that 
tenantry was widespread. 
In some cases, particularly those holdings of less than a few hundred 
mu, a form of managerial landlordism developed which saw both landlords 
and tenants actively involved in the market economy of the area in which 
they lived. In contrast to absentee landlords, managerial landlords 
participated with their tenants in the day to day running of the estate 
lands. This very involvement in the farming process meant that 
managerial landlords were able to apportion their land and labour to 
various crops in a way which was most profitable to themselves and 
their tenants. Often they employed hired labour and they were willing 
to travel considerable distances in order to get the best sale and 
h . f d't' 65 pure ase pr1ce or commo 1 1es. It was this type of efficient and 
pragmatic farming which maximized the opportunities offered by the 
increasingly currency-orientated market economy. 
But not all landlords were of the managerial kind. As landholdings 
became more concentrated and the elite culture of urban centres began 
to flourish, the incidence of absentee landlordism increased. This 
trend was exacerbated with the greater investment in land by the 
mercantile community. In general, merchants did not purchase land to 
become farmers. Land, to them, was seen as a secure investment which 
conferred many non-economic benefits. Providing that rent was paid, 
absentee landlords fnterferred little in the day to day lives of their 
tenants, a situation which encouraged the spread of permanent tenancy. 
64
wiens$ "Socioeconomic Change," p.208; and Fu I-ling, "A New 
Assessment o£ the Rural Social Relationship in Late Ming and Early 
Ch' ing China," Chinese Studies in History, 15, l-2 (Fall7Winter, 1981-2) 
pp. 77-78. 
65
wiens, "Socioeconomic Change" pp. 144-200; and Rawski, Agricultural 
Change, pp. 51-56. Both discuss in some detail the nature of managerial 
landlordism and both base their discussions on two agricultural manuals of 
the seventeenth 
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and multiple ownership. 
Permanent tenancy and multiple ownership had spread through much of 
the rice-growing area of China during the sixteenth century; i.e., the 
66 provinces of Nan Zhili, Huguang, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Fujian and Guangdong. 
It is well known that when labour is in short supply the initiative rests 
with the employee (tenant) rather than the employer (landlord) , and this 
may have been a reason why multiple ownership and permanent tenancy 
continued to spread during the seventeenth century: landlords may have 
been willing to accede to the demands of revolting tenants in the 1630s 
and 1640s simply because agricultural labour was in short supply. Yet 
it was during the sixteenth century, when the population had risen 
consistently, that these changes in landlord-tenant relations made 
their initial impact. 67 The reasons for this seem to have more to do 
with the nature of wet-rice agriculture than they do with the supply of 
agricultural labour. 
The optimal size for an irrigated rice field is very small, less 
than one sixth of an acre, so, as Fransesca Bray remarks, landlords 
would have derived 
century. These manuals were both written by farmers with land in the 
lake Taihu region; i.e., Shen Qi, Shenshi Nongshu (1643); and Zhang 
Luxiang, Bu Nongshu (1658) .. 
66
wiens, "Socioeconomic Change," pp. 228-236; Rawski, Agricultural 
Change, pp. 10-30; and Beattie, Land and Lineage, pp. 14-15. 
67The Chinese population is estimated to have risen steadily from 
103 million to 162 million during the sixteenth century, declining to 
123 million in the 1650s; see Liu and Hwang, "population Change," Table 
A.l pp. 81-82. Ho Ping-ti, Studies in the Population of China, p. 264~ 
writes "the population of south China was increasing somewhat more 
rapidly than the population of north China." 
112. 
little or no economic advantage tas is usually the case 
where dry crops are grownl evicting their tenants to 
run large, centrally managed estates. Instead th.ey 
generally preferred to leave their tenants to run their 
small farms themselves.68 
Wet-rice agriculture is labour intensive and in most of the rice 
cultivating regions of Ming China rents were fixed, which encouraged 
tenants to produce more for their own benefit. And as landlords moved 
away from their holdings, into the more sophisticated urban world, they 
lost their socio-moral control over tenantsi the landlord-tenant relation-
ship became less personal and more contractual. 
Tenants could obtain permanent security of tenure simply by paying 
a stipulated fee, called fentu yin (manured-field silverl, or baodian yin 
(once-only payment!. Payment of such a fee either granted the peasant 
an hereditary right of tenantry on the property, a right that could not 
be sold, or, as in most cases, it actually entitled the peasant to a 
'top-soil right' (tianmian/tianp~) on the land, a right that was both 
hereditary and alienable. In some cases a third party right was sold 
on the land, perhaps to the estate manager, but the tenant still retained 
a negotiable and transferable right to cultivation of the property. 
Multiple ownership could also result from the sale of subsoil rights 
by previously free-holding peasants, usually because of a high tax 
burden and unpayable debts. In becoming tenants such peasants escaped 
the need to pay taxes, yet they underwent what was little more than a 
nominal change in status; they retained the right to cultivate and sell 
the top-soil as they wished. 
The independence accruing to tenants from this security of tenure 
encouraged many of them to invest more into their properties, to increase 
their yields and supplement their incomes by moving into cash-crops and 
68 Bray, Agriculture, p. 604. 
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handicraft production. Wet-rice agriculture actually encouraged such 
endeavour, as only at the time of ploughing, transplanting and harvesting 
was it necessary to devote full attention to the rice crop. This left 
peasants free at other times of the rice cycle to diversify their 
enterprise. 
Commercial expansion brought such new economic and social opportunities, 
yet they did not come to all peasants at once. Some felt frustrated that 
they were not able to enjoy the benefits which were so obviously available 
to others. And in a time of increasing political chaos, when the military 
resources of the state were deployed elsewhere, revolt was seen as a 
viable means of hastening the process of change. 
Revolting bondservants aimed to eradicate servile status, the most 
notable of whom took for themselves the title 'levelling kings' (chan-
ping wan), declaring that they were levelling the distinctions between 
masters and servants. Whereas, with tenant revolts, Mi Chu Wiens writes 
of how 
From extensive case studies, one finds that the rampant 
tenant uprisings systematically aimed at the refusal of 
rent payment, the demand for rent reduction, the abolition 
of extra labour services and customary donations to land-
lords, the standardization of measures and capacity for 
grain-rent payment, and the recognition of multiple owner-
ship and permanent tenure. 69 
After a flurry of revolts in the 1630s and 1640s, tenant and bondservant 
agitation continued spordically throughout the seventeenth century. 
Both groups achieved degrees of success: In 1727-1728 the Yongzheng 
emperor abolished all forms of bondservitude, while the cumulative 
result of the tenant revolts was to consolidate the shift towards 
69Mi Chu Wiens, "Lord and Peasant: The Sixteenth to the Eighteenth 
Century," Modern China, 6, 1 (January, 1980), p. 28; see also her 
article "Masters and Bondservants; Peasant Rage in the Seventeenth Century." 
Ming Studies, 8 (Spring, 1979), pp. 57-64. 
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permanent tenancy and multiple ownership. 
What is notable about the revolts of the late Ming years is that 
only one was distinctively anti-tax in nature. That one uprising was 
an isolated incident, when textile workers in Suzhou successfully 
d < h . . . h 11 1 . h . . 1 1 70 oppose t e J.mposJ.tJ.on of a sure arge on a ooms J.n t e cJ.ty J.n 60 • 
Sun Long, the eunuch tax commissioner who introduced the Surcharge, 
was forced to flee the city and all attempts to levy the weavers were 
abandon~d. Apart from this one incident, however, no revolt was 
directed specifically against the fiscal policy of the late Ming 
administration, and this was so the implementation of the Single 
Whip Reform. The requirement that taxes be paid in silver would not 
have been a burden to most landholders in the commercially dynamic 
south-eastern and south-central China, but for those some distance from 
the main arterial waterways of the empire, particularly those in Shaanxi 
and Shanxi provinces, where silver had made least impact, it would have 
been much more difficult to meet the new requirements of the land tax. 
Ray Huang's study of the Ming fiscal structure leads him to conclude 
that the tax burden imposed on landholders was never onerous, even with 
the introduction of surcharges in the 1620s and 1630s to help meet the 
need for increased military expenditure. 71 Huang agrees with Bi Ziyuan, 
Minister of Revenue from 1624 to 1633, who commented that "The income 
derived from land taxes ....• is comparable to one hair taken off the 
72 body of a horse." It is also true that the Single Whip Reform was 
first introduced to those regions where silver use was most common and 
it was only later that it spread to the more economically depressed 
regions of the empire. Yet, for all this, the monetization of the fiscal 
70Yuan, "Urban Riots, 11 pp. 280-281. Yuan states that there are 25 
known instances of urban riot between 1590 and 1626, but many of these 
were politically motivated conflicts involving only the elite of society. 
71 Huang, Taxation, passim. 
72Huang, "Fiscal Administration," p. 121. 
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structure must have caused considerable difficulties to those landholders 
who had benefited least from the spread of cash-cropping and the 
intensification of the rural marketing network. On top of this, it was 
in the more economically depressed regions of the empire, such as Shaanxi 
and Shanxi, where silver had penetrated least, that the effects of the 
depreciation of copper cash would have been most severe. 
The memorialist cited at the beginning of this chapter alluded to 
the problems. of a rapidly depreciating coinage when he wrote: "what 
alternative has there been but to employ silver and throw aside copper 
73 
cash? In response to the need for increased expenditure the late 
Ming administration stepped up its output of coinage. From the 1590s 
through to the early 1640s thousands of new coins were released and 
these rapidly lost any value they initially had. The copper price of 
goods must have skyrocketed and this would have been particularly harsh 
for those who did not have recourse to silver and who relied on cash 
for their currency. 
There is no official price data available for the period, but Ye 
Mengzhu has left us some indication of how the depreciation of copper 
coinage affected the price of rice in the Shanghai area of Jiangnan. 
No doubt prices would have differed greatly throughout the empire, and 
it would be unwise to make empire-wide generalizations from such limited 
information, yet the data provided by Ye does show that silver was a far 
more stable currency than was copper cash. 
73 l See n. 
TABLE SEVEN 
Copper/Silver Exchange Rate and Rice Prices for the Shanghai 
district, Suzhou prefecture, 1632-1685. (1685 = 100) 
Year 
1632 
1638 
1640 
1642 
1643 
1646 
1651 
1678 
1685 
Source: 
Cash/Silver Index Rice Price Rice Price (cash) 
(taels) 
130 110 
-
185 205 110 
220 
- 330 
266 555 1330 
365 270 930 
1000 270 1100 
231 430 920 
125 195 204 
100 100 100 
Ye Mengzhu, Yueshibian 1 juan 7, pp. l-17b; translated 
and interpreted by Endymion Porter Wilkinson, Studies 
in Chinese Price (N.Y., 1980), pp. 25-30. 
Taking 1685 as the base year, Wilkinson has shown that the data 
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provided by Ye indicates that the cash price of one dou of husked rice 
rose from 110 in 1638 to 1330 in 1642, an increase of some 1100 per 
cent, whereas the silver price of rice rose from 205 to 550 over the 
same period, an increase of only around 170 per cent. A series of 
poor harvests combined with the political and social turmoil of these 
years to push up the price of grain, but that the percentage increase 
in the cash price was so much more than that of silver shows that 
silver did not suffer the depreciation in value which copper did. 
The difference in the increase in the copper and silver prices 
for rice in Shanghai is also partially explicable by the fact that in 
pre-modern agricultural economies a bad crop means "a decreased income 
for the public in general and hence would result in a decreased demand 
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for silver relative to copper!'. 74 Silver had a higher income 
elasticity of demand than did cash, and with the disruption to agricultural 
production in these late Ming years there would have been a much greater 
stress put on the cash sector of the currency system than on the silver 
sector. Such stress would have exacerbated the inflationary spiral 
which was making cash increasingly worthless. This is confirmed by Ye 's 
data, which shows that copper coins were valued three and a half times 
less in terms of silver in 1643 than what they were in 1628. Even in 
a district such as Shanghai, where silver use was relatively widespread, 
this depreciation of copper cash must have caused considerable hardship. 
In provinces such as Shaanxi and Shanxi, where silver use was much less 
common, the hardship would have been all that much more severe. 
These monetary factors give some insight into why it was that 
rebellions broke out in the provinces of Shaanxi and Shanxi, and why, 
in contrast to the revolts in southeastern and south-central China 1 
these rebellions developed into powerful forces which th:i::.eatened the 
very stability of the Ming state. Having arisen as a number of disparate 
rebel hands in the late 1620s, these forces eventually coalesced into 
two main groups, under the leadership of Li Zicheng and Zhang Xianzhong, 
which rampaged through most of north and central China causing widespread 
d . 75 estructJ..on. It was Li Zicheng who led his forces into Beijing in 
1644 upon the collapse of the Ming dynasty. 
Yet too much should not be made of the fact that these rebellions 
had their origins in the silver-scarce provinces of the northwest. The 
rebels never actively encouraged peasant recruitment and although there 
were times, such as during the drought which affected northern Shaanxi 
74 Chen, 11 Flexible Bimetallic Ratios," p. 362. 
75 For a study of the late Ming rebellions see James B. Parsons, 
The Peasant Rebellions of the Late Ming Dynasty (Tuscon, 1970l. 
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in 1628, when peasants left their land and joined the rebel bands, 
within a few months most left to return to their villages. This was 
a pattern which was repeated throughout the course of the rebellions. 
In seeking to explain this, John Dardess has remarked that "As ex-
soldiers and permanent outlaws, the late Ming rebels evolved a predatory 
and highly militarized ethos, one quite at variance with the private 
76 lifestyle of ordinary peasants." Despite the hardship caused by 
drough.t, famine, disease and rising prices peasants found little 
satisfaction in joining the rebel cause. The rebels were a fast-moving, 
mounted, military threat, similar but less organized, to the Manchu 
forces which threatened the Ming empire from the northeast. They were 
not leaders of a mass peasant-based agitation aimed at alleviating the 
type of monetary and fiscal problems which undoubtedly underlay much of 
the hardship encountered in these regions of northwest and north-central 
China. And the reasons for the continued success of the rebellions lay 
not with monetary factors but thB problems within the introverted and 
faction-ridden late Ming administration. 
The fear expressed by the memorialist cited at the beginning of 
this chapter that the increased dominance of silver in the late Ming 
economy could lead to considerable social turmoil seems to have been 
largely unfounded. The influx of foreign silver from the mid-sixteenth 
century onwards did stimulate an existing diversification of the agrarian 
economy and this brought increased wealth and opportunities to some 
merchants. Yet, despite their wealth, these merchants did not develop 
an independent power base, they did not become a new political force 
capable of threatening the existing scholar-official elite. Instead, 
through a process of 'gentrification', wealthy merchants were absorbed 
76 John W. Dardess, "Late Ming Rebellions: Peasants and Problems of 
Interpretation," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 3 (~972), p. 109. 
into the elite and any potential they held for altering significantly 
the structure of society, for creating a new productive base, was 
thereby nullified. 
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Similarly, the spread of silver through the more commercially 
orientated regions of the empire did much to stabalize the deteriorating 
monetary conditions which arose directly from the administration's 
inability to maintain a sound copper currency. Whereas in the more 
economically depressed regions of northwest and north-central China, 
where silver had penetrated least, the inflation caused by a depreciating 
copper coinage contributed to an increase in turmoil within society. 
It was in these regions that rebel bands arose and developed into powerful 
andcmobile forces capable of threatening the very existence of the Ming 
state. However, while unstable monetary conditions undoubtedly 
exacerbated the difficulties encountered by those living in these more 
depressed regions of the empire, they do not account for the eventual 
success of the rebel bands. The reasons for that success lay more 
within the faction-ridden world of the Ming administration itself. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Silver and the Late Ming State 
A strip of white silk brought dispair 
to the nation. 1 
Monetary factors have shed some light on the complex of events 
which led to the fall of the Ming dynasty in 1644, yet to bring these 
events into sharpest focus attention must be turned to the political 
world of the late Ming state, as it was in that world of decision-
making and the exercise of power that the seeds of decay were sown. 
With the gradual implementation of the Single Whip Reform the silver 
revenue available to the administration had increased considerably, 
but so too had the cost of running the empire. Each new year seemed 
to bring the need for increased expenditure, particularly military 
expenditure, so as to offset threats to the stability of the realm. 
Budgetary deficits continually plagued the late Ming administration. 
Yet financial difficulties do not seem to have been at the heart of 
the problems of these years. The evidence suggests that the real 
problems lay elsewhere. 
Shen Shixing, senior grand secretary in the 1580s, identified the 
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real cause for concern when he wrote of how the problems of the dynasty 
arose from a "cleavage between the top and the bottom", a "separation 
of the interior from the exterior". Never since ancient times, 'Shen 
wrote, had a state under such conditions managed to retain peace and 
2 
order for long. Shen feared that the intra-bureaucratic conflict 
which consumed administrative energy in the years immediately following 
1This is how the seventeenth century Chinese dramatist Kong Shangren 
describes the suicide of the Chongzhen emperor in his play "Taohuashan"; 
see K'ung Shang-jen, The Peach Blossom Fan (Berkeley, 1976), translated 
by Chen Shih-hsiang and Harold Acton, p. 100. 
2Ray Huang, 1587: A Year of No Significance (New Haven, 1981) p. 48, 
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the death of the powerful Zhang Juzheng would result in a severe 
diminuition of state power, possibly leading to the collapse of the 
dynasty. Such fears were to prove well founded, the late Ming bureaucracy 
was excessively introspective, with vital administrative energy wasted on 
nepotistic activity instead of being directed to the governing of the 
realm. As a consequence the power of the Ming state gradually dwindled. 
1644 was not a year of sudden revolution; rather, it was the culmination of a 
long period of dynastic decline. When the rebel leader Li Zicheng arrived 
at the outskirts of Beij he found he did not have to lay seige to the 
city or storm its walls, he simply marched his men through the that 
had been opened to them. And loyalist stands attempted over the following 
few years were all wrought by the same factional strife which underlay 
the Ming collapse; they were never a serious threat to the new rulers 
of China. How and why an administration lost control of the state it 
was empowered to govern will be the concern of this fourth chapter. 
Solvency of the State 
The cost of administering the Ming empire rose considerably from the 
1590s onwards. This last decade of the sixteenth century had seen the 
outbreak of two serious revolts, one centred on the border fortress at 
Ningxia in 1592 and the other by Miao tribesmen in Guizhou province. 
The rebellion at Ningxia began when two Chinese soldiers, Liu Dongyang 
and Xu Zhao, rose up against their commanders and joined forces with Bubei, 
a local Mongol chieftan. Together these rebels caused considerable 
problems for the Chinese and it was some time before Ming forces were 
able to retake the Ningxia fortress and supress the rebellion. 3 In the 
same year Ming authority in Guizhou province was challenged by Miao 
3oMB entries for Li Jusong, I, pp. 830-835; and Xiao Daheng, I, 
pp. 
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tribesmen under the leadership of Yang Yonglun. This Miao rebellion 
continued on until the end of the decade and was a continual drain on 
the finances of surrounding provinces. The sting was taken out of 
the rebellion with the capture and subsequent suicide of Yang in 1600, 
yet the Ming administration continued to face difficulties in the 
4 
southwest through until the end of the dynasty. 
The year of 1592 also saw Japanese forces under the leadership of 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi launch a full-scale invasion of the Korean peninsula. 
For Hideyoshi, Korea was to be a stepping stone to China. He had 
ambitions of establishing his rule and reputation far and wide, and wrote 
to his wife in the late 1580s: "Even China will enter my grip; I will 
command it during my lifetime." 5 The Japanese invasion force moved 
quickly north through Korea, taking Pusan, Seoul and Pyongyang. Within 
a few months, however, they were driven back to Pusan by the Chinese army 
and peace negotiations began. Hideyoshi wanted to be invested as a 
tributary prince of the Ming, with control of half of Korea. He also 
requested that trade between China and Japan be resumed. The Ming were 
willing to allow the first of these conditions, but not the occupation 
of korea; their attitude regarding the resumption of trade was to wait 
and see how things developed. After protracted negotiations Hideyoshi 
finally decided he was not willing to withdraw all Japanese troops from 
Korea and ordered his daimyo to re-invade the peninsula. This time the 
Chinese and Koreans were prepared and the Japanese made little progress. 
When Hideyoshi died in September 1598 his successors quickly abandoned 
h . . 6 t e ~nvas~on. 
Although successful, the cost of these three campaigns to the Ming 
4
oMB Yang Yonglun, II1 pp. 1553-1556; Liu Ting, I, pp. 964-968; 
and Hualong, I pp. 822-826. 
5Elizabeth Berry, Hideyoshi (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), p. 207 
6
oMB, Konishi Yukinaga, I, pp. 728-733; Chen Lin, I, pp. 167-174; 
and Li Hualong, I, pp. 822-826. 
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administration was high. One estimate claimed that the Korean campaign 
alone cost twenty six million taels. 7 More reasonable estimates put 
the combined cost of the three campaigns at between ten and twelve 
million tael~. 8 Grain and financial reserves built up during times 
of constrained government expenditure were soon exhausted. Thus, in 
the early years of the seventeenth century, when the administration found 
itself facing a growing Manchu threat from the northeast and further 
revolt and rebellion within the empire itself, it had to rely solely 
upon its annual income to meet these new costs. The reserves built 
up during the 1570s were no longer there. 
Between 1618 and 1639 seven surcharges were added to the land tax in 
order to meet the continually increasing costs of provisioning the armed 
forces. Ray Huang estimates that the administration would have been 
fortunate to collect 70 per cent of the imposed land tax in any one year, 
but that even if it had collected the full amount, including the seven 
surcharges, the burden of this land tax would have amounted to only 
approximately 10 to 15 per cent of the annual yield from land of modest 
fertility in central and south China. And as Huang comments, although 
high by seventeenth century standards, this was by no means an 
intolerable level of taxation. 9 Despite the fact that the government 
needed to raise its income considerably to offset increasing military 
expenditure, the fiscal burden at the turn of the century was sufficiently 
light for this to be done without provoking widespread opposition amongst 
the populace. Of course, the way in which this tax was collected may 
well have provoked antagonism, yet, as was noted in Chapter Three, the 
revolts and rebellions of the late Ming years were not specifically anti-
7 Gernet, A History of Chinese Civilization, p. 431. 
8 Huang, 11 Fiscal Administration, 11 p. 116. 
9
rbid., pp. 118-121. 
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tax in nature. 
The increase in the turnover of silver by the Ministry of Revenue 
in the early years of the seventeenth century is testimony to the fact 
that the late Ming administration was able to increase its revenue 
considerably. As early as 1442 the administration had established 
a silver vault in the Jiangnan region; in Taicang prefecture, Nan 
Zhili, and for the remainder of the dynasty this vault handled all 
the silver bullion under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Revenue. 10 
Some of the annual income of the administration went directly to the 
Ministry of Works and the Imperial Stud, but it was the Ministry of 
Revenue which controlled virtually all the income accruing to the 
; 
state from the land tax (and with the Single Ship Rejorm the land/corvee 
exaction}, the salt administration and the internal customs duties. 
The Ministry of Revenue also collected the rental from crown lands and 
the 'gold-patterned-silver' surcharge. In fact, it was the imposition 
of this new surcharge in 1436 which had made the establishment of a 
silver vault necessary, as approximately four million. piculs of the 
grain tax from the Jiangnan region was henceforth commuted to payment 
. '1 11 ~n s~ ver. 
From the detailed studies of Quan Hansheng and Li longwa we have a 
fairly comprehensive knowledge of the operation of the Taicang silver 
vault. 12 Table Nine presents a compilation of their results. What 
this data tells us is that up until the mid-sixteenth century the vault 
rarely handled any more than 2 million taels annually. But with the 
spread of the Single Whip and the increasing monetization of the fiscal 
10 Huang, Taxation, p. 15 
11 Huang, "Fiscal Administration," p. 107 
12 ., l . { h) Quan Hansheng (Ch • uan Han-sheng and L~ Longwa ,__Lee Lung-wa , 
"Ming-chung-yeh-hou t' ai-ts 'ang .sui-ju-yin-liang-te yen-chiu." (A:t•Study of 
the Annual Revenue of Silver Taels of the Taicang Vault after the Mid-Ming 
Period), Journal - The Institute of Chinese Studies - Chinese University 
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TABLE EIGHT13 
Income and Expenditure of the Taicang Vault, 1548-1645 (silver tael~) 
Year Income Expenditure Difference 
1548 2,000,000 3,470,000 
- 1,470,000 
1568 2,300,000 ( +) 4,400,000 ( +) - 2,100,000 
1578 3,559,800 (+) 3,888,400 ( +) 
- 328,600 
1589 3,270,000 ( +) 4,390,000 ( +) 
- 1,120,000 
1592 4,512,000 (+) 5,465,000 ( +) 
-
953,000 
1600 4,000,000 ( +) 4,500,000 ( +) 
-
500,000 
1602 4,770,000 ( +) 4,500,000 (+) + 200,000 
1604 4,582,000 4,582,000 
-
1605 3,549,000 3,549,000 (+) -
1612 4,000,000 (+) 4,000,000 (+) 
-
1617 3,890,000 4,219,029 ( +) 
-
329,029 
1620 5,830,246 (+) 6,086,692 (+) 
-
256,446 
1621 7,552,745 ( +) 8,568,906 (+) 1,016,161 
1622 4,968,795 ( +) 5,927,721 (+) - 958,926 
1625 3,0301725 ( +) 2,854,370 ( +) + 176,355 
1628 7,064,200 (+) 9,568,942 ( +) - 2,504,742 
1630 9,136,357 (+) 9,500,628 ( +) 
- 364,271 
1631 12,249,195 ( +) 11,125,252 (+) + 1,123,943 
1634 12,812,000 (+) 12,153,000 (+) + 659,000 
1637 16,700,000 20,000,000 - 3,300,000 
1639 20,000,000 no data 
1641 21,451,736 (+) no data 
1642 23,000,000 (+) 23,000,000 ( +) -
1643 21,300,000 (+) no data 
(+) indicates the actual figure was probably greater than that given 
of Hong Kong, 5, 1(1972), pp.123-157; and "Ming-tai Chung-yeh-hou t'ai-
ts'ang sui-ch'u-yin-liang-te yen-chiu" (The Annual Expenditure of Silver 
Taels of the Taicang Vault after the Mid-Ming Period}, Journal - The 
Institute of Chinese Studies - Chinese University of Hong Kong, 5, 2(1973), 
pp. 169-244. 
13The data for this Table comes from Quan and Li "Ming-chung/' 
pp. 126-137 Table 1; and "Ming-tai" pp. 173-185, Table 2. 
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structure the annual turnover at the vault began to increase quite markedly. 
By the beginning of the seventeenth century the average turnover at the 
vault was well over 4 million taels annually, and by 1642 this figure had 
risen to a remarkable 23 million taels. 
The magnitude of this increase in the silver income of the Taicang 
vault is evidence of the massive amount of foreign silver which flooded 
into China from the 1580s through to the 1640s. It is also testimony 
to the ability of the administration to acquire for itself an increasing 
share of the empire's silver. No doubt the addition of the seven surcharges 
to the land tax between 1618 and 1639 were partially responsible for the 
increase, yet even if all of the surcharges had been collected in silver, 
and most probably they were not, their imposition does not explain the 
dramatic nature of the increase. The reason for such a large increase must 
have been the fact that the Single Whip Reform was being implemented far 
more extensively throughout the Chinese countryside during the early 
decades of the seventeenth century. Even so, it was no small achievement 
for the administration to increase its silver income by some 400 per cent 
between 1600 and 1640, especially as the incentive to hoard specie would 
have been great in times of turmoil such as these late Ming years. At the 
end of the dynasty much of the land tax was still being collected in grain, 
but silver had come to play a vital role in the state's finances. The 
fate of the Ming may well have fallen sooner had it not been for the great 
influx of foreign silver to the empire in these early decades of the 
seventeenth century. 
An inability to raise sufficient revenue was not at the heart of the 
problems of the late Ming state. Certainly there were difficulties in 
continuously increasing income. The last Ming minister of revenue, Ni 
Yuanlu, noted this when he wrote that "methods of increasing state income, 
since they involve long-term planning, may require several decades to 
materialize; even short-range projects may take years. Sometimes investment 
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14 is necessary." The point Ni was making was not that it was impossible 
to raise more revenue, but that to do so would require the implementation 
of long-term policy initiatives, and this was ~ impossibility in a 
climate where factionalism and deep political malaise underlay the need 
for such continually high levels of expenditure. It was a political 
disease that was at the heart of the Ming decline. Incidental difficulties 
became major and costly problems through administrative inefficiency. 
Even with a 400 per cent increase in its silver revenue, an administration 
at war with itself could not retain control of the Chinese empire for 
long. The seventeenth century crisis in China was not monetary or fiscal 
in nature, it was fundamentally a political crisis. And the first signs 
of the administrative conflict that was to lead to th.e collapse of the 
dynasty came in the years immediately following the death in 1582 of the 
powerful senior grand secretary Zhang Juzheng. 
The Legacy of Zhang Juzheng 
The decade beginning 1572 had been an important one in Ming history. 
Under the administrative direction of the senior grand secretary Zhang 
Juzheng it was. a time of peace, constrained government expenditure and 
si.gnificant reform. Zhang Juzheng carne to the Grand Secretariat with a 
deep felt concern for the administrative operation of the state. He 
later described his aims as senior grand secretary to be to "devote 
attention to the strengthening of the dynasty and restricting private 
interests, reducing dis.cussion and criticism, and checking names and 
11115 
realities in order to venerate the sovereign and shelter the people. 
l 4Ray Huang, "Ni Ytlan-lu: 
Statesman," in Wrn. Theodore de 
(N • Y • 1 19701, P • 425 • 
"Realism" in a Neo-Confucian Scholar-
Bary (ed.)., Self and Society in Ming Thought 
lSRobert Crawford, "Chang Chu-cheng's Confucian Legalism," in Wm 
Theodore de Bary led. L Self and Society in Ming Thought (N.Y. 1 1970) , 
p. 37l. 
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Zhang was a vigorous bureaucrat and favoured the employment of active 
administrators. He had little time for 'ornateness' in government, 
claiming that speculation and a preoccupation with ideological concerns 
occurred at the expense of efficient administration. In contrast to the 
Confucian principle of employing generalists in all posts, Zhang directed 
specialist knowledge to particular problems. In the fields of hydraulic 
engineering, defense and fiscal policy Zhang encouraged innovative 
improvements to be undertaken by administrators with particular skills 
in each of these fields. 16 These types of administrative initiative 
were of great benefit to the Ming, yet it was in the sphere in which 
reform was most needed, the administrative structure itself, that Zhang 
Juzheng was least successful, and it was in this area that his legacy to 
the Ming state was most fateful. 
Like other bureaucrats of his time Zhang Juzheng was well aware of 
what Shen Shixing called a 'separation of the interior from the exterior'. 
When Zhang memorialized the throne in 1568 regarding the poor communication 
between the emperor and his senior ministers1 he was identifying a problem 
17 
which had its roots in the early years of the dynasty. Although the 
emperor had always been regarded as the apex of the traditional Chinese 
state, the first Ming emperor had institutionally entrenched this imperial 
pre-eminence when he abolished the only administrative body with executive 
powers to act as a check on the absolutism of an emperor. This body was 
the secretariat (Zhongsh.u sheng), and with its abolition in 1380 the outer 
court, or administration ('exterior' l , lost both its coordinating body and 
its direct and personal access to the emperor ('interior'} •18 No longer 
16For Zhang's patronnage of specialist knowledge see the entry for him 
in the DMB, pp. 53-61; as well as the entries for Pan Jixun, II, pp. 1107-
1111; and Qi Juguang, I, pp. 220-224. Also of note here is chapter five 
of Huang, 1587, pp. 156-188. 
17This 'Memorial on Six Affairs' is discussed by Crawford, "Chang Chu-
cheng's Confucian Legalism," p. 374. 
18 On the abolition of the Secretariat see Charles 0. Hucker, "Government 
Organization on the Ming Dynasty," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 
21 (December, 1958} , pp. 27-31. 
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could a Secre.tariat 1 s. two chief councillors (prime ministers) petition 
the emperor directly on hehalf of the administration. By the .mid-sixteenth 
century the problems caused by this disjunction of inner court (_!!~itang) 
and outer court (waitang) were blatantly obvious. Both the Zhengde (r. 1506-
1522) and the Jiajing (r. 1522-1567) emperors withdrew from active 
participation in administration, relying on inner court personnel to mediate 
19 between themselves and the bureaucracy. This increase in power accruing 
to eunuchs and grand secretaries, the inner court personnel, was a source 
of much antagonism amidst the regular bureaucracy of the outer court. It 
was, however, an inevitable consequence. With the increasing complexity of 
the Ming state, successive emperors could not possibly carry the administrat-
ive burden which the Hongwu emperor had taken upon himself, especially when 
they were of a more lackadaisical disposition, as was the Zhen9de 
20 
emperor. 
Because of this devolution of imperial responsibility to inner court 
personnel, it was natural for Zhang Juzheng to use his position as senior 
grand secretary to restore in a de facto sense what he felt to be lacking 
in the administration, and what could not be recreated de jure, th.e 
position of prime minister, Zhang firmly believed in autocracy, yet he 
felt that the principal governing unit should comprise both emperor and 
senior minister, not just emperor. His difficulty, therefore, was "how 
to become a prime minister under a system that did not permit a prime 
. •· h' 1121 m~n~sters ~p. The position of senior grand secretary seemed to offer 
that opportunity. 
the reign of these two emperors see DMB, I, pp. 307-315 and 
315-321. 
20 Hucker, "Government Organization, 11 p. 28 notes that in one ten day 
period toward the end of his reign the Hongwu emperor was presented with 
1,660 memorials which discussed 3,391 issues, all of which required 
imperial decision. 
21
charles o. Hucker, "The Tung-lin Movement of the late Ming Period," in 
J .K. ·Fairbank·, .· (ed.) ,Chinese Thought and Institutions (Chicago, 195n, 
p. 
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The Grand Secretariat began as an extension of the Hanlin Academy, 
providing the throne with bureaucratic assistants culled from the most 
successful candidates in the triennial metropolitan examinations. 
Initially the most important task that these secretarial assistants 
performed was the education of the imperial children, particularly the 
heir apparent. But as the dynasty progressed the grand secretaries 
became valued administrative mediators, processing the great volume of 
paperwork directed to the throne. By the sixteenth century grand 
secretaries played a vital role in policy formation, drafting rescripts 
and attaching proposals to the documents channelled through the inner 
court to the emperor. 
For Zhang Juzheng promotion to senior grand secretary came at an 
opportune time. The Longqing emperor had died a few months earlier and 
his son, th.e future Wanli emperor, was only nine years old. Despite a 
precocious intelligence the new emperor was too young to impose his 
personality on the administration and thus constantly sought the advice 
of his senior grand secretary. And having won the favour of the 
emperor's mother, the empress dowager Cizheng, as well as the head palace 
eunuch., Feng Bao, Zhang moved quickly to remove from the administration 
1 h 1 h . 22 al t ose he thought wou d oppose lffi. Within a few months of becoming 
senior grand secretary Zhang Juzheng completely dominated the 
bureaucracy. 
From this position of strength Zhang began to institute administrative 
reforms which had the affect of removing power from outer court officials 
and concentrating it in the hands of the Grand Secretariat. Zhang was 
quick also to criticize and punish censors whom he felt had exceeded 
their authority. Appointment to and advancement through the bureaucracy 
became more difficult as. Zhang reduced the number of officials to a level 
22 DMB, I, pp. 53-61 and 856-859. 
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he thought conducive to efficient administration. And moving beyond 
the bureaucracy itself, Zhang attempted to control the education of 
future officials by asserting that the focus of study should be the 
Classics and the laws and institutions of the dynasty. He felt it a 
waste of time to encourage 'idle' philosophical discussion and in 1579 
was able to gain imperial approval for a decree banning all private 
academies. Such centres, Zhang felt, could become sources of political 
opposition and should therefore be outlawed. The extent to which Zhang 
was. able to implement these policies varied, but in all cases he 
antagonized sections of the outer court and this antagonism found a 
focal point in Zhang's failure to retire from office and observe the 
customary filial duties following the death of his father in 1577. 23 
It was standard practice for all officials to retire for a period 
of twenty seven months upon the death of a parent. Zhang applied for 
such a withdrawal three times but was three times refused; it is said 
that the young emperor, his mother and Feng Baa all requested Zhang 
remain at his post. Zhang did retire from office for nine months 
following the marriage of the emperor early in 1578, but this did not 
placate those in the outer court who felt a great impropriety had 
occurred. 
Confucian tradition maintained that the strength of a dynasty 
rested with its moral rectitude and it was felt to be not only a 
dangerous precedent but also a direct threat to the dynasty for a senior 
administrator such as Zhang Juzheng to ignore so flagrantly the correct 
course of behaviour. A campaign of protest began. The minister of 
personnel, Zhang Han, was forced to retire for privately requesting that 
Zhang Juzheng observe the customarily required retirement period. Two 
23This paragraph is based onthe entry for Zhang in the DMB, I 
pp. 53-61. 
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junior Hanlin academicians were publicly beaten and dismissed for 
memorializing the throne advising Zhang's retirement. Then two more 
officials, occupying seniorpositions, were also beaten and sent as 
common soldiers to the frontier for reinforcing the views of the earlier 
. 24 
memor1.als. An imperial declaration was then published advising that 
any more comment on the matter would be treated as treasonous and those 
responsible severely punished. For the remainder of Zhang Juzheng's 
term as senior grand secretary opposition to his rule was contained 
through fear of punishment. But it was to burst forth in a flurry of 
recriminations and retribution upon Zhang's death in 1582. 
Within two years of his death Zhang Juzheng and most of those who 
had been associated with him were denounced and/or dismissed. Initially 
the Wanli emperor had been reluctant to move against his former tutor 
and senior advisor, but the pressure for recrimination was such that he 
was forced to act, especially when the accusation was made that Zhang 
25 had been plotting to usurp the throne. Underlying this outburst of 
intra-bureaucratic conflict, which was to become the hall mark of the 
dynasty over its remaining years, was the tension between inner and 
outer courts, between the 'interior' and the 'exterior'. Zhang Juzheng 
had used his position in the inner court to dominate the young emperor 
and through him the outer court. The reaction of the outer court to all 
this, and in particular of the censorial officials, was to try to limit 
the power of the Grand Secretariat. The various strands of outer court 
opposition to grand secretarial power were best synthesized in a memorial 
24Besides Zhang Han the four officials conerned were Wu Zhongxing, 
Zhao Yongxian, Zou Yuanbiao and Shen Sixia. See DMB, II, pp. 1312-1314. 
25 Huang, 1587, pp. 29-41 details the reaction against Zhang, including 
the accusation that he was conspiring to use the forces under Qi Jiguang 
to overthrow the throne. 
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submitted to the throne b.y the censor Zhang Wenxi. In this memorial it 
was suggested that: personnel reports and reports from the six ministries 
and the Censorate should not be sent to the Grand Secretariat for re-
evaluation before presentation to the emperor; the important appointments 
of minister of personnel and minister of war should not be left to the 
sole discretion of the grand secretaries; supreme commanders, governors-
general, governors and regional inspectors should not report directly 
and secretly to the Grand Secretariat; and that rescripts drafted by one 
grand secretary should be shown to the other grand secretaries before 
26 being sent to the emperor. 
Personnel management is a major concern of the central core of any 
bureaucracy and in late Ming times this was particularly so. Officials 
of the outer court resented the fact that Zhang Juzheng had undermined 
the authority of the Ministry of Personnel, which, in the absence of a 
Secretariat, had become the leading outer court body. By transferring 
many of the important decisions regarding personnel management to the 
Grand secretariat, Zhang had been able to undermine the administration, 
just as he had silenced criticism by purging the Censorate. All of the 
proposals suggested in the memorial cited above were rejected by the 
emperor, yet despite that, not one of the grand secretaries that 
succeeded Zhang Juzheng was able to dominate the inner and outer courts 
as he had done. The factionalism that consumed the administration from 
1582 until the end of the dynasty is evidence of the fact that various 
groups of officials contested the concentration and exercise of power 
by others. 
In his term as senior grand secretary Zhang Juzheng may well have 
resolved personally the dilemma of how to become a prime minster under 
26This memorial is cited in the DMB entry for Shen Shixing; II 
pp. J.l87-ll90. 
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a system that did not permit a prime ministership. Yet, in doing so, he 
revealed that the Grand Secretariat could never be a coordinating body 
for the outer court through which the officialdom could regulate and 
check, to some extent at least, the absolute emphasis which the Hongwu 
emperor had placed on the personage of the throne. This was because 
the Grand Secretariat "was never regularized, never officially institution-
alized, never recognized openly as an executive organ ranking above the 
. . . t . ,.27 s~x m~n~s r~es. Zhang's term as senior grand secretary ensured that 
it never would be. The Grand Secretariat remained an inner court body 
and the disjunction of 'interior' and 'exterior'continued. This was, 
as Robert Crawford notes, the paradox of Zhang's efforts, efforts which 
led to a "revitalization of the centralism and authoritarianism which 
were, to a large extent, root causes of the very decline he fought to 
28 
avert." Theoretically, absolute power remained with the emperor. Yet 
in practice much of this power was subverted by the bureaucracy, although 
it was not centred in an institutionally recognized body. Its distribution 
was unclear and therefore contested, as was to be clearly demonstrated 
throughout the remaining years of the Wanli reign. 
The Withdrawal of an Emperor 
In his lengthy exposition of th.e theme that traditional Asian states 
were subject to 'oriental despotisms,' Karl Wittfogel claims that the 
rulers in such states combined in their person "supreme operational 
authority". It was only because of weakness, immaturity, or incompetence 
that a ruler ever shared this operational supremacy with an aide, a prime 
minster, and Wittfogel feels that this delegation of authority never 
lasted for long: "it vanishes as soon as the ruler is strong enough to 
. . . ,.29 
realise the autocratic potential inherent ~n his pos~t~on. Yet this 
was not the case with the Wanli emperor. The furore following the death 
27 Hucker, "The Tung-lin Movement," p. 139, 
28 4 Crawford, "Chang chU-cheng's Confucian Legalism," P· 40 • 
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of Zhang Juzheng seemed to drive any interest the Wanli emperor had in the 
governing process from him and he withdrew back into his own secluded 
world, refusing to take part in even the most ceremonial aspects of 
administration. After a visit to his recently completed mausoleum in 
1588 the emperor never again set foot outside the palace grounds and 
within the next few years he had given up all audiences with his senior 
officials, a situation that was to continue for the next twenty five 
30 years. 
This withdrawal of the Wanli emperor saw a resurgence of eunuch 
influence within the Ming administrative structure, Since the early 
years of the fifteenth_ century eunuchs had ceased to be merely personal 
servants of the emperor and had developed an internal bureaucracy within 
the palace. By the Wanli reign they were organized into twelve 
Directorates (jian), four Offices (si) and eight Bureaus (zh~). Overall 
supervision came from a Directorate of Ceremonies (S i 1 i ji a~), which was 
in many ways a eunuch equivalent of the Grand Secretariat (Neig~), and was 
headed by the senior palace eunuch, the director of ceremonies, or grand 
guardian of the seal (sili zhangyin taijian) .31 Estimates of eunuch 
numbers vary, with one account suggesting as many as 70,000 to lOO,OOO 
'th' th 1 alone by 1644. 32 Wl 1n e pa ace Another estimate, a more conservative 
one, reckons that eunuch numbers never rose above 13,000 throughout the 
33 dynasty. Either way, it was certainly the case that by the late 
sixteenth century eunuchs had established a complex administrative 
29Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Depotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power 
(N.Y., 19571, p. 305. 
30 Huang, 1587, p. 123; and DMB, I, pp. 324-337. 
31These details come from a work by Liu Ruoyu, "Zhuozhongzhi"; see the 
entry for Liu in DMB,I, pp. 950-953; and also Ulrich Hans-Richard Mammitzsch, 
"Wei Chung-hsien:AReappraisal of the Eunuch and the Factional Strife at 
the Late Ming Court" (Unpublished PhD. dissertation, University of Hawaii, 
1968}_, pp. 15-56. 
32 Hucker, "Government Organization, " p. 11. 
33Mammitzsch, "Wei Chung-hsien," p. 15. 
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heirarchy within the palace and with the patronage given them by 
the Wanli emperor they came to exert a considerable influence over the 
governing process. 
When the Wanli emperor refused to see senior outer court officials 
and grand secretaries it was the palace eunuchs who mediated between 
them and the throne. Documents arriving at the palace from the outer 
court Office of Transmissions were screened by eunuchs of the clerical 
office, the Wenshufeng, most of which were then sent to the Grand 
Secretariat, although those considered of importance could be sent 
immediately to the director of ceremonies. From the Grand Secretariat 
memorials would be sent to the Directorate of Ceremonies and it was 
there that final decisions were taken on the response to be made to them. 
In the 1570s Zhang Juzheng had used his position as senior grand secretary 
to dominate the inner court bureaucracy, whereas, by the turn of the 
seventeenth century, the acquiesence of the emperor enabled the senior 
palace eunuch to exert such dominance. It was he who decided which 
memorials would go before the emperor and what course of action the 
emperor would be encouraged to support (usually only 4 or 5 out of every 
1 . . ,, 34 00 memor1als reached the emperor 1n these year~. To be a grand 
secretary in such times must have been frustrating. Without direct access 
to the emperor they could do little more than propose courses of action 
and hope they found favour with the emperor's eunuch advisors. Grand 
secretaries found themselves under pressure from the outer court to 
influence policy decisions but largely impotent within their own inner 
court sphere. The conflict of 'interior' and 'exterior' cannot have been 
helped by this importance which the Wanli emperor gave to the palace eunuchs. 
34Ibid. I p. 49. 
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Of the eunuchs themselves little is known. Confucian commentators 
have laid much of the blame for what was wrong with the Ming dynasty at 
the feet of eunuchs and there is no doubt that there is some basis to 
this criticism. Having been trained as personal servants, eunuchs were 
not accustomed to viewing matters on an empire-wide scale. Their focus 
was th.e palace and its environs. Yet the emperor allowed them a 
responsibility far greater than what such training would merit, and between 
U:699 and. 1606 · even granted eunuch commissioners supervisory control 
over all provincial taxes. In carrying out their duties some of these 
eunuch commissioners were particularly harsh and aroused considerable 
antagonism, both. with the civil officials, who naturally resented eunuch 
intrusion into what had been traditionally their own preserve, and 
35 
amongst the general populace. However, to claim that all eunuchs 
were rapacious and self-seeking would be erroneous. The fact that the 
Ming administration continued to function throughout the thirty odd years 
in which the Wanli emperor refused to partake of the governing process is 
testimony in itself to the administrative endeavour of a large number of 
palace eunuchs. 
A more serious consequence of the refusal of the Wanli emperor to 
govern was the slow attrition of administrative personnel. From 1587 on 
until his death in 1620 the emperor simply ignored memorials that either 
annoyed or did not interest him. He did respond to important memorials 
regarding defense and fiscal matters, but more routine administrative 
concerns were shelved. And as imperial approval was required for the 
appointment or transferral of officials, such non-action by the emperor 
35
see the DMB entries for the Wanli emperor,I, pp. 324-337; and the 
eunuch tax commissioner Chen Feng,I, pp. 152-153. Yuan "Urban Riots", 
pp. 287-291, relates two uprisings which resulted from the exactions of 
eunuch tax commissioners. And Matteo Ricci is said to have stated that 
the eunuchs carried out their mission "with such cruelty that in a short 
time all China was in revolt and in a worse state than it had been during 
the Korean war"; see Dunne Generation of Giants, p. 63. This comment 
greatly exaggerates the true situation, but it probably reflects quite 
accurately the attitudes of the civil officialdom with whom Ricci was in 
contact. 
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meant that administrative posts which became vacant often stayed that way. 
Zhang Juzheng had reduced staffing levels to achieve what he believed to 
be an efficient administration; the Wanli emperor simply let the 
bureaucracy wither away. The effect this had on the administration is 
described by Charles H.ucker: 
In 1602 nine of the Censorate's thirteen regional inspectorships 
were unstaffed: the central government's six ministries were 
short three ministers and ten vice-ministers, the Censorate and 
the six offices of scrutiny were ninety-four men below normal 
staffing levels; three provinces had no governors; lesser prov-
incial vacancies totalled sixty-six; and twenty-five prefectures 
lacked prefects. By 1612 administration was at a virtual stand-
still. There was only one grand secretary and he had been ill 
and secluded in his Peking residence for months; there was only 
one ministry head, charged with concurrent responsibility for 
the three ministries of Personnel, of War, and of Justice; the 
ministries of Revenue, of Rites, and of Works each had only one 
vice-minister on duty; the Censorate had no regular censor-in-
chief for eight years ••• provincial level vacancies abounded; 
and it is estimated that some fifty per cent of all prefectural 
and district posts were vacant.36 
Thus, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, imperial inaction 
threatened the very day to day governing of the empire. 
Moral Rejuvination: 'A mission lacking the means to realize itself. 137 
When an administrative tradition has as its ideological foundation 
texts of a richly ethical nature, as with the Chinese Classics, it is 
to be expected that political conflict would find its expression in 
moral terms. The most vociferous proponents of a strong moral stand in 
administrative matters were those who had been to the fore in criticizing 
Zhang Juzheng's concentration of power in the Grand Secretariat. Mostly 
censors, this group entitled itself the 'good elements' (shanlei} or 
'upright men' (zhengre~), and their concern was not so much with a 
s·eparation of the 1 interior 1 from the 1 exterior', as with the moral 
character .of individual officials. They felt that the administration was 
36 Charles o. Hucker's entry for the Wanli emperor, ~,I, p.327. 
37 d ' . Fre er~c Wakeman Jnr., "The Pr~ce of Autonomy: Intellectuals in Ming 
and Ch'ing Politics," Daedalus, 101 (Spring, 1972), p. 50. 
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·beset by too much s.elfishness and sycophancy, as typified by Zhang 
Juzheng, and that officials like themselves, self-proclaimed upholders 
of Confucian tradition, should attain senior posts in the administrative 
heirarchy so as to purge 'bad elements' and restore good government to 
the empire. Naturally, then, the attention of these 'good elements', 
and that of their opponents, became personnel management. 
Every three years provincial and district officials were subject to 
evaluation by the Minstry of Personnel. For the officials serving in 
the capital such evaluation came once in every six years. And with 
administrative power in contention, it was these merit evaluations 
which provided the means whereby differing factions could attempt to 
obtain for their supporters positions of influence. For instance, in 
the metropolitan evaluation of 1587, 'good elements' supported the 
censor-in-chief, Xin Zixiu, who wished to purge the administration of 
a number of officials he felt to be corrupt. However, the senior grand 
secretary, Shen Shixing, with the legacy of Zhang Juzheng prominent in 
his mind, wished to restore faith in the Grand Secretariat amongst the 
outer court officials and used his influence to ensure the evaluation 
was mild, with few officials losing their posts. In response to this Xin 
Zixiu retired, and those 'good elements' who had supported him, such as 
38 Gu Xiancheng, were demoted. 
'Good elements' again attempted to purge the administration of those 
they felt to pe morally corrupt when the next metropolitan evaluation was 
held in l593. Gu Xiancheng had by then returned to the capital and 
occupied an influential post in the Ministry of Personnel. Gu's associates 
amongs.t the . 'good elements' held those leading positions in the administration 
38 • · ' hu d · t P 1' t' 1 d HeinrlchBusch, "The Tung-lln S u-yuan an 1 s o 1 1ca an 
Philos.ophical Significance," Monumenta Serica, l4 (19.49) , pp. 24-25. 
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which gave them control over the evaluation: Sun Long was minister 
of personnel, Zhao Nanxing a director in the Bureau of Evaluation (within 
the Ministry of PersonneH, and Li Shida occupied a senior post in the 
. 39 Censorate. Together these men engineered what was to be a 'thorough 
house-cleaning operation,' criticizing all those officials they felt 
did not conform to the standard of behaviour befitting a 'superior man'. 
In the process, however, they criticized a number of leading lights in 
the administration, including the grand secretary Wang Xijue. Wang 
retaliated and with the assistance of a number of censors sympathetic to 
his position he was able to have those responsible for the evaluation 
punished. Zhao Nanxing was stripped of all rank and made a commoner, 
Sun Long resigned, as did Li Shida, and although Gu Xiancheng was 
initially pardoned he also chose to resign a year later. Thus, by 1594, 
most of the influential 'good elements' had been removed from the 
administration. And with the Wanli emperor unconcerned about the 
appointment or re-appointment of officials, most of them were to stay out 
of office for the next sixteen years. 
Without access to decision making these .'good elements' began to 
focus their efforts for moral reform through the Donglin Academy .. This 
was a private academy, founded in Song times, and reopened by Gu Xiancheng 
and Gao Panlong in 1604. 40 Virtually all of its members at the re-
founding were officials who had been dismissed or who had resigned in 
the wake of the metropolitan evaluation of 1593. At the academy much of 
39Ibid., pp. 25-27; DMB entries for Zhan Nanxing, I, pp. J.28-l32; Gu 
Xiancheng, I, pp. 736-744; and Wang Xijue, II, pp. 1376-1379, 
40Busch, "The Tung-lin Shu-yuan"; Hucker, "The Tung-lin Movement"; 
and the DMB entries for Gao Panlong, I, pp. 701-710 and Gu Xiancheng, I, 
pp. 736-744. John Meskill gives a more general discussion of the 
importance of academies in Academies in Ming China: A Historical Essay 
(Tuscan, 1982). 
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the activity was. passive, concerned to establish the philosophical basis 
to what was felt to be the current problems of the dynasty, but there was 
also an active political wing which wished to gain direct access to power. 41 
Zhang Juzheng' s. contention that private academies could become centres of 
political agitation had proved correct. 
This Donglin political faction constantly petitioned central 
government in order to place those it felt to be sympathetic to its 
cause higher in the administrative heirarchy. While those opposed to 
the Donglin faction sought to place their own sympathizers in senior 
positions. Up until his retirement in 1606, Shen Yiguan had been the 
principal obstacle to •good element' ambitions, and as senior grand 
s.ecretary and titular head of the Ministry of Personnel he had proved a 
very effective foil to them. 42 Following Shen's retirement, those 
opposed to th.e 'good elementtj1 coalesced into two main provincially-based 
groups; the Chidang, or Shandong faction, and the Chudang, or Huguang 
f . 43 act~on. Bo~ were broad associations whose only real common interest 
was an opposition to the proposed purges of ~e 'good elements~ and 
neither of them dominated in the administration. 
James Parsons' study of the Ming bureaucracy details the effects of 
this constant competition for administrative influence: 
41The philosophical orientation of the Donglin Shuyuan is discussed 
by Busch, "The Tung-lin Shu-yuan," passim. See also the DMB entries for 
Li Zhi,I, pp. 807-817; and Wang Zhi, II, pp. 1351-1355. 
42
oMB, II, pp. 1179-1182. 
43 Hucker, "The Tung-lin Movement," p. 148. Previous to the retirement 
of Sen Yiguan opposition to the 'good elements' was aligned into three main 
factions; the Zhedang, or Zhejiang faction, the Xuandang and the Kundang. 
the downfall of the dynasty in 1644 did not occur because its 
fortunes during the previous two decades were in the hands of 
a tightly knit clique dominated oy motives of narrow self-
advantage. Rather, the fall was attended by an intensified 
and general bureaucratic chaos with officials, especially in 
top positions, oeing replaced with bewildering rapidity.44 
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This factionalism was a disease which slowly ate its way into all aspects 
of the late Ming administration 
Donglin fortunes. suffered a major setback prior to the metropolitan 
evaluation of 1611 when letters sent by Gu Xiancheng to the grand 
secretary and Donglin sympathizer, Ye Xianggao, were published in the 
Beijing Gazette, a magazine read widely in administrative circles. 45 
Thes.e letters requested Ye use his influence to support the candidature 
of another Donglin sympathizer, Li Sancai, for the Grand Secretariat 
and their publication revealed that the Donglin faction was guilty of 
the very corruption that it accused its opponents of. Both Ye Xianggao 
and Li Sancai were forced to retire. 
Administrative energy in these late Ming years was constantly 
consumed in these factional squabbles, squabbles which were personal 
rather than programme orientated. In fact, as Frederic Wakeman Jnr. 
has. noted, these factions did not formulate unique policies; rather, 
46 
"they defined themselves mainly in terms of their opponents." 
Traditionally, factions had not been favourably considered in China. 
Wakeman puts this. most succinctly when he writes of how ''Scholars alone, 
acting as individuals, were respectably impotent," while "scholars together, 
. . . 1147 
cons.tituting a fact~on, were dubJ.ously part~san. This dilemma was 
particularly acute for the Donglin faction. Having set themselves up as 
44 James Parsons, "The Ming Dynasty Bureaucracy: Aspects of Background 
Forces," in Charles 0. Hucke.r Ced.L Chinese Government in Ming Times: 
Seven Studies (N.Y., l969t, p. 224. 
45~,I, pp. 847-850. 
46 Wakeman, "The Price of Autonomy," p. 42. 
47Ibid., p. 41. 
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moral exemplars, 'good elements', they then had to re-enter the world of 
moral degeneracy, of politics and personnel conflicts, if they wished 
to realize their aims. And in re-entering that world they simply 
exacerbated the very problems they sought to resolve. The mission of 
the Donglin members was to implement a moral rejuvination of the 
administration, but every attempt they made to achieve this simply 
undermined further the existing stability and moral standing of the dynasty. 
Factions produced factionalism, not stability and order. 
Purge and Counter-purge: A disastrous decade. 
The death of the Wanli emperor in 1620 unleashed a new and especially 
bitter wave of factional conflict as the differing groups all tried to 
assert themselves in the new power structure. The Wanli emperor's son 
died within a month of ascending the throne and this brought forward 
his grandson, the Tianqi emperor (r. 1620-16271. 48 Like his grandfather 
this new emperor was unwilling to attend to administrative matters and 
left the day to day business required of the palace to his eunuch 
assistants, and this again created antagonism amongst the 'good elements'. 
At first Donglin faction appeared to benefit from the new alignment 
of power, with leading members such as Ye Xianggao, Zhao Nanxing, Li 
Sancai, Gao Panlong and Zou Yuanbiao all returning to senior administrative 
. • 49 pos~t~ons. From these senior posts they were able to institute a purge 
of their opponents in the metropolitan evaluation of 1623. The anti-
Donglin forces sought to counter Donglin dominance by gaining support 
from amongst the coterie of the emperor's eunuch advisors. Initially 
they had little success in this, but the very virulence of the Donglin 
campaign gave them the support they desired. In 1624 a junior official 
48 For biographical details on the Tianqi emperor see ECCP,I, p. 190. 
49
oMB; Ye .Xianggao, II, pp. 1567-1570; Zhao Nanxing, I, pp. 128-132; 
Gao Panlong, I, pp. 701-710; and Zou Yuanbiao, II, pp. 1312-1314. 
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and Donglin sympathizer, Yang Lian, submitted a memorial impeaching the 
emperor's closest eunuch advisor 1 Wei Zhongxian, accusing Wei of twenty-
£ . . th . 50 our cr1mes aga1nst e M1ng state. An angry Wei Zhongxian was provoked 
into taking the advice of the Donglin opponents and supported a purge of 
all Donglin members from the administration. 
As a close associate of the young Tianqi emperor, Wei Zhongxian had 
risen quickly through the eunuch heirarchy. By the time Yang Lian 
submitted his impeachment in 1624, Wei was director of ceremonies and 
supervisor of the eunuch secret service, positions which gave him 
considerable control over the administration, both through the normal 
bureaucratic channels and through the use of terror. By 1626 all those 
in any way associated with the Donglin movement had been imprisoned, 
dismissed or forced to retire, and the academy itself was destroyed. Wei 
Zhongxian has been traditionally known as one of the four eunuch dictators 
of the Ming dynasty and he has been blamed for much of the conflict of the 
period. Wei certainly occupied an important intermediary position between 
the emperor and the bureaucracy and he was given wide discretionary 
powers by the emperor. But to claim that Wei sought to dominate the 
bureaucracy through a series of purges which he himself initiated is to 
ignore the intensely factional political environment in which he had 
risen to influence. Because of his position Wei Zhongxian was a target 
of bhe outer court conflict, both for those who resented his influence 
51 
and for those who wished to use that influence to their own advantage. 
By the 1620s factionalism affected all aspects of administration, from 
county to court. It was a time, according to Mao Shilong, when the critics 
50
charles 0. Hucker, The Censorial System of Ming China (Stanford, 1966), 
pp. 200-205, gives a translation and discussion of this memorial submitted 
by Yang Lian. 
51
aucker, The Censorial System, pp. 170-174, follows the traditional 
Confucian response to WejZhongxian, seeing him as a eunuch dictator, 
primarily responsible for the turmoil of the period. By contrast" Mammitzsch 1 
"Wei Chung-hsien," passim, considers Wei to have been a weak man used by 
others, a victim of outer court factionalism. 
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in the administration outnumbered the actors. Censorial activity was 
almost three times what it had been two hundred years before and "it had 
come to be expected that censorial impeachments would have solely 
. . . 1152 part1san mot1vat1ons. Wei Zhongxian was a product of this faction-
alism, not its cause. 
The decade of the 1620s also revealed the extent to which this 
bureaucratic infighting was threatening the very security of the empire. 
The first signs of a Manchu threat from the northeast had come at the 
very end of the Wanli reign. By 1620 Nurhaci had proclaimed himself 
khan of the Chin dynasty, formally severed relations with the Ming, 
and marched his banner forces down from the Jurched tribal regions 
d th 1 . d . h . d 1 . 53 aroun e Ya u r1ver an 1nto t e L1ao ong p a1n. They took Fushan 
in 1618 and a year later defeated a combined Korean-Ming force at Sarhu; 
an estimated 45.,890 Chinese soldiers died in this conflict. 54 By 1621 
the Manchu forces had control of Shenyang, Liaoyang, Tieling and Kaiyuan. 
This rapid occupation of the Liaodong plain had demonstrated the potential 
of the Manchu military machine and it shocked Beijing into a panicked 
reaction. 
Perhaps the clearest indication of the degree of the shock felt in 
Beijing is the fact that the Wanli emperor was roused from his lassitude. 
For the first time in over twenty years he acknowledged the need to 
recruit personnel to fill those posts that had become vacant and he also 
52Hucker, The Censorial System, pp. 175-182. Comparing censorial 
activity in the Xuande reign (1425-1435} with that of the Tianqi reign 
(1620-1627) , Hucker notes the number of entries in the official chronicles 
of the earlier period amounted to less than 1,400, while those of the 
later period were in excess of 3,200. 
53Robert B. Oxnam, Ruling From Horseback: Manchu Politics in the Oboi 
Regency (Chicago, 1975), pp. 15-37; and the entry for Nurhaci in ECCP, I, 
pp. 594-599. 
54ECCP, Yang Hao, II, pp. 885-886. 
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permitted the transferral of approximately 500,000 taels. from his 
personal treasury to the Ministry of Revenue to assist with financing 
the military build-up. 55 But it was here that the problems arose. The 
differing factions lobbied to have advocates of their interests appointed 
to the frontier and launched critiques of those aligned to opposing 
factions. As in the administrative sphere, it was impossible to 
formulate coherent policy initiatives when the bureaucracy was so much 
at odds with itself. 
The policy issue upon which factional differences concentrated at 
56 this time was the conflict which surrounded Xiong Tingbi and Wang Huazhen. 
Immediately following the loss of Shenyang and Liaoyan~Xiong had been 
appointed supreme commander of northeastern military affairs. Assisting 
him was the grand coordinator of the region beyond the wall, Wang Huazhen. 
Xiong Tingbi favoured a period of consolidation, developing a defensive 
line about the fortress at Guangning, just to the north of the wall. 
Wang, by contrast, was eager to launch an offensive against the Manchus. 
He felt sure a force of some 400,000 Mongol horsemen could be relied on 
to assist the Ming armies and that together it would be possible for them 
to drive off the Manchus before they became settled in Laiodong. 
Considering the decline in administrative and military personnel that had 
resulted from the introversion of the Wanli emperor 1 Xiong's was the more 
judicious policy. And it was the policy which was favoured most by the 
"' "' 'good elements'; so much so that Xiong became known as a protege of the 
Donglin faction. In opposition to the 'good elements', most of those 
who attacked Xiong and supported Wang Huazhen were considered Weidangren, 
. f h 1' f . 57 or We~ Zhongxian party men, opponents o t e Dong ~n act~on. 
55 Huang, "Fiscal Administration 11 , p. 116. 
56~, Xiong Tingbi, I, p. 308; and Hucker, The Censorial System, 
pp. 155-157. 
57Hucker, The Censorial System, pp. 155-157. There were exceptions 
to this alignment of Donglin members behind Xiong Tingbi and its 
147. 
Wang Huazhen eventually ignored the counsel of Xiong Tingbi and 
launched his offensive. It was an unmitigated disaster. The Manchu 
force easily rebuffed Wang's army and forced it to retreat to Shanbaiguan 1 
taking the fortress at Guangning en-route. Both Wang and Xiong were held 
to account for this disaster and both were eventually executed. To a 
large extent they were victims of factionalism. Instead of a reasoned 
debate regarding the differing policies proposed, the whole issue became 
just another focus for the already intense partisan conflict. Charles 0. 
Hucker writes that the "greatest single concentration of censorial 
impeachments" during the Tianqi reign were focused on the conflict 
58 
surrounding Xiong and Wang. With an administration so disastrously 
divided it was impossible to implement a coherent and unified military 
strategy. 
The Ming administration also faced a number of lesser threats to its 
stability in the 1620s. In the southwest an uprising of aboriginal 
tribespeople which began in Sichuan in 1621 soon spread into Guizhou 
and Yunnan. The rebellion continued throughout the Tianqi period and 
at times affected the major urban centres of the region. It was not 
until the reign of the Chongzhen emperor that the rebellion was eventually 
59 put down. Western Shandong was in 1622 subject to temporary upheaval 
as Wang Haoxian and Xu Hongren led supporters of the White Lotus Sect in 
h . 60 an uprising which took the government several mont s to contaJ.n. And 
of lesser significance was the irritation the Dutch fleet commanded by 
opponents behind Wang auazhen. For instance Ye Xianggao and Zhao Nanxing 
initially supported Wang. 
58Ibid., p. 188. 
59 b'd 157 d h MB t f M Z II 1076 1079 I J. • 1 p . i an t e Q__ en ry or u eng , 1 pp • - . 
60 
· · ' eb 11' ' Ch ' Th E ' ht m ' Susan NaquJ.n, MJ.llenarJ.an R e J.on 1n J.na: e 1g ~rJ.grams 
Uprising of 1813 (New Haven, 1976) 1 p. 63, gives a brief account of the 
1622 revolt. See also the DMB entry for Xu Hongru, I, pp. 587-589, 
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Cornelius Reyertsz caused as it attempted to establish a Dutch base 
somewhere along the south China coast. The Dutch were repulsed from 
Macao by the Portuguese in 1622 and were later driven by the Chinese from 
the Pescadores to Taiwan. Ming coastal officials were also able to co-opt 
the leading pirates of this period, Li Dan and Zhang Zhilong, and thus 
61 keep the coastal region relatively peaceful. These three threats were 
of minor significance in comparison with the Manchu threat from the 
northeast, yet together they served to antagonize further an already 
disintergrating administrative structure. 
Some consolidation of the Ming position came in the mid-l620s. 
Following the retreat to Shanhaiguan in 1622 two new appointments were 
made to the frontier. The more senior was that of Sun Chengcong as 
62 
minister of war. Sun took personal charge of the defences at Shanhaiguan 
and implemented a thorough reorganization of personnel serving at the 
frontier. With the assistance of Yuan Chonghuan he applied a defensive 
strategy based around the fortress just north of the wall at Ningyuan. 
Yuan had come to the frontier earlier than Sun and he soon established 
himself as an able administrator. Assisting Sun and Yuan were a number 
63 
of competent generals, such as Man Gui and Zu Dashou. When Nurhaci 
launched his next attack in 1626 he found the Ming defences considerably 
strengthened and his Manchu force was unable to take Ningyuan. 64 
61John E. Wills Jnr., "Maritime China From Wang Chih to Shih Lang," 
in J.D. Spence and John E. Wills Jnr. (eds.), From Ming to Ch'ing: Conquest, 
Region, and Continuity in Seventeenth Century China (New Haven, 1979), 
pp. 203-237; and the DMB entry for Li Dan, I, pp. 871-874. 
62ECCP, Sun Chengcong, II, pp. 670-671. 
63 ECCP; Yuan Chonghuan, II, pp. 954-955; Ma Gui, I, pp. 561-562; and 
Zu Dashou, II, pp. 769-770. 
64 . f . th Portuguese cannon were used to good effect by the M~ng orces ~n ese 
conflicts; see ECCP, Sun Yuanhua, II, p. 686; and C.R. Boxer, "Portuguese 
Military Expeditions in Aid of the Ming Against the Manchus, 1621-1647," 
T'ien Hsia Monthly, 7 (August, 1938), pp. 24-36. 
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Another Manchu attack in early 1627 was also repulsed. These were the 
first important Ming successes against the Manchus, but they did not mark 
a turning point. Factionalism continued to eat away at Ming strength and 
by 1627 both Sun Chengcong and Yuan Chonghuan had been forced into retirement 
through frustration with the Weidangren and their obsession with purifying 
the administrative ranks of their Donglin opponents. By the time the last 
Ming emperor ascended the throne in 1627 factionalism was too deeply 
entrenched in the bureaucratic process to eradicate. It was to plague 
the Chongzhen emperor right through until his suicide in 1644. 
The End of the Dynasty 
Although only seventeen when he took the throne in 1627, the 
Chongzhen emperor immediately attempted to play an active part in 
administration, something that was no easy task after the more than 
fifty years of imperial negligence and disinterest which had preceeded 
h . 65 ~m. He had lived through the Tianqi reign and was well aware of the 
intensity of the purges and counter-purges of those years, and he was 
also aware that those ousted by the faction associated with Wei Zhongxian, 
those ousted by the Weidangren, would be the first to demand his attention, 
insisting on retribution and their own return to office. Wei Zhongxian's 
banishment from Beijing and subsequent suicide did not appease the 
remnants of the Donglin faction and they pressured the Chongzhen emperor 
to implement a thorough purge of all Weidangre~. After some initial 
hesitancy the purge came, but squabbles continued for many years over 
who should or should not have been included on the purge lists. It is 
said that the issue intensely frustrated the emperor and that "the name 
Tung-lin (nonglin] seems to have been almost as distasteful to him as was 
. h ' ( . . , ,.66 that of We~ Chung- s~en We~ Zhongx~anJ . 
65 For biographical details on the Chongzhen emperor see ECCP,I, pp.l91-192, 
66 
Hucker, The Censorial System, p. 156. 
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With a more active emperor, power in the inner court shifted back 
from the eunuch-administrators to the Grand Secretariat. This office thus 
became the focus for the differing factions as they tried to dominate the 
bureaucracy. Han Kuang, the first senior grand secretary appointed in 
the Chongzhen reign, retired from the office through frustration at the 
intensity of this partisan conflict and this allowed Wei Tiren to emerge 
th l d . f. . th d . . . 67 as e ea ~ng ~gure ~n e a m~n~strat~on. Wei Tiren created 
considerable antagonism in the offices of the outer court and in the 
outer reaches of the bureaucracy, particularly from a group called the 
Fu She. Originally formed in 1624, this body of disaffected scholars took 
over the Donglin mantle around 1630. Its;members were young, however, and 
most of their energy was directed towards examination success. Those who 
did gain official status found their attempts to obtain influential 
, " 
administrative positions frustrated by Wei Tiren and his protege and 
successor in the Grand Secretariat, Xue Guoguan. It was not until after 
Xue had been dismissed from office in 1640 that Fu She members began to 
emerge on the scene. But by this time the dynasty had entered its final 
and chaotic last years. As Williams. Atwell notes, it is difficult to 
imagine the Fu She accomplishing much in such circumstances. 68 
Despite the fact that Wei Tiren exerted considerable influence over 
administrative affairs under the Chongzhen emperor, it continued to be 
the case that no one faction was able to dominate. Officials rose and 
fell with what can only be described as disastrous frequency. In the 
period from 1621 until 1644 there were 116 different ministers appointed 
to head the six ministries, and from 1641 until 1644 eighteen different 
. d . 69 men served ~n the Gran Secretar~at. Factionalism produced a climate 
67
oMB; Han Kuang,I, pp. 483-485; and Wen Tiren, II, pp. 1474-1477. 
68
william s. Atwell, "From Education to Politics: The Fu She," in 
Wm. Theodore deBary (.ed.), The Unfolding of Nee-Confucianism (N.Y.,l975), 
pp. 333-367. 
69
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in which just the slightest hint of failure or unethical behaviour was 
sufficient to see an official removed; and when the control administrators 
exerted over the empire was diminishing daily there was no shortage of 
problems with which officials could be accused. The clamour of this 
'mouth and tongue disease'meant that it was impossible to implement 
1 . . f 1 . 'f. 70 po ~c~es o ong-term s~gn~ ~cance. In such circumstances it was 
inevitable that anarchy would intensify and Beijing would lose its 
grasp on the realm. While the Manchu forces continued to threaten from 
the northeast, rebellion and uprisings now erupted within the empire itself. 
The rebellions which erupted in Shaanxi and Shanxi provinces were a 
direct result of the political anarchy which began to infect much of 
China during the Wanli and Tianqi reigns. Localized political leadership 
in areas away from the heartland of the empire was frustrated by the 
fact that so many of the provincial, prefectural, county and district 
offices remained vacant. This problem was particularly acute in northern 
Shaanxi, where the remoteness and difficulties of the region encouraged 
administrators to abandon their posts on the slightest pretext. 
Factionalism compounded these problems as the s:enior officials of the 
province in the 1620s were known to be l~eidangren and were therefore 
opposed by their juniors who were mostly Donglin sympathizers. Officials 
were more interested in the political events of the capital than in the 
governing of the province and James Parsons has described how they were 
"extremely lax about maintaining an effective administration and a 
71 proper state of preparedness in the armed forces." The military 
strength of the empire had been in decline throughout the sixteenth century 
as soldier's pay and conditions worsened. Desertions from the frontier 
70 Hucker, The Censorial System, pp. 299-300. 
71 James Parsons, The Peasant Rebellions, p. 2. 
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military settlements were rife, wi~ soldiers taking horses and weapons 
away to establish their own private raiding parties. The desertions were 
of such an extent that by the 1570s nthe lands along the borders were 
turning into deserts''· 72 Then, to make matters worse, the senior grand 
secretary Han Kuang advised the Chongzhen emperor to discontinue the 
postal service in the remote regions of the empire in order that finance 
could be redirected to help meet the cost of the anti-Manchu campaigns. 73 
The immediate effect of this was to throw more men into unemployment, more 
men into a position where they saw little choice but to join the rebel 
bands that were springing up throughout the region, striking out and 
taking by force what they could no longer earn. By 1630 these rebel 
bands had spread their range of action through most of Shaanxi arid·into 
Shanxi. Government attempts to control them simply drove the rebels 
further east into southeastern Shanxi, southwestern Bei Zhili and Henan, 
from where they were to plague the Ming administration for the rest of 
the dynasty. 
With the rebel bands almost constantly on the move it was difficult 
for ~e Ming armies to combat them. Yet ~e main difficulty the Ming 
faced in these anti-rebel campaigns was the inability to formulate and 
implement long-term policy initiatives, a consequence of the fracturing 
administrative structure. The one and only attempt to apply a grand plan 
for the eradication of all rebel forces came when Yang Sichang was 
appointed minister of war in 1636. 74 Yang planned for a defensive force 
to encircle the rebels and then envisaged a smaller attacking force, 
operating within the defensive ring, directly confronting the rebels. 
Xiong Wencai was appointed supreme commander of the anti-rebel armies 
72 Chan, The Glory and Fall, p. 192. 
73
oMB, Han Kuang,I, p. 483-485. 
74
oMB, Yang Sichang,II, pp. 1538-1542; and Parsons, The Peasant 
Rebellions, pp. 54-58. 
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and was. given extra troops and finance to implement Yang's plan. However, 
Xiong was of a different persuasion than Yang. He preferred negotiation 
to combat, a strategy which had proved successful in his operations 
against piracy along the south China coast. 75 Parson's study of these 
last Ming rebellions leads him to conclude that there is no evidence 
that Xiong ever attempted to put Yang's plan into effect. He also notes 
that Xiong's subordinates, Hong Chengzhou and Zuo Liangyu, "went on 
operating almost entirely independently". 76 The decline of military 
strength during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries meant that the 
Ming had come to rely largely upon mercanary forces whose loyalty lay 
with individual commanders. These independent commanders had great 
difficulty in acting together. Parsons relates that Zuo Liangyu was 
on such bad terms with Xiong Wencai that he even encouraged his men to 
attack a regiment of Xiong's army. Coordinated. action against the rebels, 
such as that envisaged by Yang Sichang, was impossible in such 
circumstances. 
At the same time as policy initiatives against the rebels were 
disintergrating, Manchu campaigns of raid and plunder across the Wall 
into north China were stepped up. Abahai had succeeded Nurhaci as the 
Manchu leader in 1626 and a decade later proclaimed himself emperor of 
77 the Qing dynasty. The Qing armies conquered Korea easily in 1638, and, 
bouyed up with success, launched raids into Bei Zhili and Shandong. The 
last Ming defenses beyond the Wall had fallen to the Qing by 1643 and a 
75 DMB, Xiong Wencai,I., pp. 562-566. 
76Parsons, The Peasant Rebellions, pp. 57-58; ECCP, Zuo Liangyu,II 
pp. 761-762; and~, Hong Chengzhou,I, pp. 358-360. 
77ECCP, Abahai,I, pp. l-3. 
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full scale invasion of China seemed imminent. But then Abahai's death 
provoked a succession crisis and by the time Dorgon had established himself 
as regent to the future Shunzhi emperor (r. 1644-1661) 1 Li Zicheng had 
already led his rebel forces into Beijing. 78 
For the rebels, dynastic ambitions had come late in the piece. It 
was only once the many disparate rebel bands had coalesced into two main 
groupings, under the leadership of Li Zicheng and Zhang Xianzhong, that 
the thoughts of these leaders turned towards the Mandate of Heaven. The 
transition from plunder to politics was not easy, however, and the force 
led by Zhang Xianzhong never seriously contemplated it. 79 Zhang led 
his forces back and forth through the southern Henan, Huguang, Nan Zhili 
and Sichuan, plundering to such an extent that they devastated most of the 
countryside through which they passed. Yet Zhang was never able to 
establish a base area for his rebels and by 1644 he had been forced to 
retreat back into Sichuan. Once there he did proclaim himself emperor 
of Daxiaguo, the Great Western State, but his rule of terror destroyed 
any change of consolidating control over the province. Zhang was 
constantly opposed by the remnants of the Ming armies that remained in 
Sichuan, but it was left to the conquering Qing armies to destroy Zhang 
and his retreating rebel force in January 1647. 
The more direct threat to the political crown of the Ming came from 
the other rebel force led by Li Zicheng. These rebels had achieved a 
number of victories over the Ming armies in northern Huguang and Henan 
in the 1641-1642 period, and by 1643 had established themselves in Xi'an, 
the capital of Shaanxi province,. Here Li Zicheng proclaimed himself the 
founding prince of the Shun dynasty and in February 1644 began his march 
. . . 80 
on Be~J~ng. Ming defenses had collapsed by this time and there was 
78ECCP, Dorgon,I, pp. 215-219i and Oxnam, Ruling From Horseback, pp.39-40. 
79 Parsons, The Peasant Rebellions, pp. 147-176i and~' Zhang 
Xianzhong,I, pp. 37-38. 
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little to stop the rebel advance. In the capital, the Chongzhen emperor 
was receiving contradictory advice. Some advised fleeing to Nanjing, 
while others claimed that to leave Beijing and its nearby ancestral shrines 
would be tantamount to relinquishing the Mandate of Heaven. 81 The 
emperor felt duty bound to remain, but with the capital virtually undefended 
there was little he could do but await defeat. 
When the rebels arrived at Beijing the eunuch commander of the capital 
garrison, Ca Huashan, realizing the futility in resistance, opened the 
city's gates to them. After years of hard campaigning Li Zicheng must 
have been amazed at how easy it was to take the political heart of the 
empire. Yet the Ming decline had its roots in Beijing. Political 
malaise underlay that decline and had spread out from the capital to 
infect the rest of the empire. By 1644 there was no vigour left in the 
Ming state. And the sense of guilt and frustration at seeing the dynasty 
reduced to such a state drove the last Ming emperor to suicide. His death 
on 25 April 1644 marked the end of the Ming dynasty. 
For Li Zicheng victory proved illusory. Like his rebel compatriot, 
Zhang Xianzhong, Li found it impossible to make the transition from 
plunder to politics. A marketplace jibe well discribes Li's delemma: 
Tzu-cheng (Zicheng) hacked his way to power -
But he's not the son of heaven. 
He mounted the throne on horseback -
But not for very long. 82 
Li was unable to reign in his troops and they soon began to plunder Beijing. 
And in government Li found he did not have the necessary administrative 
. . . 1 83 lnfrastructure to assert polltlcal contra . Defeat came quickly. Upon 
80 Parsons, The Peasant Rebellions, pp. 121-127. 
81Frederic Wakeman Jnr., "The Shun Interregnum of 1644," in J.D. Spence 
and John E. Wills Jnr. (eds.), From Ming to Ch'ing: Conquest, Region, and 
Continuity in Seventeenth Century China (New Haven, 1979), p. 48. 
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learning of the rebel capture of the capital, the Ming general in charge 
of forces along the northeastern frontier, Wu Sangui, led his troops back 
from the Wall to confront Li. This allowed the Qing armies through the 
pass at Shanhaiguan and into China. Wu Sangui accepted the inevitability 
of this and aligned himself with the superior force. 84 Faced with 
this combined force Li Zicheng fled the capital, finding little support 
left in the regions through. which he had previously marched. How Li 
eventually died is unknown, but he soon became an insignificant figure 
once more. 
After the terror and uncertainty of the Shun interregnum, officials 
were glad of the Qing arrival in Beijing. The source of their guilt over 
the failure of the Ming was now in flight from the capital and they could 
thus concentrate on establishing themselves in the new govenment. The 
Qing brought to Beijing a strong military and administrative infrastructure 
which enabled control to be quickly established over the city. The 
challenge they faced was to extend that control out over the Chinese empire. 
In his article on the influential late Ming artist, Dong Qichang, 
Nelson Wu has presented us with a very useful way of envisaging the 
distinction of state and society in late Ming times. 85 Wu asks us to 
picture a dumbell-shaped area superimposed on the map of China. The 
northern end of this was the political nerve centre of the empire, with 
its heart in Beijing. Connected to it by the narrow region encompassing 
the Grand Canal was the southern sphere of the dumbell, the cultural and 
commercial world of Jiangnan. It was in this southern region that foreign 
silver made its impact, stimulating the spread of cash-cropping and petty 
84 Angela Hsi, "Wu San-kuei in 1644: A reappraisal," Journal of Asian 
Studies, 34, 2 (February, 19751, pp. 443-453. 
ssw u, "Tung Ch'i-ch'ang," pp. 262-263. 
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commodity production, both of which were at the core of the commercial 
expansion of the late Ming period. Had it not been for the wealth 
generated in this dynamic southern sphere, even though that wealth was 
not evenly spread through the empire, the combined effects of rebellion 
and Manchu invasion may well have brought the Ming dynasty to an end 
much sooner. Ni Yuanlu, the last Ming minister of revenue, noted that 
money continued to flow into the capital right up until the first month 
of 1644, and it was only in the last few years of the Chongzhen reign that 
h 1 abl h f . . 86 t e state was no onger e to support t e army rom 1ts treasur1es. 
Lack of finance was not the basic problem of the late Ming state. 
While the southern sphere of Wu '·s dumbell was expanding, out along the 
coastal sea lanes and the inland waterways of the empire, the northern 
sphere, the political world of the state, was contracting. And in 
identifying the reasons for this contraction the analysis of the seventeenth 
century scholar Huang Zongxi . 87 rema1ns most acute. Huang felt it was 
the concentration of power by the first Ming emperor in the personage 
of the throne and the abolition of the supervisory head of the bureaucracy, 
the Secretariat, which was at the heart of the problems of the late Ming 
state. The Hongwu emperor created a precedent that lay heavilyon his 
successors. Theoretically, the emperor's involvement was required in all 
aspects of day to day administration. No other person, wheth.er a senior 
grand secretary such as Zhang .;ruzheng, or a senior eunuch such as Wei 
Zhongxian, could exercise legitimately the kind of authority which the 
Hongwu emperor had reserved for the throne. Attempts to do so provoked 
accusations of .usurpation arid led to factional disputes of intense 
bitterness. And when an emperor chose not to fulfil the role demanded 
of him1 as did the Wanli and Tianqi emperors, then the distribution of 
86 Wakeman, 'The Shun Interregnum, p. 44; and Chan, The Glory and Fall, 
p. 198. 
'. 87For a discussion of the historical perspective of Huang Zangxi 
see Wm. Theodore deBary, "Chinese Despotism and the Confucian Ideal: 
A Seventeenth Century View," in J. F. Fairbank (ed.) , Chinese Thought 
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power within the administrative structure was unclear. No administrative 
body or official could legitimately claim that power. Factions evolved 
to contest control of administrative decisions and vital energy was wasted 
in nepotistic squ~bling, energy which should have been directed to the 
governing of the realm. With leadership so much at odds with itself 
dynastic decline was inevitable. This introverted political sphere 
gradually lost control of the state it was empowered to govern, allowing 
anarchy to intensify and eventually bring about the fall of Beijing itself. 
This was the tragedy of late Ming times. The intra-bureaucratic 
conflict which consumed administrative energy in these years meant that 
administrators turned their backs on the empire at a time when it was 
undergoing the most concentrated socioeconomic change since the commercial 
expansion of the Song. The Single Whip Reform and the associated 
monetization of the economy of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries underlay the commercial vigour of eighteenth century China, 
and that this commercial vigour was not experienced throughout the 
seventeenth century was not the consequence of a cut-off in supplies of 
monetary metal. It was due to a political crisis, a crisis that had its 
roots in the faction-ridden bureaucracy of Beijing. The seventeenth 
century crisis in China was first and foremost a political crisis. 
and Institutions (Chicago, 1957), pp. 163-203. 
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EPILOGUE 
This study suggests that monetary factors should always be balanced 
against what is known of the social and political climate of a particular 
period. But this does not mean that a monetary perspective is of no 
value. While China's dependence upon foreign silver was found to be 
of little consequence in the sequence of events leading up to the fall 
of the Ming dynasty in 1644, volatile monetary conditions did contribute 
to the turmoil of these years. This was something that was recognized 
by three of the most noted of seventeenth century Chinese scholars, all 
of whom wrote of the importance to the state of stable monetary conditions. 
These three scholars had all lived through the late Ming years and they 
were well aware of the hardship caused through the debasement of copper 
cash. 
Huang Zongxi included in his critique of the Ming administrative 
structure advice on the need for sound and convenient media of exchange, 
suggesting, despite his experience of the late Ming years, that paper 
1 
notes and copper cash would meet such a need, Fang Yizhi, by contrast, 
emphasized, in his essay entitled 'Proposals Concerning Monetary Policy' 
(·Qianchao yi, 1643), that it was vital to establish the credibility of 
any currency and advised against simply ordering people "to regard 
2 
sheets of paper as valuable". Huang recommended that the use of both 
gold and silver as monetary media be prohibited and Fang similarly warned 
of the increased use of silver in the late Ming years, particularly as 
it circulated as bullion and was therefore difficult for an administration 
to control. Yet Fang recognized that when confidence in the government's 
1de Bary, "Chinese Despotism," p. 192. 
2Peterson, Bitter Gourd, pp. 74-76. 
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coinage was eroded it was inevitable that people would prefer to use 
the more stable silver bullion. He stressed the importance of an active 
mint policy in establishing sound monetary conditions. Similarly, Gu 
Yanwu, in his essay 'On the Coinage System' (Qianfu lu~), was of the 
opinion that "as long as the government continued to mint coins without 
accepting them in payment of taxes, copper cash could not be accepted 
in the market at face value and consequently people suffered and the 
3 
state was weakened." 
While none of these three reputable scholars served with the Qing 
administration, the concerns they expressed were reflected in the active 
monetary policy of the new regime. On coming to power the Qing adopted 
the same bimetallic currency system as was in use in the late Ming years, 
accepting silver as a currency but not attempting to cast it as coinage. 
Thus, the new administration had to manipulate the cash sector of its 
currency system if it was to achieve stable monetary conditions and 
bring prices down from the very high levels reached in the 1640s. This 
it did. Between 1644 and 1734 the weight of the copper coins was changed 
six times, the composition twice, and the quotas required of the mints 
three times. Besides this, provincial mints were opened and closed as 
the administration responded to the fluctuating supply of monetary metal 
and the changing demands of the regional economies. The principal 
objective underlying these adjustments was the desire to maintain a 
stable copper/silver exchange rate and in this the Qing were largely 
successful. By the 1680s the actual rate was close to the ideal of 1,000 
cash per silver tae1. 4 Prices fell fairly consistently until the 1680s, 
when, with order restored to the realm, the Chinese empire entered a new 
3
willard J. Peterson, "The Life of Ku Yen-wu Cl613-l682) ,I," Harvard 
Journal of Asiatic Studies, 28 (1968), p. 137. 
4King, Money and Monetary Policy, pp. 136. 
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phase of political stability, enabling economic growth to extend throughout 
5 the eighteenth century. 
What is most notable about the success of the monetary policy of the 
early Qing is that it was achieved at a time when supplies of monetary 
metal were at the lowest they had been for the entire seventeenth century. 
Domestic mining, always limited during the century, was at a standstill 
through the years of dynastic transition and foreign silver was becoming 
increasingly scarce. Yet the Qing administration was willing to give 
priority to political factors over monetary ones. Between 1661 and 1684 
the 'maritime prohibitions' (haijin) which were implemented to bring 
pressure to bear on the Ming loyalist forces of the Zheng 'family' 
network based on Taiwan saw ports closed and ships forbidden to leave 
the Chinese shore. To ensure the policy was effective the coastal 
population was withdrawn many miles inland. 6 Chinese junks which had 
sailed to Manila and Nagasaki to procure supplies of silver and copper 
were no longer able to do so. Yet despite this, the Qing administration 
still managed to create far more stable monetary conditions than what 
had prevailed in the late Ming years when Japanese copper and an 
unprecedented volume of Japanese and Spanish-American silver had flowed 
into the Chinese empire. No doubt the Qing had learned from the mistakes 
of the late Ming, yet the major reason for this difference in success 
with monetary policy must lie with the general character of the 
administrations themselves. The seventeenth century Qing was a young 
and vigorous administration, whereas in late Ming times the administration 
had been riddled through with factionalism, beset with lassitude, and 
was incapable of taking the kind of policy initiatives which the Qing did. 
5
wang Yeh-chien, "The Secular Trend of Prices During the Ch~ing Period 
(1644-19111," Journal- Institute of Chinese Studies- Chinese University 
of Hong Kong, 5, 2(1972), pp. 345-368; and Ch'uan, "Mei-chou pai-yin," for 
an investigation of the relationship of imported silver and prices in 
eighteenth century China. 
6
asieh, "Removal of the Coastal Population." 
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This does not mean, of course,that the Qing could have survived 
indefinitely without allowing monetary metal to be imported to the 
empire. Even with its active monetary policy the shortage of coin and 
bullion was beginning to produce considerable strain by the 1680s and 
pressure was building for a relaxation of the maritime prohibitions. 
Wang Yuyang was one of a number of officials who advised the throne 
of the urgent need to obtain supplies of Japanese copper and Mi Tianyuan 
warned in a memorial submitted in 1681 of the hardship caused by a 
d . dl' f '1 . . 1 t. 7 w1n 1ng amount o S1 ver 1n c1rcu a 1on. Mu felt that the foreign 
trade which brought in silver enriched the empire and was great stimulus 
to domestic production. Where was the logic, he asked, in erecting a 
dam in the river but still wanting the water to flow? Such advice was 
well received by the Kangxi administration (1661-1722), and with the 
conquest of Taiwan in 1683 the maritime prohibitions were lifted and 
foreign trade encouraged. By 1686 more than one hundred junks were 
bound for Nagasaki laden with silks and sugar, intent on profiting 
by obtaining the monetary metal which the empire so urgently required. 
Similarly, trade through Manila began to increase once more. And as 
Mu Tianyuan had remarked, the stimulus this trade was to give the 
Chinese economy was considerable. 
However, this need to import monetary metal to supply its bimetallic 
currency system reveals a vulnerability in the pre-modern Chinese 
economy which. was to be of long-term significance. By the 1740s 
production from the Yunnanese copper mines had increased to the extent 
that these mines were able to supply all the copper the Chinese economy 
. d 8 requ1re . But this did not occur with silver. China remained dependent 
upon overseas sources for its silver requirements throughout the 
sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It was 
7 Ch'uan, "Mei-chou pai-yin," p. 541 gives details of this memorial 
submitted by Mu Tianyuan; and Hall, "Notes," p. 452 comments on the 
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this dependency which Fernand Braudel had in mind when he suggested 
that it was the 'bombarding' of Asia's gates with silver that enabled 
Europe to gain access to a world "which otherwise would have been firmly 
9 
closed." 
Braudel's terminology is perhaps too Eurocentric in its bias. 
European traders did have the good sense to carry precious metals of 
Spanish-American origin to Asia, but they did not have to 'bombard' 
resisting Asian states with this metal. The expansion of the economies 
of the Indian Subcontinent, China and Japan demanded that an increasing 
1o 
volume of monetary metal circulate through them. Delmer M. Brown 
has detailed the sixteenth century increase in output of monetary metal 
from Japanese mines and she, amongst others, has shown how an increase 
in economic activity in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
ab bdth'' 1 f .,, .. 1' 11 sor e e vast new supp y o co1.ns 1.n c1.rcu at1.on. In the 
Indian Subcontinent, silver use extended south from the Mughal territories, 
where the rupee dominated in a trimetallic currency system, into Golconda 
and Maharashtra during the seventeenth century, and Frank Perlin has 
given eloquent testimony to the increasing demand for the more 'huffiQle' 
monetary media, copper and cauri~, in the Subcontinent throughout the 
,, th . 12 late seventeenth and e1.ghteen centur1.es. 
concern expressed by Wang Yuyang. 
8 ' 
Hall, "Notes," p. 458. 
9Braudel, Th,e Wheels of Commerce, p. 200. 
While in China, we know 
10 The monetary and economic conditions in Southeast and Central Asia 
are not considered here. 
11Brown, Money Economy, p. 97; see also Kobata, "The Production and 
Uses"; Sydney Crawcour, "The Development of Credit in Seventeenth-Century 
Japan," Journal of Economic History, 21, 3 (September, 1961L pp. 342-360; 
Kozo Yamamura, "Returns on Unification: Economic Growth in Japan, 1550-
1650," in John Witney Hall, Nagahara Keiji and Kozo Yamamura (eds.), 
Japan Before Tokugawa: Political Consolidation and Economic Growth, 1500 to 
1650 (New Jersey, 1981), pp. 327-372; and William B. Hauser, Economic 
in;titutional Change in Tokugawa Japan: Osaka and the Kinai Cotton Trade 
(Cambridge, 1974), pp. 7-23. 
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of the commercial expansion of the late Ming years and the increased 
demand for monetary media which that had created. 
But of these three regions, Japan was the only one with sufficient 
reserves of monetary metal to supply its own currency requirements. China 
continued to import silver, while the Indian Subcontinent imported 
copper, cauris, silver and gold. Japanese mines provided some of this 
monetary metal, at least for part of the seventeenth century, but over 
the long-term it was European traders who provided both India and China 
with the monetary metal they required, and with silver in particular. 
Thus Frank Perlin is on firm ground when he argues that "local regional 
growth facilitated the establishment of European commerce in Asia 
~xcepting, of course, in Japan], and, 1 seen more widely, formed part of 
the preconditions for the development of a system of international 
exchanges and dependencies in which Europe established an increasing 
13 hegemony." 
The uniqueness of Japan as compared with other Asian economies is a 
. . . 14 . 
subJect that demands cons~derable scholarly attent~on. The quest~on 
of why it was that Japan was able to modernize in a way which China and 
12
rrfan Habib, "The Currency System of the Mughal Empire, (1556-1707) ," 
Medieval India Quarterly (Aligarh) , 4 (1961) , pp. 1-21; and Habib's section, 
"The Monetary System and Pric:es,'' in Tapan Raychaudhuri and Irfan Habib 
Ceds.), The Cambridge Economic History of India, I (Cambridge, 1982), 
pp. 360-381; as well as Frank Perlin, "Money Use in Late Pre-Colonial India 
and the International Trade in Currency Media," in J.F. Richards (eds). 
Imperial Monetary Systems in Early Modern India (Oxford, forthcoming) . 
13Frank Perlin, "Proto-Industrialization and Pre-Colonial South Asia," 
Past and Present, 98 (February, 1983), p. 89. 
14For a comparison of development in China and Japan see Frances V. 
Moulder, Japan, China and the modern world economy (Cambridge, 1977); 
and for the contrast of India and Japan see the recent article by B.R. 
Tomlinson, "Writing History Sideways: Lessons for Indian Economic 
Historians from Meiji Japan," Modern Asian Studies, 19, 3 (1985), pp. 669-
698. 
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India could not has lead many scholars back from an initial concentration 
upon what was important about the Meiji period to a search for this 
15 
uniqueness in Japan's pre-modern roots. Yet what is often overlooked 
in these studies, and is something that arises from our monetary 
perspective, is the fact that Japan did not depend in pre-modern times 
upon European traders for its supply of monetary metal, whereas China 
and India did. Indeed, there would not have been such a 'secluded' 
and isolated Tokugawa Japan had it not been for the fact that its precious 
metal reserves were sufficient to supply an expanding domestic economy. 
Japan was independent of European traders in this sense, which explains, 
at least in par~ why there was not the same degree of European intrusion 
into its economy and polH:y as subsequently occurred in both China and 
India. 
The evidence presented in this thesis leads to the conclusion that 
we cannot agree with S.A.M. Adshead's suggestion that China's seventeenth 
century crisis was "related to disturbances in the world monetary system," 
yet the importance he placed on China's dependence upon foreign supplies 
f '1 . d 16 o s1 ver must not be 1gnore • As long as the balance of trade 
remained in China's favour, as it did until the 1820s, this dependence 
gave little cause for concern. But when imports of opium increased to 
such. an extent that the silver used to pay for the drug exceeded the 
volume of the metal entering the empire through legal trade, the 
precariousness of this dependence was immediately revealed. Wang Yejian 
has described how this sudden and increasing loss of silver created, by 
the mid-nineteenth century, "a severe monetary crisis that not only 
brought down prices sharply but also had the devastating effects of 
increasing th.e tax burden of the people and cutting down business 
15A good example of such research is J.I. Nakamura, "Human Capital 
Accumulation in Premodern Rural Japan/'Journal of Economic History.' 
41, 2 (June 1981)_, pp. 263-281. 
16Adshead, "The Seventeenth Century General Crisis in China," p.272. 
activities of all kinds." 17 
The deflationary effects of this loss of silver were· exacerbated 
by the fall in the value of silver as compared with gold throughout 
the nineteenth century, particularly once the European powers adopted 
166. 
a gold standard. Commercially this put China at a distinct disadvantage 
to the Europeans, who were intruding more extensively into its economy 
at this time. It also meant that the indemnities imposed with the 
unequal treaties became an even more onerous burden. China had for 
centuries profited from its foreign trade. Yet the dependence upon 
foreign silver which underlay this trade meant that China was exposed 
to aggressive and powerful European traders in a way which Japan, 
without the need for imported monetary metal, was not. While it is 
again necessary to emphasize that such monetary factors need to be 
balanced against the broader social and political events of the time, 
a much stronger case can be made for the importance of China's 
vulnerability to a wider world economy in the early decades of the 
nineteenth century than was so for the late Ming years. 
Seville was not, for the East Asian sphere at least, the centre of 
a world monetary system in the early decades of the seventeenth century. 
Japan had its own reserves of monetary metal and China drew on these 
as well as the Spanish~American silver. Thus, the decline of imports 
of monetary metal to Seville did not automatically signify the decline 
of a world monetary system, or an ensuing crisis in China similar in 
nature to that of Spain. China's mid-seventeenth century crisis was 
essentially political in nature, unrelated to events in Europe at the 
time, and although China was becoming increasingly dependent upon the 
17
wang, "The Secular Trend of Prices," p. 366. 
trade of European merchants, ~e consequences of this were not to be 
felt for another two hundred years. 
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APPENDIX 
Currencies and Weights 
China: 1 tael 1 liang = 0.0378 kgs. of silver. 
Japan: 1 kan = 1,ooo monme tmommel = 3.76 kgs. 
"' 1 kin = 16 ·ryo , or approximately equal to 0.258 kgs. 
mai 
; 
1 = 10 ryo, approximately equal to 0.1615 kgs. 
Dutch: 1 florin <guilder) = 20 stuivers, approximately equal to 
0.01 kgs of silver. 
Portuguese: 1 quintal, approximately equal to 50 kgs. 
Spanish: 
Indian: 
Russian: 
SOURCES: 
1 pi:cul = 1oocatties = 60.48 kgs. 
1 cruzado, a unit of account, taken to be generally 
equivalent to 1 pesos de a ocho in Asia. 
1 peso de a ocho (272 maravedis) = 0.025561 kgs. of pure 
silver. 
1 rupee = 0.01133 kgs. of silver. 
1 pood , approximately equal to 21.5 kgs, 
Boxer, The Great Ship, pp. 335-342. 
Sumiya Mikio and Tarra Koji, An Outline of Japan's Economic 
History, 1603-1940 (Toykyo, 1979), pp. 53-55. 
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Te Paske, "New World Silver," p. 440. 
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